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A note from the editors 
This collection of essays originated in the Summer School ‘Metaphysics 
or Modernity?’, which was held at the University of Bamberg in August 
2012. Designed as a forum for graduate students in philosophy, the 
Summer School brought together a highly diverse group of young 
academics who – more often than not – came from utterly different 
schools and traditions of thought.  
This pluralism is reflected in the pages of this book. While the volume is 
roughly divided into two halves – one with a more historical focus, the 
other with a more systematic focus – the reader will find an unusually 
wide array of topics and questions treated here. Since the 
aforementioned pluralism was one of the main strengths of our 
Summer School, this is something in which we take much pride. 
Neither this collection of essays nor the Summer School itself would 
have been possible without the generous support of both the Philosophy 
Department at the University of Bamberg and the German Academic 
Exchange Service (DAAD). In particular, Christian Schäfer and Christian 
Illies have spent numerous hours discussing our project with us, 
navigating administrative difficulties and giving valuable advice or 
encouragement. To them – as well as to all our colleagues who were 
willing to publish their work in this collection – we owe heartfelt thanks.  
Simon Baumgartner, Sebastian Krebs and Thimo Heisenberg 

Contents 
Modernity, Metaphysics, and the Re-Invention of 
Philosophy – A Short Historical Introduction 
Christian Schäfer 
page 1 
Historical & Contemporary Perspectives 
1 John Locke’s Contemporaries’ Reaction against the 
Theory of Substratum 
Mihretu P. Guta 
9 
2 Metaphysics in the work of Charles Darwin 
Bárbara Jiménez Pazos 
29 
3 The Puntel-Whitehead Method for Philosophy 
Benjamin Andrae 
45 
4 On Rudolf Carnap’s Aufbau and its Interpretations 
Rafał Wodzisz & Piotr Lipski 
63 
5 Stroud’s Dissatisfaction with Kant 
Elvira Basevich 
79 
6 I Can’t Get No (Metaphysical Dis-)satisfaction! – 
Why I’ll be satisfied with my metaphysical conquests 
Carly Minsky 
95 
7 Skepticism, Invulnerability and Epistemological 
Dissatisfaction 
Chris Ranalli 
113 
8 A Trip to the Metaphysical Jungle – How Kripke’s 
Intuitions Revived Aristotelian Essentialism 
Sebastian Krebs 
149 
9 Natural Kind Terms and the Necessary A Posteriori 
Adriana Pavic 
161 
10 Consistency as a tool for interpreting the Philosophical 
Investigations 
Leon Weber 
179 
Systematic Perspectives 
11 On a favorite example in metaphysics: Are the 
heuristics of science a threat to metaphysics? 
Mads Goddiksen 
187 
12 Understanding the Dispute between Science and 
Metaphysics 
Shao-Pu Kang 
205 
13 Thirsting for a world: the permeating presence of 
metaphysics in Epistemology 
Jesus Moreno   
217 
14 On the Prospects for Naturalism 
Nicholas Tebben 
235 
15 Quine, Putnam, and the naturalization of metaphysics 
Sander Verhaegh 
249 


Modernity, Metaphysics, and the Re-Invention of Philosophy 
– A Short Historical Introduction
Prof. Christian Schäfer  
(University of Bamberg) 
There seemed to be something like a broad consensus in 20th century 
philosophy that metaphysics corresponded to a ‘premodern’, and hence, 
obsolete, way of thinking. This consensus reflected a more general anti-
metaphysical sentiment in the sciences, social life, and theology. But 
even if we leave aside the fact that this purported consensus presupposes 
a dubious way of looking at epoch-making and history altogether and a 
somewhat poor philosophy of history, and although in contemporary 
philosophy this consensual view seriously appears to crumble: the 
consensus on metaphysics’ incompatibility with modern thought still 
shows what can be considered a continuing standard notion concerning 
metaphysics and the self-conception of modern man. As a matter of fact, 
metaphysical thinking is widely believed to have been supplanted by a 
more effective or less gullible way of thinking sometime during the 17th 
or 18th century. The result of this historical development in philosophy is 
that every philosopher who, in spite of the prevailing consensus, wants 
to do metaphysics today has to meet the challenge posed by the anti-
metaphysical sentiment in philosophy.  
The challenge consists of two components. First, one’s metaphysical 
position must address the anti-metaphysical consensus (an awkward 
task, since it is difficult to define it neatly), and account for what enables 
one to pursue metaphysics in the face of it. In other words, one must 
explain why one thinks that the longstanding criticism of metaphysics 
does not invalidate metaphysical thinking, but should have had a 
cathartic effect on doing metaphysics. Second, and partly dependent on 
the reply to the first problem, contemporary metaphysics has to tackle an 
even more demanding task: it has to explain and vindicate its concept of 
philosophy, for the question of metaphysics has always been one 
concerning the way philosophy as a whole is conceived of. 
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Both these challenges converge at a certain point. Every criticism of 
metaphysics presupposes a certain concept of the metaphysical and its 
value for philosophy, and in turn this is liable to influence and, as the 
case may be, to re-define what is conceived of as ‘metaphysical’ (i.e., the 
material and the formal object of metaphysics). In this introduction, I 
therefore evaluate how these two problems, or rather clusters of 
problems, present themselves in the philosophical currents that in the 
course of centuries shaped the consensus on metaphysics as 
‘premodern’ thinking. I thus consider the question of ‘metaphysics and 
modernity’ from a historical viewpoint in order to give an idea of the 
decisive currents of the anti-metaphysical consensus. The first problem 
concerns understanding the prevailing patterns of anti-metaphysical 
sentiment during the last three hundred years or so and the difficulty of 
discerning which conception of metaphysics underlies these patterns. 
The second problem concerns the related issue of the transformations of 
metaphysical conceptions and conceptions of metaphysics resulting 
from the anti-metaphysical sentiment in the history of Western 
philosophy. Due to space constraints, I limit myself to what I believe are 
the three most influential philosophical ‘schools’ of anti-metaphysical 
criticism, and after explaining their basic ideas, I attend to the question 
of how each of them contributed to a specifically ‘modern’ criticism of 
metaphysics. 
1. Transcendentalising the subject and ‘de-transcendentising’ the 
metaphysical 
Philosophers have traditionally distinguished metaphysics into ‘general’ 
and ‘special’ metaphysics. The latter speculates about the nature of God 
(‘being as such’ in a definitive acceptation), the soul, providence etc., 
whereas the former considers the basic structure of reality (‘being as 
such’ in a fundamental acceptation); questions about substance, essence, 
categories, the status of universals and individuals, etc., are paramount 
here. From the 16th century on, Protestant thinkers in particular 
(admittedly relying on longstanding, but, until then, rather 
underrepresented theological traditions) tended to view ‘special 
metaphysics’ as falling below acceptable standards of ‘rationality.’ They 
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held that religious truths were attainable by scripture alone, as the 
‘formal principle’ of Protestantism maintained, and by faith alone, as the 
‘material principle’ of Protestantism stated. This was part of their effort 
to ‘purge’ religion from philosophy and from natural theology. 
Accordingly, in a move that can be considered the first serious attempt 
to confine metaphysics to the ‘premodern’, philosophers like Christian 
Wolff accented the difference between ‘special’ and ‘general’ 
metaphysics. For him, ‘metaphysics’ meant metaphysica specialis and 
was devoid of any entitlement to philosophical rationality, whereas 
‘general metaphysics’ he renamed ‘ontology.’ This re-conceptualisation 
kept general metaphysics – alias ‘ontology’ – philosophically afloat for 
some time yet. As a consequence, the term ‘metaphysics’ was assigned 
almost exclusively to private, mostly irrational convictions, mystical 
insights, and the sensitive issues touching on scriptural truths and other 
supposedly rationally unaccountable matters. This left ‘metaphysical 
thinking’ to such seemingly outré domains as alluded to by Woody 
Allen’s famous joke “I was thrown out of N.Y.U. my freshman year for 
cheating on my metaphysics final, you know. I looked within the soul of 
the boy sitting next to me.” 
The dichotomy between general and special metaphysics and the 
disparagement of the latter culminated in what is generally called the 
‘subjective turn’ of modernity. From the 16th century onward, a novel 
inwardness characterized modern piety and considerably influenced the 
estimation of metaphysics. Ontology, on the other hand, awaited its own 
subjective turn that would reduce the transcendent to the 
transcendental, and transfer the basic structuring of reality to 
psychological preconditions. Although he had not intended to abolish 
metaphysical thinking altogether, it was Kant who brought about this 
subjective turn with his ‘critical philosophy.’ In his Prolegomena to Any 
Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Come Forward as Science, he 
reduces the question “how is metaphysics possible at all (as a science)?” 
to the question “how is cognition from pure reason possible?”. Kant’s 
‘preliminaries’ or ‘prerequisites’ for all future metaphysics contend that 
the ‘thing in itself’ (i.e., reality considered as such) cannot be an object of 
philosophical scrutiny. According to Kant, we must begin to conceive of 
reality quoad nos, as we ‘phenomenologically’ experience it and as we 
are capable of critically understanding it. In Kant’s transcendental 
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dismissal of the thing in itself, anything that ‘transcends’ the subject 
belongs to a rationally unaccountable ‘beyond’, and thus, the objects of 
general metaphysics – as the objects of special metaphysics before – 
were ‘sent to kingdom come,’ to the realm of the rationally 
unaccountable. Accordingly, after Kant, the problems of ‘general 
metaphysics’ or of what once was ontology shifted almost exclusively to 
questions about (human) cognition, the mind-body problem, human 
autonomy and the like. In order to be philosophically acceptable, the 
traditional field of ‘general metaphysics’ dissolved into an analysis of the 
subject’s cognitive makeup – its irreducibility, its range, and its possible 
function as a source of normativity. 
2. Logic, empiricism, and logical empiricism 
Whatever the definition of ‘metaphysics’ may be, its standard 
acceptation certainly seems to presuppose that metaphysics describes 
and deals with certain basic structures subjacent to reality which a) are 
rational and logically coherent but b) transcend or precede the realm of 
human experience and the phenomenological. This is in perfect 
agreement with the traditional main topics of metaphysical thought, e.g. 
universals, categories, God, questions of essence, potentiality, aprioristic 
knowledge, or human liberty. In its heyday during the first half of the 
20th century, the criticism of metaphysics zeroed in on both these 
aspects of traditional metaphysics. Logical empiricists, some of them 
emerging from neo-Kantian currents, others from post-Hegelian 
schools, held and explicated a positivist view that constrained all 
knowledge to experientially verifiable empirical perception (as its 
‘material principle’: by empiricism) on the one side, and everything 
logically analyzable (as its ‘formal principle’: by logic alone) on the other. 
Metaphysical statements, logical empiricists assert, do not pertain to 
either of these two realms or sources of knowledge (in the wider ambit 
of these thinkers philosophers like Wittgenstein or Russell, along with 
the mainstream of analytic philosophy, held occasionally different, but 
quite comparable views). Accordingly, logical empiricism saw the role of 
philosophy predominantly, if not solely, in explaining how to reconcile 
logical (or, as the case may be, mathematical) truths and methods with 
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the empirical sciences and their results. It was in contention to this 
confinement of philosophy and to the basic tenets and discussions of 
logical empiricism that the new interest of analytical philosophy in 
metaphysics arose. Saul Kripke’s writings on modal logics are but one 
famous example of how logical empiricism’s critique of metaphysical 
thinking has been challenged successfully in the 20th century. 
3. Continental ‘existentialism’
The project of re-inventing philosophy to the detriment of metaphysics 
is even more palpable in existential thought, stemming from Nietzsche 
and – via Kierkegaard and Heidegger – culminating in the likes of 
Camus and Sartre. If in the context of anti-metaphysical thought, in 
post-Kantian 19th century mainstream philosophy and logical 
empiricism ‘re-invention’ meant to ‘re-conceive’ philosophy in an 
attempt to re-define it in such a way as to show that it had nothing or 
little in common with the dark ages of metaphysical philosophy, 
Nietzsche launched, and Heidegger intensified, an attack on 
metaphysical thinking where ‘re-inventing’ meant to ‘re-discover’ 
philosophy, assuming that philosophy had been led astray since the 
times of Plato, or even before, and alleging that the different forms and 
systems of metaphysical thinking were exactly what accounted for the 
wrong track of philosophy in history. According to them, traditional 
metaphysics had been a ‘new’ kind of philosophy that had betrayed ‘true 
philosophy.’ They called for a rediscovery of what philosophy had 
originally been – and should be again. With its famous adage – 
“existence precedes essence” – the existentialist movement – despite the 
serious doctrinal differences between its exponents – advocated a 
reorientation of philosophy that abjured traditional metaphysical 
concepts such as essence and the category of the universal. It instead 
tried to ground our understanding of Being from a non-systematic 
consideration of human existence and its imponderabilia. In 
existentialism’s anti-metaphysical creed, it is the individual’s 
consciousness (to avoid the term ‘intellect’ or ‘reason’) that produces 
values and determines meaning in an absurd world devoid of it and any 
rational coherence. According to Heidegger, for example, a 
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‘fundamental ontology’ is called for that substitutes traditional 
‘transcendentals’ with what he calls ‘existentals.’ He advocates that 
philosophy illuminate our pre-reflective understanding of the world and 
of the human condition by meditating on metaphysically ‘unspoiled’ 
everyday meanings of concepts such as time, being, death, possibility, 
and thinghood. He claims that his philosophy offers a more primordial 
approach to the question of being (Sein) through an analysis of being 
human (Dasein) than classical metaphysics, and other existentialists did 
likewise, everyone in his own fashion.  
This brief historical survey, streamlined as it may be, demonstrates 
at least one thing: The criticism of metaphysics always presupposes a 
‘thick’ conception of the metaphysical, and the forms of ‘new 
metaphysics’ have a symbiotic relationship with anti-metaphysical 
criticism evident in the recent history of Western philosophy. A 
historical survey like the one given above can clarify the quality of this 
criticism up to a certain point: Criticism of metaphysics has a long 
tradition in philosophy. But generally, it has always been either more 
radical or less general than the kind of criticism that has culminated in 
the standard dismissal of metaphysics as ‘premodern.’ Consider the 
Pyrrhonist attack on metaphysical thought that resulted in a skeptical 
attitude towards rational explanations, or the nominalist ‘anti-
metaphysics within metaphysics’ in the dispute over universals. Hardly 
any of this is found in the criticisms of metaphysical thinking in 
modernity. The problem of ‘metaphysics and modernity’ is historically 
considered a meta-philosophical problem, one that is sui generis and 
aims at banning and abolishing, rather than quarreling or arguing with, 
metaphysical thinking. Forms of criticism that declare that metaphysics 
is a premodern way of thinking claim that metaphysics is a way of 
reasoning that does not apply to our (that is, currently prevailing) way of 
thinking, and that it does not comply with our (that is, prevailing 
‘normal scientific’) acceptance of the rational. They dismiss metaphysics 
as non-philosophical. Therefore, in contrast to the attack on 
metaphysical thinking launched by, say, Ockham or Hume, the different 
contemporary approaches that we label ‘criticism of metaphysics’ do not 
aim at particular metaphysical tenets. This is true regardless of the fact 
that every type of criticism of metaphysics focuses on a certain type of 
metaphysics, as it seems to target a specific form or variety of 
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metaphysical theory, or stems from a specific doctrinal controversy with 
a particular school of metaphysical thinking: For example, the Protestant 
pre-Kantian thought took on scholastic Aristotelianism and the 
existentialists on traditional metaphysical essentialism – let alone the 
fact that in their alleged ‘demolition of metaphysics’ Kant’s critical 
philosophy and other idealists’ philosophical projects resemble 
Neoplatonic thinking and its very metaphysical, basic convictions to a 
great extent. But this should not distract us from the fact that all 
attempts to dismiss metaphysics as a ‘premodern’ way of thinking, 
despite their particular quarrelling with certain forms or schools of 
metaphysical thought, nonetheless rely on the conviction that 
philosophy as a whole has to be redefined and that within that definition 
of philosophy there is no place left for metaphysical thinking, neither in 
its acceptance as special metaphysics nor as general metaphysics. 
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John Locke’s Contemporaries’ Reaction 
against the Theory of Substratum 
Mihretu P. Guta 
(Durham University) 
The goal of this paper is to critically examine the objections of John 
Locke’s contemporaries against the theory of substance or 
substratum. Locke argues in Essay that substratum is the bearer of 
the properties of a particular substance. Locke also claims that we 
have no knowledge of substratum. But Locke’s claim about our 
ignorance as to what substratum is, is contentious. That is, if we don’t 
know what substratum is, then what is the point of proposing it as a 
bearer of properties? This question underlies the criticism Locke’s 
contemporaries raise against the notion of substratum. In section I, I 
lay out the context for Locke’s theory of substratum by pointing out 
his main motivation in proposing his theory. In section II, I give a 
brief analysis of the theory of substratum. In section III, I discuss the 
objections of Locke’s contemporaries against the theory of 
substratum.1 I focus on Edward Stillingfleet, Lee Henry, G. W. 
Leibniz and John Sergeant. In section IV, I conclude that there is no 
warrant to dismiss Locke’s theory of substance.
1. The Need for Substratum
Locke’s proposal of the theory of substratum aims at answering one key 
question. That is, do properties (e.g., color) or qualities need bearers? As 
we shall see, Locke answers this question affirmatively. But how does 
Locke go about the task of accounting for the bearer of properties? How 
does he describe it? Does the supposed property bearer have its own 
nature, i.e., its own identity via which we come to know what it is? Does 
Locke have a uniform and uncontentious way to characterize his theory 
of substratum? Such questions are still hotly debated and disagreements 
over what constitutes the right answer to them are far from over.2  
1 For dialectical purposes, in section I, I consider the first objection against Locke’s theory 
of substratum. In doing so, I will pave the way for my discussion of the other objections in 
section III.  
2 Both David Hume and George Berkeley dismissed Locke’s theory of substratum (see: 
Lowe 1995: 83-87). But contemporary Locke scholars proposed a number of interesting 
ways to amend the contentious aspect of Locke’s substratum. Due to space limitations, we 
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What is a substance? Locke answers this question by pointing out 
the role of senses and reflections (Essay Book II, chap. XXIII).3 Locke 
claims that the mind is furnished with a number of simple ideas or 
qualities, which are found in ‘exterior things.’ But what is the source of 
these simple ideas? Locke claims that such simple ideas are obtained via 
the senses. Furthermore, for Locke, the mind on its own operations is 
capable of noticing the unity of qualities, i.e., such qualities ‘go 
constantly together’ in experience (Essay II, XXIII. 1). So such unity 
observed in simple ideas, is often attributed as belonging to one thing, 
even describing it under one name. But for Locke, what is being 
understood as one simple idea is rather a combination of many ideas 
(Ibid.). However, here we need to keep in mind that even if Locke 
considers an idea as subjective mental phenomenon (e.g., see Essay II, 
VIII. 8), his use of the term ‘idea’ is not always fixed. That is, Locke also 
uses the term ‘idea’ to refer to a quality of a subject existing external to 
the mind which produces a particular idea in our mind (see further 
Lowe 1995:19-22). 
Locke tells us that the notion of the unity we observe in simple ideas 
forces us to ask a question. That is, what enables these simple ideas, i.e., 
qualities of a physical object to stay in unity? More precisely, what 
underlies such unity? Initially, Locke’s answer for this question may 
come across both as arbitrary and ad hoc. For example, Locke claims that 
simply because we cannot make sense of how qualities or simple ideas 
can subsist by themselves, we tend to assume that something grounds 
them or supports them. As Locke states:  
...not imagining how these ideas can subsist by themselves, we accustom our 
selves, to suppose some substratum, wherein they do subsist, and from which 
they do result, which therefore we call substance (Essay II, XXIII. 1).  
will not be able to discuss the proposed solutions. However, towards the end of this essay, I 
will say something very brief in regards to the implications of the contemporary 
philosophers’ attempt to amend Locke’s substratum. While there are so many issues one 
can raise in relation to Locke’s theory of substratum, for present purposes, the focus of this 
essay is narrow and is limited only to some of the issues Locke’s four contemporary critics 
raise.  
3 Unless indicated otherwise, all references of the Essay are from: John Locke, An Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter H. Nidditch (Clarendon: Oxford University 
Press, 1975). 
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Here some take Locke’s remarks at face value and think that Locke’s 
proposal of substratum as the bearer of sensible qualities is just a place 
holder. That is, its significance lies only in helping one make sense of 
the underlying ground for the unity of qualities whether or not the idea 
of substance itself is real. Commenting on the above quote, Alexander 
Campbell Fraser suggests: 
The expressions ‘not imagining how’—‘we accustom ourselves to suppose’ 
seem to refer to our idea of substance to ‘imagination’ and ‘custom,’ instead of 
finding it implied in the very intelligibility of experience; for although ‘custom’ 
may explain our reference of such and such ‘simple ideas’ or qualities to such 
and such particular substances, it does not show the need in reason for 
substantiating them, in order to conceive that they are concrete realities (in 
Fraser, v. 1: 390, footnote 3).  
If Locke’s skepticism (or seeming agnosticism) towards the reality of 
substance is substantiated, then so much is worse for Locke. Lowe 
remarks that, among other things, the reason why Locke’s account of the 
idea of substance generated more controversies than any other topic we 
find in Locke’s Essay has to do with its implications for theological 
thought. This was most importantly in relation to the accounts of God’s 
nature and the immortality of the soul.  
So, doctrines such as (1) transubstantiation, i.e., a view that bread 
and wine transforms into the body and blood of Christ; and (2) the 
Trinity, i.e., the Father, Son and Holy Spirit while distinct persons, yet 
share the same indivisible divine nature, are rooted in the idea of 
substance (Lowe 2005:59). So the only plausible way that seems available 
to maintain the intelligibility of the idea of substance, as Lowe remarks, 
“would be to declare it innate” (Ibid.). In light of this, Lowe further 
remarks that for the religious establishments of Locke’s time, Locke’s 
empirical based understanding of the idea of substance was seen as a 
slippery slope down the road of atheism (Ibid.). This is because, inter 
alia, since God is taken to be a substance, to endorse Locke’s account of 
substratum would require us to confess ignorance about our knowledge 
of God himself. But such confession (for the religious establishment of 
Locke’s day) of our ignorance of the knowledge of God is nothing short 
of moving in the direction to embrace atheism. 
But is the above fear of the dangerousness of Locke’s view of 
substance justifiable? Details aside, one way to answer this question is to 
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look at Locke’s response to one of his main critics, the Bishop of 
Worcester Edward Stillingfleet. As we recall, Locke employs some 
suspicious sounding phrases when he talks about substratum or 
substance: “…we accustom ourselves to suppose…” For Stillingfleet, 
such phrases came across as unacceptable on the basis of their 
implications for theological thought as briefly discussed earlier. So, in 
his third Letter to Stillingfleet, Locke clarifies his use of the phrase 
‘supposing’ claiming that it should not be taken as a ground to label him 
as being skeptical of the reality of substance. In his Letter to Stillingfleet, 
Locke makes it clear that since we cannot conceive the existence of 
qualities per se without being substantiated, it follows that there must be 
something we call substance that underlies them (see Fraser, footnotes 
Essay II, XXIII. 1:390-391).  
In this case, Locke is claiming to be a realist about substance 
ontology. Taken this way, the suspicion we put forth earlier as to 
whether or not Locke is a realist about substance ontology seems to lack 
any ground. Thus, we can say that the notion of ‘substance’ for Locke is 
not just a place holder after all. But as we shall see, such a positive 
characterization of Locke as a realist about substance ontology does not 
seem to weaken the objections his critics raise against his theory of 
substratum.    
2. What is Substratum? 
Locke claims that we have no idea of the notion of pure substance in 
general, or substratum. All that we can say with respect to substratum is 
something that supports the qualities that produce simple ideas in us, 
yet we can give no further analysis for it. For Locke, pure substance is 
simply something ‘one knows not what supports’. As Locke states:  
If any one should be asked, what is the subject wherein Colour or Weight 
inheres, he would have nothing to say, but the solid extended parts: And if he 
were demanded, what is it, that Solidity and Extension adhere in, he would not 
be in a much better case, than the Indian…who, saying that the world was 
supported by a great Elephant, was asked, what the Elephant rested on; to which 
his answer was, a great Tortoise: But being again pressed to know what gave 
support to the broad-back’d Tortoise, replied, something, he knew not what 
(Essay II, XXIII. 2; also cf. Bk. II. Ch. Xiii § 19).  
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Here Locke’s point is that inquiry into what exactly substratum is, is not 
an open ended one. Even if, we know well that qualities (e.g., colour, 
weight) have owner or subject that instantiates them, the qualities 
themselves have no role to play by way of revealing the ‘identity’ of the 
thing that underlies them. So ‘substratum’, despite its key role in 
underlying qualities, is epistemically inaccessible to us. Hence, we 
cannot keep on asking endlessly what substratum is. In light of this, 
Locke suggests that the best way to end our curiosity, to get to the 
bottom of the identity of substratum, is by confessing ignorance.4 
Perhaps, here Locke’s emphasis on ignorance could be taken as a 
deterrent to unnecessary explanatory regress. But despite such prima 
facie benefit, Locke’s own insistence on the unknowability of pure 
substance turns out to be less illuminating. We will return to this 
discussion in section III. But insofar as Locke is concerned, he sums up 
his theory of substratum as follows: 
The idea then we have, to which we give the general name Substance, being 
nothing, but the supposed, but unknown support of those Qualities, we find 
existing, which we imagine cannot subsist, sine re substante, without 
something to support them, we call that Support Substantia; which, according to 
the true import of the Word, is in plain English, standing under, or upholding 
(Essay II, XXIII. 2).  
4 That said, however, it is important to keep in mind that for Locke, the general idea of 
substance is not made of via a process of combining many simple ideas, which eventually 
lead to the formation of complex ideas. By contrast, the abstract or general idea of 
substance is formed only by the process of abstraction and hence it refers to a mental 
process. As Locke puts it, “The use of Words then being to stand as outward Marks of our 
internal Ideas, and those Ideas being taken from particular things, if every particular Idea 
that we take in, should have a distinct Name, Names must be endless. To prevent this, the 
Mind makes the particular Ideas, received from particular Objects, to become general; 
which is done by considering them as they are in the Mind such Appearances, separate 
from all other Existences, and the circumstances of real Existence, as Time, Place, or any 
other concomitant Ideas. This is called ABSTRACTION, whereby Ideas taken from 
particular Beings, become general Representatives of all of the same kind; and their 
Names general Names, applicable to whatever exists conformable to such abstract 
Ideas….Thus the same Colour being observed to day [sic] in Chalk or Snow, which the 
Mind yesterday received from Milk, it considers that Appearance alone, makes it a 
representative of all of that kind; and having given it the name Whiteness, it by that sound 
signifies the same quality wheresoever to be imagin’d or met with; and thus Universals, 
whether Ideas or Terms, are made” (Essay, II, XI. 9). See Berkeley’s objection to Locke’s 
doctrine of abstraction in the introduction to the Principles. 
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3. Reactions against Locke’s Theory of Substance 
Other contemporaries of Locke also followed Stillingfleet’s footstep in 
critiquing Locke’s view of substratum. Here is how Henry Lee begins by 
explaining his own version of substance before he critiques Locke’s:  
This Name of Substance we give to any thing whose Existence we conceive 
independent upon every thing else, and in which several Properties or Qualities 
are united and combined. And this, as old as it is, is taken to be a perfect 
Definition of Substance in General: because hereby the Mode of its Existence is 
distinguishable from that of Qualities or Properties: namely, its Existence does 
not depend upon any other created Substance or any Quality or Property. 
Whereas Qualities or Properties do depend upon one Substance or other, and 
have no qualities united in them. (II.23.1: 110). 
Here Lee’s analysis of the notion of substance is Aristotelian in its tone. 
Lee thinks that the relation that exists between substance and properties 
or qualities is asymmetrical, that is not equal. To make sense of the 
asymmetry Lee draws here, we can do no better than return to Aristotle 
himself. Aristotle inter alia, holds that substances (ousia) are ultimate 
subjects of predication and ontologically independent. In the Categories, 
Aristotle argues that primary substances have ontological priority, i.e. 
while other things depend on them for their existence, the converse is 
not true. Aristotle claims that primary substances such as individual 
men and horses are subjects that ground the existence of other 
nonsubstantial things such as qualities and quantities. For Aristotle, the 
primary substances are ultimate subjects of which other things are 
predicated but which are not themselves predicated of anything else 
(1028b 36-37). In the Categories, Aristotle does not treat primary 
substance as complex bodies although he does treat primary substances 
as complex bodies in his Metaphysics (see further: Mary Louise Gill 
1989: chap.1). 
Because of such a shift in Aristotle’s thinking, there is a debate on 
whether complex entities, i.e. entities with combination of matter and 
substantial form are primary substances. Yet Aristotle’s own 
commitment to the primacy of substance over stuff still stands. This line 
of thought has been rigorously defended in recent years (see e.g., Lowe 
1999: chap. 1; Lowe 1998: chaps. 6-9; Michael Loux 1998: chap. 3). Since 
for Aristotle, stuff has only potentialities as opposed to actualities, stuff 
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fails to be basic. To say that rock is stuff of a building is to say that rock 
has only a potential to become a building. By contrast, actuality is prior 
to potentiality (Book Θ 8, 1049b 18-25). Since substance is actuality, it 
follows that substance is prior to stuff. But Locke rejects the Aristotelian 
notion of substantial forms. But for now, the details do not concern us.5 
Here the point is that when Lee refers to his construal of substance as 
‘old’, his approach is broadly Aristotelian. If this is correct, then what is 
Lee’s point here? 
Before we answer this crucial question, it is important to bear in 
mind that Aristotle’s discussion of substance ontology is inextricably 
linked with his metaphysics. In fact, it is hardly an overstatement to say 
that we can only arrive at a proper understanding of Aristotle’s 
substance ontology, if we take Aristotle’s metaphysics seriously which 
underlies Aristotle’s overall approach in his investigation of the nature 
of reality. In Metaphysics Γ.1, Aristotle tells us that the object of the 
investigation of first philosophy is not as limited as some special 
sciences, which only tend to focus on their respective area of interest. 
For example, mathematics focuses on things that are countable and 
measurable. But for Aristotle, metaphysics is a universal science that 
studies being qua being.6 But what does Aristotle mean by ‘being qua 
being’? As S. Marc Cohen remarks, Aristotle’s description of ‘the study 
of being qua being’ does not imply as if there is a single subject 
matter—being qua being—which is under investigation. Instead the 
phrase, ‘being qua being’ involves three things: (1) a study, (2) a subject 
matter (being), and (3) a manner in which the subject matter is studied 
(qua being), (Cohen 2012: sec. 1). As Cohen further points out, 
Aristotle’s study does not focus on some recondite subject matter 
identified as ‘being qua being’. Rather it is a study of being. In other 
words, for Aristotle, first philosophy studies beings, in so far as they are 
beings (Ibid.). 
So as Michael Loux argues, metaphysics considers things as 
existents and tries to specify the properties they exhibit in so far as they 
are beings. The chief goal of metaphysics is not just to grasp the concept 
of being but also to grasp general concepts such as identity, difference, 
5 For an excellent discussion on ‘substantial form’, see Oderberg 2007: 65-71. 
6 Here the term ‘qua’ comes from Latin and it means ‘in so far as’ or ‘under the aspect’. 
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similarity, and dissimilarity that apply to everything that there is. In light 
of this, Loux further remarks that central to Aristotle’s metaphysics is 
the description of what Aristotle refers to as categories. These are the 
most general kinds under which things fall. So the business of a 
metaphysician is to identity those general or highest kinds. But the task 
does not end here. That is, a metaphysician is also supposed to specify 
the features unique to each category. The upshot of engaging in such an 
activity provides us with a map of the structure of all there is (Loux 1998: 
3-4).7  
So for Aristotle, metaphysics is the study of the fundamental 
structure of reality.8 Insofar as Aristotle is concerned, a metaphysician’s 
success in the investigation of the nature of reality depends on whether 
or not his/her approach is a realist one, which is to say that whether or 
not one accepts the existence of a mind-independent reality. For 
Aristotle, a mind-independent reality is the starting point of his 
metaphysical theorizing. If this is true, then I fully agree with Kit Fine 
when he says, “I take Aristotle’s primary concern in his metaphysical 
and physical writings to be with the nature of reality rather than the 
nature of language. I am rarely tempted, when Aristotle appears to be 
talking about things, to construe him as saying something about 
words…” (Fine 1996: 83-84).9
7 See also, other contemporary neo-Aristotelian advocates of the traditional metaphysics: 
Lowe 1998; ibid. 2002; ibid. 2006; Oderberg 2007; Hoffman and Rosenkrantz 1997; 
Schaffer 2009: chap. 12; and Tahko (ed.) 2012. 
8 Similarly, in his recent Writing the Book of the World, Ted Sider describes metaphysics 
as an inquiry into the fundamental structure of reality (Sider 2012). However, it is 
somewhat troubling to note that there is no mention of Aristotle in Sider’s book. One 
wonders what justifies Sider’s decision to do so. 
9 But the hitherto brief description of the traditional metaphysics was rejected by David 
Hume, Immanuel Kant and in modern times, by post Hume-Kant thinkers such as W.V. 
Quine. Most notably, a serious attack was launched against the traditional metaphysics by 
the 1930s and 40s Vienna Circle logical positivists, such as Rudolf Carnap and others. As is 
well known, logical positivists promoted a movement that restricts the source of genuine 
knowledge to what can only be empirically verifiable (see e.g., Uebel 2012). Though, at 
present, the ‘verification principle’ largely has fallen out of favor, it is safe to say that its 
spirit is still around. Recently Huw Price in his essay entitled, “Metaphysics after Carnap: 
The Ghost Who Walks?”, argued that metaphysics [traditional] is ‘as dead, or at least 
deflated, as Carnap left it’ (Price 2009: 322). Here Price’s remark is not only very strong but 
it is also entirely unfounded in light of the work of notable contemporary neo-Aristotelian 
advocates of traditional metaphysics (see e.g., the representative sample I gave above under 
footnote # 7). One can confidently say that Aristotelian metaphysics is back on the stage, 
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In light of the foregone considerations, we are better prepared now 
to see Lee’s point when he refers to his construal of substance as ‘old’. In 
this regard, Edwin McCann in his essay ‘Locke’s Theory of Substance 
under Attack!’, points out that Lee is basically distinguishing what he 
calls the ‘old’ notion of substance from Locke’s ‘new’ one. In doing so, 
Lee wants to show that Locke’s notion of pure substance obscures the 
old notion of substance. Lee’s main goal then is to diagnose Locke’s 
mistake (McCann 2001: 95). As Lee puts it: 
He [Locke] would have a clear notion of pure Substance (that is) abstracted from 
all Properties or Qualities whatever. I answer, there is no such Substance in the 
whole World. Every Substance has some Qualities or other: A Spirit its 
Thinking, Space its Expansion, Body its Solidity. And then how can any man 
have a distinct Notion of that, from which you suppose all its Properties (by 
which it should be distinguish’d) separated or abstracted?...there is really no 
such Substance in the World abstracted from all Qualities, nor no Qualities 
abstracted from all Substances (II.23.3:110-111).  
Here the biggest worry Lee expresses against Locke’s notion of pure 
substance seems to be that of the divorce Locke introduced between pure 
substance and property. As we recall, for Locke, substratum, though it is 
a property bearer, is not itself knowable. So Lee’s point is that once we 
divest pure substance of all its properties (via which we come to know 
what pure substratum is), the result is to find ourselves in the dark. 
What then is the implication of such ignorance of what pure substance 
is? If we let Lee himself answer this question, he might say that if a 
substance is devoid of a property that defines its identity, then the very 
existence of such a substance can be called into serious question. Lee 
contra to Price’s claim and all those who are sympathetic to his remarks. But I don’t intend 
to argue for this claim here for that would take us too far afield. That said, however, unlike 
Hume who dismissed both Aristotelian metaphysics in general, and his substance 
ontology in particular (see Treatise Book I part IV), Kant was a friend of substance 
ontology, which he went on defending it. As he insightfully remarks, “…the necessity with 
which this concept of substance forces itself upon us, we have no option save to admit that 
it has its seat in our faculty of a priori knowledge”, (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B.6). So 
whatever reservations one might have about Locke’s characterization of substance, it 
should not be a reason to reject Aristotelian substance ontology. One should keep in mind 
that despite his departure from the Aristotelian tradition, the roots of Locke’s own 
conception of substance ontology can be traced back to Aristotle. Despite some knee jerk 
reactions of some modern philosophers, Aristotelian substances continue to occupy a 
central place in our discussion of identity, agency and causation, inter alia (see e.g., 
Ruggaldier 2006: chap.3; also see Lowe 1998: chaps. 4-7). 
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also might say that we have no epistemic ground to talk about a 
substance that is abstracted or separated from its property. This is 
simply because for Lee, we cannot conceive a substance apart from its 
property on the one hand and the instantiation of properties without 
their bearer on the other. In light of this, Lee remarks:  
But if he [Locke] expects we should answer what a Substance is, ‘tis not kindly 
done to suppose, first, the Question is unanswerable, as it is, if we strip it of all 
of its Properties and Qualities, and then ask us, what it is? (II.23.4:111).    
Along similar lines with that of Lee, Leibniz also in his New Essays 
expresses serious doubts against Locke’s characterization of pure 
substance. Here are Leibniz’s own remarks: 
THEO. If you distinguish two things in a substance - the attributes or 
predicates, and their common subject - it is no wonder that you cannot conceive 
anything special in this subject. That is inevitable, because you have already set 
aside all the attributes through which details could be conceived. Thus, to 
require of this 'pure subject in general' anything beyond what is needed for the 
conception of 'the same thing' - e.g. it is the same thing which understands and 
wills, which imagines and reasons - is to demand the impossible; and it also 
contravenes the assumption which was made in performing the abstraction and 
separating the subject from all its qualities or accidents. The same alleged 
difficulty could be brought against the notion of being, and against all that is 
plainest and most primary. For we may ask a philosopher what he conceives 
when he conceives 'pure being in general'; since the question excludes all detail, 
he will have as little to say as if he had been asked what 'pure substance in 
general' is. So I do not believe that it is fair to mock philosophers, as your author 
does [xiii.19] when he compares them to an Indian philosopher who was asked 
what supported the world, to which he replied that it was a great elephant; and 
then when he was asked what supported the elephant he said that it was a great 
tortoise; and finally when he was pressed to say what the tortoise rested on, he 
was reduced to saying that it was 'something, he knew not what'. Yet this 
conception of substance, for all its apparent thinness, is less empty and sterile 
than it is thought to be. Several consequences arise from it… (II.23.2:218).10
10 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz also criticized Locke’s remarks on the doctrine of innate ideas 
(New Essays on Human Understanding, 1740). Here ‘innate idea’ refers to the notion that 
the basic components of human knowledge and understanding are not rooted in sense 
experience. Rather such items of knowledge and understanding (e.g., necessary truth) were 
imprinted in the human mind. So human beings, so to speak are born with such innate or 
primary ideas to which universally all humans assent to. For Leibniz, as it is true for Rene 
Descartes, such construal of innate ideas is perfectly justifiable (see, e.g., John Harris in 
‘Locke on Human Understanding,’ I.C. Tipton (ed.), 1977: chap. II; Mackie 1976: chap. 7). 
But Locke thinks that such blind acceptance of innate ideas stifles honest inquiry into how 
we acquire our knowledge thereby encouraging dogmatism as well as obscurantism. So 
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It is clear that Leibniz also thinks that divesting the concept of substance 
of its attributes is problematic. This is because for Leibniz, we can only 
come to grasp the very nature of substance via its qualities or properties. 
In light of both Lee’s and Leibniz’s insistence on the importance of 
ascribing a property to a substance (obviously the move Locke resists), 
the question remains: what sort of property can we ascribe to a 
substance? Here essential property and accidental property come to 
mind. Roughly speaking, an object is said to have an essential property if 
it cannot exist without it. For example, being extended is an essential 
property of a house, without which a house cannot continue to exist. By 
contrast, an object is said to have an accidental property if an object can 
lose it without ceasing to exist. For example, suppose that John is sad 
now. It is possible for John to have lacked the property of being sad now. 
So being sad is an accidental property of John. For present purposes, I 
will put aside complicated and detailed discussions that surround these 
two domains of properties, i.e. essential and accidental (see further Lowe 
2002, chap. 6; Code 1986; Fine 1992; McGinn 2000; Plantinga 1974). 
In light of this, it might be the case that both Lee’s as well as 
Leibniz’s complaints against Locke’s characterization of substratum or 
pure substance as ‘something we know not what’ seem to have targeted 
on the loss of an essential property of a substance. However, here we 
may argue that Locke does not necessarily deprive a substance of its 
nature. Rather Locke only insists that we have no knowledge of the 
nature of substance. But such response does not satisfy Locke’s critics. 
This is because, since by Locke’s own account we have no idea of what 
the nature of substance is, it remains unclear what entitles us to say 
anything substantial about it.    
So the heart of Lee’s and Leibniz’s charge against Locke’s 
characterization of substance seems to be that Locke deprived pure 
substance of all its content. But some disagree with such a conclusion. 
Locke dedicates Book I of his Essay to refute the doctrine of innate ideas before he returns 
in Book II of his Essay to the discussion of substratum and particular substances. For 
more information on Locke’s take on innate ideas and the controversies surrounding it, 
see e.g., Lowe 1995: chap. 2 and 2005: chap. 2; J. Gibson 1917: chap. 2, § 6; J.W. Yolton 
1956; R.I. Aaron 1955; D.J. O’Connor 1967: 39-40, Greenville Wall in Locke on Human 
Understanding, I.C. Tipton, ed., 1977: chap. I, Margaret Atherton in Locke, Vere Chappell, 
(ed.), 1998: chap. II and J.L. Mackie 1976: chap. 7. 
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For example, McCann claims that both Lee and Leibniz 
mischaracterized Locke’s characterization of substance. McCann thinks 
that Locke did not leave us with an empty conception of substance nor 
did he subtract all properties and qualities from it, as both Lee and 
Leibniz claim. Furthermore, for McCann, Locke does not rob the notion 
of substance of all content. This is because, as McCann argues, Locke’s 
characterization of the idea of substance as self-subsisting property 
bearer of objects (serving as their common subject) exactly matches 
Lee’s own characterization of substance as the ‘old’ conception of 
substance (McCann 2001: 96). However, McCann’s defense of Locke’s 
conception of substance appears to be overly simplistic.  
If indeed Locke’s conception of substance exactly matches that of 
Lee’s, then that means that Locke takes an Aristotelian conception of 
substance without reservation. But that is indeed not the case. Locke 
clearly does not endorse some core notion of substance in the 
Aristotelian tradition in general and scholastics, in particular. For 
example, although Locke calls such things as man, horse, sun, etc., as 
particular substances, he does not consider them to be substances in the 
fundamental ontological sense. McCann’s misunderstanding here arises 
from his unjustifiable inference that because Locke grants that 
substance is a property bearer, it follows that Locke’s conception of 
substance is not devoid of content. The real issue here is not the lack of 
consensus or awareness of the fact that Locke clearly takes pure 
substance to be a property bearer. Rather the real issue has to do with 
what pure substance itself is, on its own ground apart from being a 
property bearer. Does it have its own nature or identity, if it does what is 
it? How do we come to know it? So, only knowing pure substance as a 
property bearer per se is not a substitute as McCann seems to think for 
settling such fundamental questions.  
So, contrary to McCann, it is not wrong to say that Locke left us with 
an empty conception of substance. For example, Jonathan Bennett 
argues that many philosophers rightly point out that Locke’s notion of 
pure substance or substratum is impossible or intolerable. But why is 
that? Bennett thinks that the answer concerns with conceptual 
emptiness. By this Bennett meant that since it is thought that because 
substratum has to be the bearer of all the qualities, it must be therefore, 
in itself, bare or unqualified in some problematic way (Bennett 1998: 131 
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in Vere Chappell, ed.). But as Bennett further points out the defender of 
substratum theory is inevitably accused of requiring content in 
something that had been stripped of all content (Ibid.: 132).   
McCann’s move in trying to bring Locke’s conception of pure 
substance closer to the traditional understanding of substance turns out 
to be inconsistent with McCann’s own suggestion about what he thinks 
Locke is up to, in advancing his theory of substance. McCann points out 
that Locke’s main agenda in Book II of the 23rd chapter of his Essay has 
been understood in terms of (1) Locke giving us a positive theory of 
substance more in line with the traditional view of substance; and (2) 
Locke giving us a negative theory of substance, which is taken to imply 
that he is entirely rejecting his theory of substance (e.g., see Essay 
II.13.17-20 & II.23.2). But McCann suggests his own alternative: (3) the
‘no-theory’ theory of substance. As McCann puts it: 
Locke is giving an account of an idea we have, the idea of substance in general, 
which is derived from simple ideas given in sensation and reflection but which, 
given the vagaries of this derivation, is hopelessly and irremediably confused 
and obscure. An idea this confused and obscure cannot be used to explain 
anything, including the six phenomena….Locke’s realization of, and indeed 
insistence upon, this fact explains why it is that he never, either in the Essay or 
in the correspondence with Stillingfleet, claims to explain anything in terms of 
that idea. It is an idea we’ve arrived at faute de mieux, serving mainly to mark 
our inability to conceive how qualities exist by themselves by supposing they 
exist in something, something, given the circumstances, we know not what 
(McCann 2001: 94-95).   
Here by ‘six phenomena’ McCann is referring to six features attributed 
to the theory of substance which he himself recognizes can be traced 
back to Aristotle. In a nutshell, these features are (a) predication relation 
that is, certain terms are predicated of other in an asymmetrical fashion. 
We can say, the ‘flower is red’ but it is wrong to say ‘The red is a flower’; 
(b) substances can exist on their own but the same cannot be said of 
modes or properties. That is, only the later need the former for their 
instantiation; (c) substances unify various sensory experiences (e.g., 
colors, shapes, feels, smells) to hang-together; (d) substances play the 
role of identifying or individuating individual objects. For example, a 
substance can persist via qualitative change while maintaining its 
numerical identity over time; (e) substances have a special sort of unity 
in that a substance is ens per se, i.e., a being through itself, which is 
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radically different from mere aggregates, which are entia per accidens, 
i.e., an entity that exists accidentally; (f) the theory of substance also
needs to tackle the question of how many basic kinds or fundamental 
kinds of substance there are and how each basic kind differs from the 
other (Ibid.: 88-90).  
What is the problem with McCann’s (3) above?11  The problem is not 
with McCann’s overall characterization of Locke’s theory of substance. 
Certainly one can ask whether or not Locke’s theory of substratum is 
explanatorily adequate. But the issue here is whether or not Locke is 
successful in the way he characterized his theory of substratum. Leaving 
that aside for now, McCann’s (3) is inconsistent with his earlier remarks 
that Locke’s theory of substance ‘exactly’ matches both Lee’s as well 
Leibniz’s characterization of substance. How so? Given McCann’s (3) 
Locke’s theory cannot explain the six features of substance McCann 
himself lists as shown above in (a)-(f). That means that Locke’s theory of 
substance hardly matches the account given by Lee as well as Leibniz.  
This is because the Lee-Leibnizan account is perfectly consistent 
with the six features pointed out by McCann, whereas Locke’s theory of 
substance fails to match up with the six features. This is precisely 
because Locke’s substratum or pure substance is so obscure and 
confused whose features we cannot tell (if such a task is even possible to 
undertake in the first place). If this is correct, then my early remarks 
regarding the Lee-Leibnizan account of substance being Aristotelian in 
its spirit stands their ground. If I am right about this, it follows that 
McCann’s claim that Locke’s conception of substance is equally rich in 
its content as that of Lee-Leibnizan turns out to be by its own standard 
both inconsistent and groundless.  
Moreover (3) can be given an ambiguous reading. Basically (3) does 
not tell us anything different that cannot be achieved either by adopting 
one of the other strategies, i.e., (1) or (2) as stated above. But the 
ambiguous reading I have in mind here can be spotted between (2) and 
(3). As it stands, one can understand (3) as Locke rejecting his theory of 
substance, in which case the meaning of (2) is in place. On the other 
11 As we recall, we already made (with some qualification) a positive case for (1). But we 
rejected (2) on the basis of claiming that Locke is a realist about substance ontology. In the 
above quote, McCann mistakenly thinks that the idea of substance is derived from simple 
ideas given in sensation and reflection. See footnote # 4 for Locke’s own view. 
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hand, one can also understand (3) as implying that Locke is not rejecting 
his theory of substance, instead he is simply stating the difficulties 
surrounding it to spell out what it is, in which case we settle for (3). But 
it is hard to tell which meaning fixes McCann’s ‘no-theory’ theory of 
substance. In light of such considerations, therefore, option (1) seems to 
be the best alternative to adopt.   
Finally, the other contemporary of Locke worthy of mentioning is 
John Sergeant. Sergeant begins his discussion of Locke’s 23rd chapter of 
Book II as follows: 
While I perused Mr. Locke's 23th Chapter, of the Idea of Substance, I was 
heartily grieved to see the greatest Wits, for want of True Logick, and thro' their 
not lighting on the right way of Philosophizing, lay Grounds for Scepticism, to 
the utter Subversion of all Science; and this, not designedly, but with a good 
Intention, and out of their Sincerity and Care not to affirm more than they 
know. He fancies that the Knowledge of Substance and Extension are absolutely 
Unattainable. Now, if we be altogether Ignorant what Substance or Thing 
means, we must bid Adieu to all Philosophy, which is the Knowledge of Things, 
and confess that we talk all the while of we know not what: And, if we be 
invincibly Ignorant of what Extension is, farewell to all the Mathematical 
Sciences; which, (those that treat of Number, or Arithmetick, excepted) do all of 
them presuppose our Knowledge of Extension, and are wholly grounded on that 
Knowledge (Reflection, 1697, 13.22-23: 238).  
Sergeant certainly gives credit to Locke for exercising an epistemological 
modesty by not pretending to know more than he does. Yet for Sergeant 
such epistemological modesty comes with a price. That is, suspending 
judgment in matters such as substance and extension creates a fertile 
ground for skepticism. Hence, the ultimate consequence of such 
skepticism shakes up the very foundation of our knowledge of things. 
So, Sergeant offers his own version of substance: 
Now, as we can consider the Thing according to its Modes or Accidents, so we 
can have another Notion or Consideration of the Thing as to its own self· 
abstracting from all these former Considerations; or a Notion of the Thing, (not 
according to any Mode it has, but) precisely according to its Thingship (as we 
may say) or Reality; that is, in order to Being; or (which is the same) we can 
consider it precisely and formally as an Ens, Res, Substance or Thing; and all we 
can say of it, thus consider'd, is, that 'tis capable to be actually. For, since we see 
Created Things have Actual Being, yet so that they can cease to be; all that we 
can say of them, (thus consider'd) is, that they are Capable to be. Besides, since 
we see they have Being, were this Actual Being or Existence Essential to them, 
they would be of themselves, and so could not but be; and, consequently, must 
always be; which our common Reason and Experience contradicts; in regard we 
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know them to have been made; and we see many of them daily Produced, and 
others Corrupted (Reflection, 1697, 13.22-23: 239-40).  
Compared to the Lee-Leibnizans’ account of substance, Sergeant’s 
account is different. Sergeant spells out his notion of substance in terms 
of ‘capacity to exist’. In this regard, McCann points out that Locke 
responded to Sergeant’s definition of substance in two marginal 
comments on Sergeant’s own Solid Philosophy. Locke’s first comment 
reads: “All which amounts to no more but that Substance is something, 
which is what Mr. L. [Locke himself] says” (p. 241 as quoted in McCann 
2001:97). The other comment Locke gave concerns direct criticism of 
Sergeant’s own conception of substance:  
If the Idea of Substance be capacity to exist, then Accidents are Substances for 
they are capable to exist. If it be as J.S. puts it here and else where a thing 
capable to exist, then his Idea of substance or thing will be this, that a thing is a 
thing capable to exist, which as much clears the point as if he should say an 
[accident?] is an accident capable to exist, or a man capable to exist (p. 244 as 
indicated in McCann 2001: 98)  
Here I agree with McCann’s remark that Locke’s criticism of Sergeant’s 
conception of substance is effective. Locke is certainly right to say that if 
the criteria for something to be a substance is based on the capability of 
whether that thing exists or not, then anything that is capable to exist 
can be given a status of substance, a notion that goes against what we 
have discussed so far. But where I still disagree with McCann is when he 
says, “Locke is criticizing Sergeant for departing from the traditional 
notion of substance’’ (Ibid.: 98). Here my disagreement with McCann is 
based on the earlier claim that Locke is not committed to the traditional 
notion of substance to the extent McCann claims. Thus, at the least, it 
remains unclear whether or not Locke’s point in criticizing Sergeant’s 
construal of substance is motivated by Locke’s commitment to the 
traditional understanding of the theory of substance. Although the four 
contemporaries of Locke have their own independent line of thoughts, 
what unifies them all against Locke is their insistence on the inadequacy 
of Locke’s characterization of substratum or pure substance in general 
as ‘something we know not what.’  
The question remains: where does all this leave Locke’s theory of 
substance? Is Locke’s theory of substance misguided? I personally think 
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not. As Sergeant rightly noticed, Locke’s insistence on the unknowability 
of substratum is motivated by his epistemological modesty (i.e., by not 
pretending to know more than he does). Yet as we recall from sections I 
& II, Locke’s main goal in proposing substratum does seem to be 
primarily metaphysical in nature. That is, Locke on a purely ontological 
ground seems to have realized that properties or qualities necessarily 
need some sort of bearer for them to exist. Hence, there cannot be free 
floating qualities (cf. Lowe 1995: 76-77). More importantly, as Lowe 
remarks, when Locke characterizes substratum as ‘something we know 
not what’, he (Locke) seems to be implying that it may have a nature 
which may be known to other beings such as angels and God (e.g. Essay 
II, XXIII. 6; Letter to the Bishop of Worcester, p. 28 as quoted in Lowe, 
2000:507). If so, the objections Locke’s immediate critics raised against 
his theory of substance are not insurmountable. 
In light of such and similar other considerations, contemporary 
philosophers such as C.B. Martin, E.J. Lowe, M. R. Ayers, Jonathan 
Bennett, J.L. Mackie, Margaret Atherton, and Martha Brandt Bolton 
proposed various solutions to provide a defensible framework for 
Locke’s theory of substance. Though the amendments these 
philosophers suggest differ from each other, they all agree that Locke’s 
theory of substance is not a result of careless conjecture and thus must 
not be dismissed. For reasons already indicated, looking at these 
solutions is not our present concern (see for details, Martin, 1980; Lowe, 
2000 & 2005; Ayers, in Tipton, I.C., 1977; Mackie, 1976; Bennett, Ayers, 
Atherton and Bolton, in Vere Chappell 1998). That said, however, one 
thing we can certainly say is that with some modification, Locke’s theory 
of substance can be made free from the problems that beset it.  
4. Conclusion
In this short paper, we have looked at what Locke’s motivation was in 
proposing the theory of substratum. We have also looked at some of the 
problems that beset the theory of substratum as pointed out by Locke’s 
immediate critics. Yet Locke’s insistence on the unknowability of 
substratum stems from his epistemological modesty. If so, the best that 
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can be said about the merit of the objections raised by Locke’s 
contemporaries is that at the least, the objections show that Locke’s 
theory of substratum is contentious. But such objections in no way 
prevent us from modifying Locke’s account of substratum (as 
contemporary philosophers attempt to do). Therefore, I conclude that, as 
things stand, there is no warrant to dismiss Locke’s theory of 
substance.12 
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Metaphysics in the work of Charles Darwin 
Bárbara Jiménez Pazos 
(University of the Basque Country) 
It is not hard to see how two visions of nature are intertwined in 
Darwin’s Journal of Researches: one vision, the province of romantic 
authors depicting the sentiments awakened by certain landscapes, the 
other, the domain of natural scientists describing the world without 
reference to the aesthetic qualities of the scenery. Nevertheless, 
analyses of this double perspective in Darwin’s work are relatively 
rare. Most scholars focus on Darwin, the scientist, and more or less 
ignore the aesthetic aspects of his work. Perceiving the gradual 
transformation of Darwin’s world view, however, depends on 
analyzing the two different modes in which Darwin approached and 
perceived the world. While one can, on occasion, find commentaries 
on the beauty of the natural world in Darwin’s early work, the passage 
of time produces a modification in the naturalist’s manner of 
perceiving nature. This does not, however, mean that Darwin ceases 
to find beauty in nature; on the contrary, the disenchantment, in Max 
Weber’s words, that Darwin’s theory produces should not be 
understood in a pejorative, but rather in a literal sense. The theory of 
evolution, in effect, divests nature of its magical character and begins 
to explain it in terms of natural selection, according it, in the process 
a new and more intense attraction. In the present work, the 
metaphysical implications of this new vision of the world are 
analyzed through the eyes of its discoverer. 
1. Darwin, religion and landscape
Formerly I was led by feelings, such as those just referred to (although I do not 
think that the religious sentiment was ever strongly developed in me), to the 
firm conviction of the existence of God, and of the immortality of the soul […] I 
well remember my conviction that there is more in man than the mere breath of 
his body. But now the grandest scenes would not cause any such convictions 
and feelings to rise in my mind. It may be truly said that I am like a man who 
has become colour-blind (Darwin 1887: 311-312).1 
As demonstrated by, among others, Daniel Dennett’s book Darwin’s 
Dangerous Idea (Dennett 1995) or by the disputes in the United States 
1 All citations from Life and letters of Charles Darwin. Including an Autobiographical 
Chapter are from Volume I. 
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over Intelligent Design theory, analyzing the metaphysical implications 
of Darwin’s theory remains relevant to philosophical debates. The quote 
that opens the present work refers to the relation between the 
emergence of religious sentiment, produced by the aesthetic perception 
of landscape, and the disappearance of the same caused by the growth in 
scientific knowledge about nature. One may, in turn, directly link 
Darwin’s confession to a series of metaphysical questions surrounding 
Darwinism, such as religious beliefs (Creationism), the revision of 
received ideas with the aim of attributing meaning to human history and 
human existence, the aesthetic perception of nature, or the problem of 
the existence of God. Dennett, in effect, makes an oblique reference to 
these questions when he argues that Darwinism functions as a 
“universal acid” that corrodes all received metaphysical ideas. 
There is little consensus regarding the relevance of theological 
questions in understanding the Darwinian theory of evolution. In 
describing aesthetic marvels, Darwin occasionally uses language that 
implies a foundation in religious belief. As Phillip R. Sloan points out, 
however, such language is “not religious in the traditional sense”, as it is 
“devoid of references to ‘God’, ‘creation’, ‘providence’, ‘design’, or the 
other categories of traditional theology” (Sloan 2001: 261). On the whole, 
then, one can say that Darwin’s writings contain metaphysical 
references, but display no clear connection to traditional theology. 
After Darwin’s voyage in the Beagle (1831-1836), the influence of 
Thomas Robert Malthus’s writings gave him a new vocabulary that 
distanced itself from Humboldtian2 nature. This period was of great 
2 Alexander von Humboldt’s accurately taken nature data and his detailed landscape 
descriptions make the reader form an almost inevitable association between him and 
Charles Darwin, one of his followers. Both authors started research voyages to know in 
detail the natural world, and it is a remarkable fact that Darwin carried with himself a copy 
of Humboldt’s Personal Narrative (1814) taken as a helpful reference for his own research. 
Darwin’s Journal of Researches preserves Humboldt’s descriptive style, which is 
characteristic for its adoption of two different ways of analyzing and describing the 
elements of nature. On the one hand, Humboldt adopted the Romantic Movement’s 
delight for nature and, consequently, he also maintained the romantic descriptive style of 
nature’s elements. This particular descriptive method is easily recognizable, since it shows 
the beholder’s subjective point of view and, therefore, the feelings that some scenes or 
elements of nature arouse in the observer. On the other hand, one recognizes in 
Humboldt’s texts the descriptive method that natural sciences use to analyze the 
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significance for Darwin. His understanding of nature became more 
complex and, prompted by the work of Malthus to conceive of nature as 
a selector, his naturalistic ideas began to acquire a direction slightly 
different from that of his predecessor Humboldt, though preserving 
traces of Humboldt’s influence. As Sloan puts it: 
The synthesis of Darwin’s complex body of readings and reflections finally took 
shape in the remarkable first drafts of his transformist theory in 1842 and 1844, 
the first texts to employ the concept of “natural” selection. In these texts we can 
also see the beginnings of the interplay of the “Humboldtian” and “Malthusian” 
conceptions of nature (Sloan 2001: 264). 
Darwin’s Journal of Researches (1839) clearly reveals this presence of 
two intertwined visions of nature: one is that of Romantic authors who 
want to convey the feelings that the observation of certain types of 
landscapes produces, and the other is that of natural scientists who 
describe the world without reference to the aesthetic qualities of the 
landscape. While one may characterize Darwin’s early view of nature as 
pantheistic, one cannot say the same of the conception of nature present 
in the writings dating from the period of the On Origin of Species 
(1859), where the influence of Malthus is visible, and where the 
enumerative and schematic description of observations predominates. 
During the earliest years in which Darwin was engaged in formulating 
his theory, his writings, according to Sloan, display a conception of 
nature that resembles Spinoza’s notion of natura naturans and natura 
naturata3, and it is in those writings that one can perceive the link 
between the sense of the sublime in Darwin and the figure of God (with 
the understanding, as noted above, that this “God” is not the God of 
traditional theology). Connecting Darwin’s ideas with the Spinozistic 
notion of nature, Sloan makes the important claim that in Darwin’s 
writings, 
These [the complex forms and adaptations found in nature] are not contrivances 
imposed by an external creator on a passive material nature in the tradition of 
environment. This descriptive style is formed by the objective information with which the 
observer aims to devise a complete view of nature, leaving aside the personal repercussion. 
3 One could refer to natura naturans as “active nature” (God) and to natura naturata as 
“passive nature” (“all that follows from the necessity of the nature of God”). These two 
states of nature can, on the one hand, be defined separately but, on the other hand, should 
be understood as two complementary elements (Spinoza 1989: 25-26). 
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British natural theology. They are rather properties that emerge from the 
immanent constructive activities of nature itself (Sloan 2001: 268). 
After all the references to theology, Sloan finds it necessary to qualify the 
term “religious”: 
If we define “religious” motivations to involve some kind of belief in the 
transcendent, in an objective foundation of a moral order, and as the source of 
answers to the main questions of life and death, a constitutive and even 
religious significance in Darwin’s appeal to “nature” is more plausible (Sloan 
2001: 267). 
One must analyze whether religious beliefs shaped the way in which the 
English naturalist formed an understanding of the natural environment. 
Sloan leans toward accepting that the transcendent had a certain 
influence on Darwin’s ideas, causing Darwin to have a quasi-religious 
conception of nature: 
Darwin’s “nature” was something more than a mere metaphysical premise [...] it 
was also a source of moral order for Darwin, not in the sense of a system 
displaying obvious design and contrivance, but as a lawful system on which one 
could rely for ethical norms, serving as the source and foundation for life. To 
this extent, we can affirm that cognitive premises of a quasi-religious nature do 
indeed play a significant role in Darwin’s science (Sloan 2001: 269). 
Seeing Darwin’s conception of the quasi-religious nature as something 
that comprises a system of laws and ethical norms that establish the 
basic principle of life, one can conclude that this conception plays an 
important role in Darwin’s scientific work. 
David Kohn, in Darwin’s Ambiguity: The Secularization of 
Biological Meaning, argues for a certain ambiguity in Darwin’s 
metaphysics-related writings. On occasion, Kohn notes, references to the 
Creator coexist with a ridiculing of the special creation doctrine; 
similarly, the same letter may contain both the affirmation and the 
denial of God. Kohn sees, then, a naturalist with a dual character: 
So we continue to have these conflicting portraits: Darwin as conforming 
Victorian theist – the last of the natural theologians – and Darwin as religious 
radical who recovered the deistic tradition of the enlightenment and had a 
special role in establishing the independence of scientific naturalism and the 
secularization of the modern world view (Kohn 1989: 218). 
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According to Kohn, the important fact is that Darwin’s search for a 
scientific theory of biological origins unfolds in a specific theological 
context (Kohn 1989: 223). The context appears to influence Darwin’s 
thought and, according to Kohn, this influence can be seen during the 
first years in which Darwin developed his theory – although one can, at 
the same time, detect a certain materialism in his ideas. These two 
aspects of the naturalist add ambiguity to his texts. 
One can regard Darwin as a materialist, but this need not lead one to consider 
him an atheist, given that he saw no problem with affirming that the laws of 
nature may be established by God – an impersonal God, undefined and 
synchronized with nature itself. Darwin’s work consists in explaining a natural 
order that implies the existence of a Creator (Kohn 1989: 238). 
This double aspect is the reason that Darwin’s thought is compared to 
Victorian Romanticism, which was also pulled in two different 
directions at once: the “lyrical materialism” (Beer 2009: 44) of William 
Wordsworth and the idealistic theology of Samuel Taylor Coleridge. 
Moreover, there is in Darwin a new approach to the sublime and the 
beautiful from the perspective of naturalism, as Kohn explains: 
Darwin can be shown to preach a naturalist reconciliation of the sublime and 
beautiful. When he lifts up the vision of a natural world created and finely 
balanced by selection, he captures the heightened religious emotions of a 
doxology and appeals to a spirituality dislocated by the Victorian crisis (Kohn 
1989: 234). 
The sublime, characterized by a powerful and destructive nature, is in 
diametric opposition to the beautiful, defined more by calm than by 
natural force. Wordsworth’s search of a conciliation between the 
sublime and the beautiful is brought to completion in the work On the 
Origin of Species, where, according to Kohn, one encounters a Darwin 
who is no longer the young Humboldtian naturalist of the Journal of 
Researches, but rather a mature scientist capable of finding the balance 
between the beautiful and the sublime for which Wordsworth yearned 
(Kohn 1989: 235). 
A close reading of the Journal of Researchers reveals the existence of 
two descriptive tendencies, two forms of approximating nature that 
appear to be intertwined, forming a stable equilibrium – and that are, for 
Darwin, complementary. Darwin achieves a new form of perceiving 
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nature, a form that is inevitably rooted in Romanticism, but that, little by 
little, distances itself from an enchanted (Weber) vision of nature, 
arriving at explanations of the way nature works that do not draw on the 
transcendental. Nevertheless, despite possessing an explanation of 
nature based on his theory of evolution, Darwin continues to perceive 
beauty in nature. 
In my view, it is incorrect to claim that Darwin found himself on the 
fence at all times; rather, with the passage of time, Darwin refined his 
manner of observing nature. The increase of knowledge that resulted 
from his incessant observation of the environment caused Darwin to 
modulate his perception of the landscape. As James Paradis notes: 
“While Darwin’s developing theories did not alter the appearance of 
landscape, they did ultimately alter what Darwin saw,” (Paradis 1981: 
105). Paradis locates the difference between Naturalism and 
Romanticism in the perception of nature, and comments that “as 
[Darwin’s] concept of nature became increasingly intellectual and 
abstract, his representations became less traditional and emotional” 
(Paradis 1981: 107). I suspect that, contrary to Paradis’s argument, 
knowledge intensifies the aesthetic experience, making it denser, more 
human, more serious, and more profound. This is exemplified in the 
last paragraph of Darwin’s On the Origin of Species. 
2. The entangled bank
Darwin closes the Origin of Species with the following words: 
It is interesting to contemplate a tangled bank, clothed with many plants of 
many kinds, with birds singing in the bushes, with various insects flitting about, 
and with worms crawling through the damp earth, and to reflect that these 
elaborately constructed forms, so different from each other, and dependent 
upon each other in so complex a manner, have all been produced by laws acting 
around us. These laws, taken in the largest sense being Growth with 
Reproduction; Inheritance which is almost implied by reproduction; Variability 
from the indirect and direct action of the conditions of life, and from use and 
disuse: a Ratio of Increase so high as to lead to a Struggle for Life, and as a 
consequence to Natural Selection, entailing divergence of Character and the 
Extinction of less-improved forms. Thus, from the war of nature, from famine 
and death, the most exalted object which we are capable of conceiving, namely, 
the production of the higher animals, directly follows. There is grandeur in this 
view of life, with its several powers, having been originally breathed by the 
Creator into a few forms or into one; and that, whilst this planet has gone 
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cycling on according to the fixed law of gravity, from so simple a beginning 
endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful have been, and are being 
evolved (Darwin 1876: 429). 
According to Kohn (1997), the “entangled bank” metaphor does not 
pertain only to the last paragraph of On the Origin of Species, but is, 
rather, developed over the course of the Journal. Kohn argues that in the 
Journal, Darwin exhibits a variety of strong responses to natural scenery: 
in describing his experiences in Tierra del Fuego, he emphasizes 
decadence and desolation,4 where, in describing the Brazilian forest, he 
sees grandiosity. Nevertheless, both scenes are conducive to the creation 
of the entanglement metaphor: 
The Darwinian fixation with entanglement, both in Tierra del Fuego and Brazil 
expresses a struggle towards the sublime that is rooted in Milton’s language 
(Kohn 1997: 26). 
It is worthy of note that Kohn, besides discussing the “entangled bank” 
metaphor, also traces the roots of the “wedging metaphor”5 that appears 
in the Transmutation Notebook of 1838, describing it as the initial 
formulation of the thoughts expressed in the last paragraph of On the 
Origin of Species, where it is finally united with the “entangled bank”. 
As Kohn puts it: 
My claim is that the birth of the entangled bank in 1859 was already 
foreshadowed in the textual framing of the 1838 wedging metaphor […] the 
wedging metaphor and the entangled bank prove to be intimately related in the 
Origin. In the end, they are almost one […] their commonality derives from 
Darwin’s powerful attachment to his version of the romantic aesthetic (Kohn 
1997: 40, italics in original).  
Recalling the earlier discussion on the linkage of the sublime with 
natural force and of the beautiful with calm, Kohn adds one last thought 
regarding Darwin’s metaphors. He argues that in both metaphors, one 
4 Kohn refers to the following quote: “Among the scenes which are deeply impressed on 
my mind, none exceed in sublimity the primeval forests undefaced by the hand of man; 
whether those of Brazil, where the powers of Life are predominant, or those of Tierra del 
Fuego, where Death and Decay prevail” (Darwin 1913: 533-534). 
5 The “wedging metaphor” derives from Darwin’s comment about the necessity of finding 
a structure that could be adapted to change. As Kohn puts it: “The balance of death and 
destruction with life and growth – the oeconomic balance sheet of nature – finds its 
meaning in adaptative change” (Kohn 1997: 37). 
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can detect a kind of preparation of the textual frame, with Darwin 
inviting us to contemplate the natural landscape that he sees, so that he 
can then explain the workings of what he observes. In other words, one 
passes from the beautiful to the sublime within one thought. 
The final fragment of On the Origin of Species displays aesthetic 
sensibility in a “disenchanted” sense, though one should not interpret 
that “disenchantment” as a negative process. One can see how Darwin 
continues to perceive beauty in nature (“endless forms most beautiful 
and most wonderful have been”) despite having uncovered its 
workings.6 In Darwin’s case, there is no “disenchantment” in the 
Weberian sense – quite the opposite. Offering a theory that explains the 
unknown aspects of the evolution of species prompts Darwin to 
approach nature with new eyes, causing him to marvel at it even more 
than before he had discovered his theory of evolution through natural 
selection. George Levine (2008) terms this process “secular re-
enchantment” and notes: 
The excitement that follows upon understanding the instincts that drive birds to 
migrate (and this requires no mystification or invocation of transcendental 
spirit), the astonishment that follows upon recognizing the overwhelming 
complexity of the eye’s functioning (even despite the flaws in the mechanism 
that are clear evidence that there is no intelligent design behind the construction 
of the eye) […] these and all the various knowledges that scientific study of 
nature and the human has been producing are elements of new forms of 
enchantment (Levine 2008: 28). 
I find this approach to Darwin’s perception of nature appealing, and 
therefore I venture to refine somewhat the claims of Paradis, discussed 
earlier: Darwin’s theory of natural selection may not modify the 
appearance of landscape, but it does modify the representational 
instances (previous information, theoretical explanations, etc.) that 
always accompany human experience. This allows Darwin to see in the 
landscape that which the Romantics cannot see. In other words, 
Paradis’s argument could be amended in the sense that while Darwinian 
evolutionism does not modify the “physical appearance” of the 
6 In fact, George Levine (Levine 2008: 31) argues that seeing Darwin’s work as devoid of 
affection for the world is an incorrect way of interpreting it: “The tendency to understand 
Darwin’s world as providing no affective or even rational compensation is […] another of 
the ‘misuses’ –  although perhaps an inevitable one – of Darwin”.  
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landscape (a claim that is trivial, given that no theory can accomplish 
that), it does substantially reshape what the brain or mind sees. In other 
words, it does not alter what the eyes see, but it does change the human 
perception of the images on the retina; that is, it changes the 
interpretation of the landscape, the human sensations, the 
“apperception” (Leibniz) – and, finally, the internal experience, 
including the aesthetic experience. 
3. Darwin’s Autobiography and the loss of aesthetic taste
One of the aspects of the Autobiography that has received the most 
scholarly attention is Darwin’s statement that he is losing his aesthetic 
taste. This loss begins with poetry, previously a source of pleasure to 
Darwin. 
The naturalist notes in his autobiography that he used to read 
poetry. But he also confesses that he has completely lost the taste for it 
over the years: “Later in life I wholly lost, to my great regret, all pleasure 
of poetry of any kind” (Darwin 1887: 33). Darwin states that his taste for 
poetry lasted until he was thirty years old, but that since that age, poetry 
began to bore him to the point of nausea: 
Up to the age of thirty, or beyond it, poetry of many kinds, such as the works of 
Milton, Gray, Byron, Wordsworth, Coleridge, and Shelley, gave me great 
pleasure, and even as a schoolboy I took intense delight in Shakespeare, 
especially in the historical plays. I have also said that formerly pictures gave me 
considerable, and music very great delight. But now for many years I cannot 
endure to read a line of poetry: I have tried lately to read Shakespeare, and found 
it so intolerably dull that it nauseated me (Darwin 1887: 100-101). 
Besides poetry, art and music had also given pleasure to Darwin. Yet in 
his old age, Darwin had so completely lost his taste for most art forms 
that he even felt that a part of his brain – the part related to the aesthetic 
(the higher tastes) – had atrophied; only some feeling for the beauty of 
scenery was left, and even that was reduced. Darwin finds this loss very 
strange: 
I retain some taste for fine scenery but it does not cause me the exquisite delight 
which it formerly did […] This curious and lamentable loss of the higher 
aesthetic tastes is all the odder, as books on history, biographies, and travels 
(independently of any scientific facts which they may contain), and essays on all 
sorts of subjects interest me as much as ever they did. My mind seems to have 
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become a kind of machine for grinding general laws out of large collections of 
facts, but why this should have caused the atrophy of that part of the brain alone, 
on which the higher tastes depend, I cannot conceive (Darwin 1887: 101). 
Darwin’s words are not simply a dispassionate acknowledgement of a 
loss of interest in poetry, painting, and music. Instead, Darwin conveys 
his grief at the loss, which he suspects may have further consequences: 
The loss of these tastes is a loss of happiness, and may possibly be injurious to 
the intellect, and more probably to the moral character, by enfeebling the 
emotional part of our nature (Darwin 1887: 102). 
This “enfeebling of the emotional part of our nature” is what seems to 
worry Darwin most; this is hardly surprising given its importance for 
Darwin in previous years. In addition to the explicit emotion that he 
himself in the Journal of Researches described himself feeling, his son, 
Francis Darwin, recounts the childlike manner in which his father 
observed and admired flowers: 
I used to like to hear him admire the beauty of a flower; it was a kind of 
gratitude to the flower itself, and a personal love for its delicate form and colour. 
I seem to remember him gently touching a flower he delighted in; it was the 
same simple admiration that a child might have (Darwin 1887: 117). 
This same admiration, that Francis Darwin considers childlike, can also 
be seen, though not in exactly the same form, in a passage in the Journal 
of Researches, where Darwin describes how his experiences in the 
Brazilian forest produced in him a feeling that there is more to human 
beings than the corporeal. By contrast, in the later Autobiography he 
describes himself as, in a way, color-blind. If the scenes of the Brazilian 
forest in years past had prompted in him a sense of belief in something 
more than the corporeal, with the passage of time, these scenes, so 
closely connected to a belief in God, ceased producing that effect in 
Darwin. The naturalist proclaims that the same scenes would no longer 
call forth in him the same sensations of the sublime, that is, of 
sentiments related to the divine. 
It is possible that Darwin understood, or intuited, that the aesthetic 
sense, like the moral instinct, also has bio-evolutionary roots, so that the 
connection with the sublime, that aesthetic theories since Plato had 
affirmed, would be lost. It is known that Darwin lost at least the onto-
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theological significance of the beauty of natural landscapes – that is, he 
no longer perceived them as vestigia Dei (traces of the Creator). This 
onto-theological perception of the landscape is inseparable from the 
traditional pre-Darwinist aesthetics: beauty as a manifestation of the 
sublime (divine) in man and in nature. 
Various authors have contributed towards an explanation of 
Darwin’s loss of aesthetic taste. John A. Campbell notes that two 
explanations have dominated attempts to solve the question of Darwin’s 
affective decline. On the one hand, Campbell suggests that decline has 
been attributed to Darwin’s overconcentration on scientific studies, and, 
on the other, to his loss of religious faith (Campbell 1974: 159). Two 
types of evidence, states Campbell, have been used to support these 
claims: first, the testimony of the Autobiography, and second, the 
limited relevance that Darwin in The Descent of Man (1871) accords to 
emotion and imagination in man’s future evolution. In Campbell’s view, 
however, these interpretations of Darwin’s affective decline are based on 
an incorrect or partial reading of Darwin’s texts, and are in conflict with 
explicit evidence in those texts. Although there is some generally 
accepted evidence, such as the above-mentioned aspects of the 
Autobiography and The Descent of Man, Campbell considers that claims 
regarding Darwin’s affective decline are made without sufficient 
attention to other relevant pieces of evidence. 
Campbell bases his theory on a distinction between art and nature. 
Campbell’s argument is that while it is evident that Darwin suffers a 
substantial loss of interest in art – and indeed, affirms that loss himself 
in the Autobiography – no comparable loss of interest in nature can be 
detected in Darwin’s texts, nor does Darwin claim to suffer such a loss. 
Darwin’s affective responsiveness to nature did not undergo a decline at all 
comparable to his decline of interest in art […] One need not read far in any of 
Darwin’s works to see that one of the most striking aspects of Darwin’s 
emotional response is his manner of describing the natural world. The language 
of Darwin’s descriptions betrays a relationship with the objects of his study that 
is personal and affective. In his earliest work his praise of nature is expectedly 
exuberant (Campbell 1974: 161-162). 
To be sure, even if Darwin’s manner of observing and describing nature 
did not become completely unemotional, it did nevertheless change: 
“[a]s he grew older, Darwin’s response, without ceasing to be intense, 
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became less effervescent and more serene” (Campbell 1974: 163-164). 
Nevertheless, this merely indicates a change in the character of Darwin’s 
emotional sensibility to nature, not a disappearance of that sensibility. 
Campbell next makes an attempt to discover whether Darwin’s 
affective response to nature had religious roots. Comparing Darwin to 
the natural theologian William Paley, Campbell states that they share “a 
delight in the particular, but the difference between them is that for 
Darwin the particulars of nature have very little connection with God” 
(Campbell 1974: 166). And yet, faced with the Brazilian jungle, Darwin 
had referred to the existence of something more than the corporeal in a 
human being. Viewing these types of situations as general and the 
observation of a flower as something particular, Campbell argues that 
for Darwin, God was a “God of things in general” (Campbell 1974: 167). 
In looking for the source of the delight that Darwin takes in nature, 
Campbell links Darwin’s love of nature with his conception of science, 
suggesting that the emotional force of the first years of the naturalist’s 
work might almost have eclipsed the scientific rigor of his observations, 
whereas in his later years the situation was the reverse (ibid.). According 
to Campbell, however, Darwin achieved a balance between science and 
emotional delight in nature – a balance rooted in his humanist vision of 
nature (Campbell 1974: 168). Darwin demonstrates this humanism in 
not evincing any discomfort with comparing human beings with the 
most humble organisms imaginable, even expressing admiration for 
such organisms. This acknowledgment of apparently insignificant 
organisms is what makes the human being worthy of participating in 
the organic flow of life. Darwin, therefore, says Campbell, “humanizes 
knowledge through emotion” (Campbell 1974: 173). 
Having established Darwin’s continued emotional appreciation of 
nature, Campbell locates the source of his complete dedication to 
science in his later years in the serious illness that he suffered and that 
left him without the energy to pursue other studies, including artistic 
ones: “Darwin’s decline of interest in literature and music was not so 
much part of a larger hostility to art as a response to a life situation 
which did not allow him a reserve of emotional energy sufficient for its 
demands” (Campbell 1974: 173).  
In Charles Darwin, the Anaesthetic Man, Donald Fleming begins 
his explanation of Darwin’s loss of interest in the aesthetic by describing 
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the tradition of “dissociation of knowledge and sensibility; fact and 
affect” that, it is argued, leaves people with only the capacity to know and 
not the capacity to feel (Fleming 1961: 220). In addition, Fleming 
focuses on the influence of religion: according to him, it influenced 
Darwin in the worst possible sense, being an important factor in 
Darwin’s loss of interest in aesthetics. Fleming asks: “Why did Darwin 
experience this atrophy of the aesthetic instincts?” (Fleming 1961: 225) 
and locates the key to the puzzle in Darwin’s experience with the feeling 
of the sublime, which links his loss of aesthetic taste to his views on 
religion. 
Fleming states that although Darwin never precisely defines what he 
means by “the sublime”, it is clear that “[t]he sublime was associated by 
Darwin with an upwelling from the depths of the spirit that appeared to 
set reason aside and prevail over it” (Fleming 1961: 226). Fleming 
emphasizes the role of various fundamental pillars like scenic grandeur, 
religion, and the sublime: “Great art by association with scenic 
grandeur, scenic grandeur with religion, and all three with the sublime, 
became part of a single universe of experience” (ibid.). It is not difficult, 
therefore, to detect in Darwin’s texts a connection between the feeling of 
the sublime, achieved through linking art with nature, and religious 
feeling.  
In Fleming’s view, if Darwin came to lose his taste for the aesthetic, 
that was due to his insistence on distancing himself from the religious 
(Fleming 1961: 227), an insistence that is clear in his works. Given the 
connection between religious feeling and the feeling of the sublime, 
Fleming considers it logical that Darwin’s effort to gradually distance 
himself from religion be accompanied by a symmetrical distancing from 
the sublime and from everything derived from the aesthetics of 
landscape. There is, also, a further question. Referring to feelings, 
Fleming notes: “Intense feeling was undesirable in Darwin’s own 
experience as exacerbating his already keen sensitivities […] Therein lay a 
tremendous ambiguity at the very heart of Darwin’s position” (p. 229). 
That ambiguity is embedded in the theory of natural selection, which 
collides with the search for and broadening of the good in religion 
because it emphasizes “pain, suffering, frustration, and unfulfillment” 
so that “[a]ny good that comes of it, comes by evil” (ibid., italics in 
original). Fleming describes Darwin’s view of this as follows: 
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To him [Darwin], a God that dwelt in natural selection would be the worst of all 
possible Gods. For the proprietor of the universe to have to seek for a mere 
preponderance of good over evil in the world that he made, which was the best 
that could be said for any progress attained by natural selection, was monstrous 
to Darwin’s eyes (Fleming 1961: 231).  
Darwin, furthermore, finds no solace in the claim that suffering is a 
means to moral improvement: that claim, for him, only makes it all the 
more unacceptable to think that a benevolent God should have created 
millions of animals below humans in the animal scale, and these can 
obtain no moral improvement from the suffering that is supposed to 
offer an opportunity for it (ibid.). 
One might even state that Darwin’s rejection of art is due to the fact 
that natural selection presupposes the very opposite of nature 
understood as a work of art. Fleming, however, argues that the source of 
that rejection is more appropriately located in Darwin’s determination 
not to be an accomplice to evil by accepting the dominion of God 
(Fleming 1961: 232). If one understands the sublime as the act of 
observing the relentless power of nature, always seen from a distance, 
that produces the feeling of human insignificance in the face of natural 
force, it seems logical to argue that Darwin rejects the possibility of 
accepting the existence of a God that imposes evil from above: 
The chief lie of lying religion for him was that evil could have been inflicted 
from on high instead of simply occurring. If, by access to the sublime, he should 
assent to this lie, his act of charity to mankind for uncovering the harsh 
necessity of natural selection would fall to the ground (Fleming 1961: 233).  
The only possibility of incorporating art into Darwin’s system would, 
therefore, be the discovery of a constructive role for religion in the 
evolution of humanity: 
The iron band that clamped art, sublimity, and religion together in his own 
experience would have meant that the obvious way to build art into his system 
would be to assign a powerful role to religion as a constructive force in the 
development of mankind (Fleming 1961: 235). 
4. Conclusion 
A variety of explanations have been offered for Darwin’s loss of aesthetic 
taste. Yet one should not, perhaps, understand this loss as the complete 
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elimination of aesthetic taste, but rather as a modification produced by 
the move from an enchanted explanation of the workings of nature to an 
explanation that does not require a mystical element. Darwinian 
evolution represents one of the most prominent milestones of the 
process of desacralization or secularization of the world that modern 
culture entails. Desacralization, however, is not specifically Darwinian as 
a whole, only in its application to living things and particularly to the 
human condition. 
A scientific naturalism such as Darwinian evolutionism implies a 
complete conceptual revision of basic ontological presuppositions 
relating to nature (‘species’, ‘substance’, ‘natural law’, ‘teleology’, etc.). 
These modifications have correlations in nature perceptions, including 
their aesthetic perception and, therefore, also in nature descriptions. 
Contrary to what is sometimes claimed, the secularized view of the 
world that Darwinism promotes carries with it neither a devaluation of 
moral or aesthetic sentiments nor the dehumanization of existence. 
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The Puntel-Whitehead Method for Philosophy 
Benjamin Andrae 
(Munich School of Philosophy) 
The point of departure for this essay is the observation that it is not 
only metaphysics that is called into question in modern times, but all 
of philosophy. The basis of this impression, as argued in the first 
section, is the lack of real progress in philosophy – especially if 
compared with the rapid advances that most other sciences have 
made in the 20th and 21st centuries. One main reason for this failure 
of philosophy is analyzed in the second section: the deductive method 
that many philosophers apply is found to be inherently flawed. 
Especially in metaphysical debates, the claim that we can somehow 
intuit absolutely certain propositions on which to base the whole 
discussion is fruitless, as an example from the metaphysics of free 
will shows. Here and elsewhere, differing intuitions leave us with 
unhappy stalemates which stand in the way of progress. To avoid this 
situation, an alternative method is presented in the third section: We 
should not consider the truth as the starting point of a philosophical 
way of thinking, but rather as its ultimate goal. Instead of starting 
with intuitively true propositions, we start with vague explananda – as 
they are presented to us by common sense or by other theoretical 
frameworks that we already find ourselves in. The goal of 
philosophical explanation is then to give a unified account of many of 
these explananda, and thus render them as intelligible as possible. By 
presenting this method via the thoughts of Alfred North Whitehead 
and Lorenz Bruno Puntel – who are two of the most important, most 
revolutionary and most systematic and metaphysical thinkers of the 
20th and 21st centuries – it is shown that such a method does not 
have any inherent limitations, and can reach great speculative depth. 
We just have to remember that such metaphysics gains its 
justification from its ability to make all of reality intelligible, rather 
than from some mysterious insight into the nature of things. 
1. Is philosophy ‘just empty talk’?
Most, if not all, of us who have made academic philosophy their – 
temporary or permanent – professional occupation know the colloquial 
challenge: “All you people do is talk all the time, with nothing ever being 
decided.” Now sometimes, upon our vehement opposition to such a 
simplistic and non-constructive remark, a clever conversational partner 
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answers: “Then name one, just one, issue that philosophy has settled to 
universal agreement in the past two-and-a-half millennia.” 
Now we are in trouble. Really? Are we? Different retorts spring to 
mind: You might want to simply argue that this is not true, i.e. that there 
are lots of definite philosophical results. 
Another way of answering might be to claim that other disciplines 
do not fare any better; that huge revolutions of thought have happened 
and will happen in every discipline, and thus there is no such thing as 
universal agreement. Thus, the failure to deliver permanent results 
would not be a special – blameworthy – feature of philosophy. 
Both these ways of answering, though, do not usually convince. 
They both fall prey to what I call the ‘time-traveler-objection’: Imagine a 
well-educated person, say someone with a masters degree in some 
subject, were to travel back in time to talk to the founders of their 
discipline. In mathematics, physics and biology, in history, geography, 
medicine and psychology, even in education and economics, the master 
student would certainly make quite an impression on his historic 
predecessor. Talking about the advances in modern geometry to Euclid, 
about modern western medicine to Hippocrates, about the theory of 
relativity to Newton or even about modern psychological methods and 
theories to Freud would be quite an event. Probably the new 
developments would not always be greeted, but certainly the old masters 
would consider you a scholar of first rate, if not a genius. 
On the other hand, talking modern philosophy with Plato (or, even 
worse, with Socrates) is not – I imagine – something where one would 
come off as a genius. Rather, I guess, modern theories would be 
confronted with the same arguments that are given in the classical texts, 
which are also still put forward in modern debates by experts on ancient 
philosophy. 
And while some of the modern ideas would probably excite the 
interest of the ancient philosophers, I guess that there would be just as 
many that they would look upon as thoroughly misguided – and no 
amount of argument would make them change their minds. 
This idea of the time-traveler shows that both ways of answering the 
above challenge – that there is no real progress in philosophy – do not 
work. There really is a difference. Philosophy does not make progress 
like other disciplines do.  
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Maybe the way to answer the critic is to embrace this fact. Again, 
there are two possible strategies to argue that, while yes, philosophy does 
not seem to make appreciable progress, it is still a worthwhile 
enterprise, indeed very much so. 
The first strategy is to say that in philosophy, the goal is a different 
kind of knowledge, and that while this knowledge does not know real 
progress, it still – and with great effort – needs to be sought for anew by 
each generation. Kierkegaard formulated this idea by saying: “Whatever 
one generation learns from another, it can never learn from a 
predecessor the genuinely human factor. In this respect, every 
generation begins afresh, has no task other than that of any previous 
generation, and comes no further, provided the latter didn’t shirk its task 
and deceive itself.”1 
The second strategy to argue in favor of philosophy, in the face of its 
apparent lack of progress, is to say that philosophy is very, very difficult. 
There is progress, this argument claims, it is just much, much slower 
than in other sciences. This difficulty, the argument continues, stems 
from the core of the philosophical enterprise itself: It is at the end of the 
food-chain of explanation. Peter Simons puts this as follows: “One of the 
problems about being a philosopher is that you cannot shove the hard 
questions off onto someone else. Other sciences can leave a hard 
question aside, saying, ‘That’s a problem for philosophers, not for us.’ 
The buck stops with us.”2 
Further, and partly as a consequence of having to answer the left-
over questions from every other discipline, philosophy has to, and wants 
to – in a way – be about everything. It has a fundamentally universal 
aspiration, attested to here by Jorge Gracia: “Only philosophy aims to be 
fully comprehensive. Philosophy aims to produce a big picture, even of 
partial aspects of the world; it is not content with partial pictures of the 
world, or any of its parts.”3 These two – one could say ‘metaphysical’ – 
1 Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling (London: Penguin Books 2003), 145 (in the 
epilogue). 
2 Peter Simons, Interview in Metaphysics: 5 Questions, ed. Asbjørn Steglich-Peterson 
(Copenhagen: Automatic Press / VIP 2010), 138. 
3 Jorge Gracia, Metaphysics and its Task (Albany: State University of New York Press 1999), 
11. 
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aspects certainly makes philosophy much harder than any other 
discipline. 
What are we to make of this second pair of arguments? They both 
contain a meaningful insight, and, unlike the previous arguments, 
cannot be discarded as simply wrong. Yet, they both do not quite satisfy. 
The first, essentially existentialist, argument shows that philosophy – as 
it is sometimes practiced – has a non-theoretic aspect. Some 
philosophers are not simply after a true theory, but after much more. 
That more might be called wisdom, spiritual insight, moral uprightness, 
beauty or even salvation. Kierkegaard, in the paragraph following the 
above citation, says that the ‘humane factor’ he is speaking of is 
‘passion’, is ‘loving’. 
I do not wish to belittle any of these goals of philosophers – which 
are absolutely worth pursuing –  but one cannot help but notice that 
their attainment is not really promoted by what academic philosophy 
does – which is publish articles and books containing theoretic 
sentences. 
As long as it is granted, as I think it should be, that there is a 
meaningful way to use the term ‘the discipline philosophy’, and that this 
term denotes a fundamentally theoretical activity – engaged in, during at 
least the last few centuries, by women and men in universities, just like 
any other theoretical activity – let me restrict the above arguments to this 
use of the term. The kind of knowledge sought after in this discipline, a 
true theory, is not so fundamentally different from the knowledge that 
other disciplines seek.4 Consequently, the problem that this theoretical 
endeavor does not seem to make a lot of progress appears with 
undiminished force, and the Kierkegaardian way of thinking does not 
apply anymore. 
The second argument, that philosophy is just so very hard, due to its 
4 Of course, this academic discipline of philosophy can – as it in fact does – include 
theories of ethics, beauty, salvation, etc. But a theory of beauty wants to be true, not 
beautiful, and a theory of salvation wants to be true, and not bring about salvation in either 
the reader or the writer. Note also that theories can be integrated in other endeavors, as 
when someone utters the normative (and thus non-theoretic) sentence: “Find out what is 
the right thing to do and then do it!” But such a sentence can never be a part of academic 
philosophy, conceived as (merely) the search for a true theory. 
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fundamental and universal nature, also sees something that is correct – 
namely precisely this dual character that sets philosophy apart from any 
other academic discipline. And yes, it is thanks to this character that 
philosophy is more difficult than other endeavors: in philosophy, and 
especially in the part of philosophy that is called ‘metaphysics’, we tend 
to go all the way and offer a final interpretation of matters, and it is 
precisely this that interests us in the first place. Certainly, this is very 
hard. 
The second argument goes quite a long way in rationalizing the 
apparent lack of real progress in philosophy. 
Yet, as an excuse, saying that the progress is ever-so-slow because 
the task is so very hard comes off as a bit feeble. More importantly, it 
somewhat misrepresents how academic philosophy fails to make a lot of 
progress – which is precisely by neglecting its universal aspiration, and 
by misunderstanding its fundamental one. It seems that for every 
philosophical position these days there is at least one that claims the 
exact opposite, and very little effort or hope to reconcile the two. As for 
the fact that philosophy wants to – and has to – offer final 
interpretations, the problem is that these are understood as ‘the basis’, 
or the foundation, of thought. Therefore, whenever there is change to 
these ‘basics’, the whole building of philosophy collapses (for those who 
support the change) and a new one is erected. This leads to numerous 
positions which are not just opposite to a given position, but which are – 
or claim to be – utterly incomparable to it, giving rise to the impression 
that nothing is ever decided in philosophy. 
So, while the theoretical, fundamental and universal science that is 
academic philosophy is certainly very difficult, this difficulty is not the 
only culprit for its lack of progress, and cannot completely account for it. 
Rather, we are faced with a situation in which we have to agree, only 
to a certain extent and after important clarifications, with the critic: 
academic philosophy really does not always make enough definite 
progress, and thus becomes vulnerable to the charge of being ‘just 
empty talk’5. 
5 After I had written this paper, it was brought to my attention that David Chalmers has an 
unpublished paper on his website (at http://consc.net/papers/progress.pdf) called, 'On the 
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However, in analyzing the attempts to counter the critic, we have 
made important steps towards diagnosing just what the problem might 
be. 
2. Starting out with the truth 
Most philosophical arguments come down to a modus ponens: One 
affirms statement A, and the fact that A implies B, and from that 
concludes that B is true. An example, taken from the metaphysics of free 
will, would be: “Given the truth of Determinism, and the fact that 
Determinism does imply that there is no free will, it follows that there is 
no free will.” Obviously, there is nothing wrong with this logically. In 
standard propositional logic ((A ^ (A → B))  → B) is a theorem. More 
importantly, this is the way we naturally deduce a truth from other 
truths: “It is raining outside, and I know that if it is raining outside, then 
I do not need to water the plants in the garden today; so, I do not need to 
water the plants in the garden today.”  No one in his right mind would – 
on philosophical or logical grounds – want to criticize this line of 
thought. 
How, then, does this tool fare in philosophical discussion? Coming 
back to the metaphysics of free will, there is a lot of debate about the 
conclusion, namely that there is no free will. In fact, this is a prime 
example where no definite result of any kind is in sight. What do these 
philosophers debate? And how is this different from the case of the rain 
in the garden? 
The difference lies in the fact that in the philosophical argument the 
premises are far from certainly true. In the case of the rain in the 
garden, one usually relies on one’s senses to affirm the fact that it is 
raining, and on one’s theoretical and practical experience with botany to 
affirm the fact that with enough rain plants do not need extra water. 
Limits of Philosophical Progress', where he shares my diagnosis that philosophy has not 
made enough progress on the big questions, and says about this fact: “To me, this is the 
largest disappointment in the practice of philosophy.” (p. 4). He discusses the possibility 
that the method of philosophy is partially to blame – as I will claim below – but does not 
offer an alternative – as I will do below. 
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Neither of these inputs is subject to reasonable doubt, under normal 
circumstances. 
In the philosophical debate, on the other hand, the truth of 
‘Determinism obtains’ and/or ‘Determinism does imply that there is no 
free will’ is very much in question. So, a debate trying to decide the truth 
of one statement – ‘there is no free will’ – has turned into a debate trying 
to decide the truth of (at least) two other statements. So far, still, there is 
absolutely nothing wrong with this: the truth-values of these three 
different statements are definitely somehow entangled, and thus one 
cannot decide on the truth of one of them without regarding that of the 
others. 
Yet, factually, the situation has devolved somewhat. What we are 
stuck with is an argument about the logical form of which there is no 
question, together with different people assuming different truth-values 
for the premises of the argument, obviously leading to different 
conclusions.6 This situation repeats itself in quite a few other 
philosophical debates, leading to unhappy stalemates and certainly not 
to any progress in the project of obtaining a universal and fundamental 
theory.7 
So, how can we go about breaking such stalemates? Here it becomes 
problematic. If we stick to the above method of arguing, we need 
another modus ponens that has the problematic premises in question as 
conclusions. But of course, this second modus ponens would again have 
premises. The process would have to be repeated until we hit premises 
that are self-evident, or at least practically indubitable, like in the ‘rain in 
the garden’ case. Unfortunately, in many cases no such deductions from 
universally self-evident truths can be given for a philosophical debate, 
and all one ends up with is different ‘intuitions’ of what is self-evident 
6 This can lead to both sides accusing the other of 'begging the question'. An example 
concerning the free-will debate, where the difficulties involved in this accusation come out 
nicely, is: John Martin Fischer and Garret Pendergraft, “Does the consequence argument 
beg the question?”, forthcoming. 
7 It almost seems as if modern philosophers have sussed out Socrates' trick of making 
people agree to seemingly harmless premises and then deducing uncomfortable 
conclusions – to such an extent that nowadays many philosophical debates very quickly 
lead to: 'wait wait wait, I do not assume this premise'. If you don't like the conclusion, 
simply deny one of the premises appears to be the motto. 
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for different philosophers – rather than real progress. 
In the face of this dilemma, one might be tempted to go for what is 
sometimes termed ‘conditional philosophy’ – i.e. arguing only for 
certain inferences of the form ‘if you assume this, then it follows that’ – 
without affirming the first premise. More generally, this amounts to 
uncovering ways in which philosophical questions are related, without 
ever asking which actually is the correct theory. While such work has 
considerable merit – it is usually very difficult – this leaves something to 
be desired if we actually want definite progress.8 
No. If we want such progress, we have to turn to altogether different 
methods. In what follows, I will go on to showcase one such method, 
based on the works of Lorenz Bruno Puntel and Alfred North Whitehead 
– who are two of the very few systematic and metaphysical thinkers of 
modernity – which is based on the idea that truth is not the starting 
point of philosophical thought, but its final stage. Thus, as I hope to 
show in the next section, it avoids the unhappy stalemates described 
above and might have the potential of resulting in some real 
philosophical progress. 
3. The Puntel-Whitehead Method 
Let me start with a few words of warning: Puntel’s and Whitehead’s 
ideas about methodology are deeply intertwined with the rest of their 
philosophical systems, and thus a greater understanding of those ideas 
can be gained by studying their respective works in toto.9 Since I cannot 
provide such a grand perspective here, we will have to make do with a 
look at the main points, densely focused on dealing with the issues 
8 This 'conditional philosophy' is what I think many of the publications about the 
metaphysics of free will are about these days. 
9 The main sources for these works are: Lorenz Bruno Puntel Structure and Being 
(University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press 2008) – in the following 
abbreviated as SB – and: Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality. Corrected Edition, 
ed. David R. Griffin and Donald W. Sherburn (New York: Free Press 1979). Originally 
published in 1929 – in the following abbreviated as PR. Both abbreviations are then 
followed by the page number. 
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discussed in the first two sections.10  Let us get started with that: 
Puntel, in one sentence, sums up the difference between his 
method (the ‘systematic’ one, which is yet to be explained) and the 
‘foundationalist’ one (described in the last section) as: 
“The foundationalist process is, to put it one way, ‘archaeologically’ oriented, 
whereas for the systematic process of grounding, the designation, ‘teleological’ 
is appropriate. […] a systematic philosophy is metasystematically grounded, not 
when it is foundationally established, that is, not when it is developed on the 
basis of foundational theses that are established as they are presented, but only 
when, after it has been completed, it is considered as a whole.”(SB 68) 
In a very similar vein, Whitehead says: 
“Philosophy has been haunted by the unfortunate notion that its method is to 
indicate dogmatically premises which are respectively clear, distinct, and certain; 
and to erect upon those premises a deductive system of thought. But the 
accurate expression of the final generalities is the goal of discussion and not its 
origin. […] The verification of a rationalistic scheme is to be sought in its general 
success, and not in the peculiar certainty, or initial clarity, of its first 
principles.”(PR 8) 
The clarification of both these centrally important statements of the 
basic idea about how progress in philosophy can be achieved is the goal 
of most of the rest of this essay. 
The first issue to be clarified will be this: If we cannot start with 
affirmed premises, then where do we start? Despite its highly theoretical 
nature, this is also a very pragmatic question. I want to have a good 
philosophical theory about this-and-that, how do I go about obtaining 
one? What should I do first? 
The answer is that precisely the above mentioned ‘this-and-that’ is 
your starting point. The things that you want your theory to explain, with 
all their vagueness and indeterminacies, with their inherent demand to 
be clarified, are the points of departure. 
A positive aspect – again from a pragmatic standpoint – is that here 
the chance for agreement between different philosophers and even 
10 As a consequence, the differences – which are definitely present even at the 
methodological level, and much more so when looking at each of their respective systems 
as a whole – between the ideas of Puntel and Whitehead are not the main concern of this 
essay. 
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schools of philosophy is much higher. We do not have to agree to the 
final, determinate form of the theory, but we have to agree what it is that 
we actually want to explain. 
I will call this starting point the initial ‘datum’, in the following 
sense:  
“Our datum is the actual world, including ourselves; and this actual world 
spreads itself for observation in the guise of the topic of our immediate 
experience. The elucidation of immediate experience is the sole justification for 
any thought; and the starting point […]. But we are not conscious of any clear-cut 
complete analysis of immediate experience.” (PR 4) 
“The dimension of the universe of discourse is the comprehensive datum in the 
literal sense: what is given to philosophy to be conceptualized and/or explained 
(i.e., everything with which philosophical theorization can and must be 
concerned).” (SB 10) 
It is important to note that this sense of ‘datum’ cannot be restricted to 
any of the usual senses of the word; neither are we restricted to positions 
of pointers in what we want to explain, nor in the impressions of our 
senses – although these things certainly are among the data. The term 
simply includes everything of interest: the price of a cup of coffee at my 
favorite cafe, the color of the Mediterranean on a cloudy morning, the 
various demands of my conscience to act in one way or another, the 
nature of theoretical implication itself and its various possible 
formulations, the mathematical structure of general relativity, last 
night’s dreams, Darwin’s theory of evolution or the feelings evoked by a 
particular poem on a particular day are but a few examples of such data. 
This wide conception of data is, in my view, one of the most 
important aspects of this method. It means that philosophy – thus 
conceived – is at the core a positive, productive effort that cannot and 
should not exclude any facets of the world as mere appearances or 
illusions, or as falling categorically outside of its scope. Whitehead says: 
“Philosophy may not neglect the multifariousness of the world.”(PR 338) 
Yet, we must always remember this: data are not ‘true’, for truth will 
have to wait until the end of inquiry. They are merely the explananda, 
the things that could and ultimately should be explained by a theory. 
Puntel (following Rescher) says: “‘Datum’ here can be understood as a 
candidate for inclusion in a theory or for truth.” (SB 11) 
It is worth noting that, since we do not build our philosophy upon 
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as-evident-as-possible assumptions, there is no privileged starting topic 
for philosophy according to this method; nothing needs to be settled 
first, before other questions can be approached. We can start wherever 
we want, and thus the very many different projects engaged in by 
modern philosophy are all prima facie relevant. The only thing one must 
keep in mind is the universal aspiration of philosophy, which is to 
eventually include and integrate (in a sense to be detailed below) all the 
data. 
Now, one crucial question needs to be answered regarding these 
‘data’: Are they somehow pure, as in ‘independent of every theory’? The 
answer comes from Puntel, and is a resounding ‘No!’ – and it already 
includes directions for how we are to proceed from the data: 
“The datum, thus the particular data, is/are available as prestructured, at the 
fundamental or zero-level of theorization, within everyday theoretical 
frameworks relying on ordinary language, and on higher levels of theorization 
within the theoretical frameworks of the various sciences, including philosophy. 
They include all the ‘somethings’ that emerge as articulated theoretically in the 
universe of ordinary discourse when there is talk of ‘things’, ‘the world’, ‘the 
universe’, etc. Systematic philosophy must attend to these and to relevant 
higher-level articulations and attempt to bring all these data into a 
comprehensive theory. Doing so does not involve accepting such data as in any 
important sense “ready-made” components of the theory; quite on the contrary, 
they are precisely candidates for restructuration within the theory, items that 
must be conceptualized and explained, a process that involves radical 
corrections and transformations.” (SB 11) 
Here we see two centrally important points: (a) The fact that ‘data’ are 
always already within what Puntel calls a ‘theoretical framework’. Thus, 
if I want – coming back to the previous example – a good theory of the 
free-will issue, I will start with ‘Determinism within mathematical 
physics’ and/or ‘Determinism as divine foreknowledge in theology’, and 
with ‘Freedom as concept in everyday thought’ and/or ‘Freedom in 
moral theory’ and/or ‘Freedom in the theory of law’, etc. Also, we see 
that (b) the suggested method does not – not at all – content itself with 
collecting different facts, e.g. uses in ordinary language, and ordering 
them a bit. On the contrary, it does not shy away from radical re-
interpretation (Whitehead and Puntel offer two of the most innovative 
metaphysical systems available!). The method starts with what we have, 
and proceeds boldly from there. How, exactly, it does that, will be the 
next issue for our discussion. 
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Once we have our data, the first thing we have to do is articulate 
them. For example, when looking at ‘Freedom as a concept in everyday 
thought’, we will look at the different parts of the notion within the 
realm of everyday thought and their connections. Preferably, this 
articulation takes some simple logical form, such as propositional logic. 
Here, philosophers need to practice restraint, and tolerate what – from 
our point of view – must look horribly vague at times. Note that this has 
the practical advantage that agreement is very likely; no-one’s 
philosophical theory is at stake yet, all we do is lay out what it is that we 
want to explain. Of course, if the datum stems from a more theoretical 
area, e.g. mathematical physics, good knowledge of the datum’s position 
within that area – and a more fine-grained structure than propositional 
logic – is required.11 Often this very simple first step of articulating what 
it is that one is actually trying to explain is a decisive factor in weeding 
out misunderstandings, and thus should be carefully undertaken. 
Next, we take our datum, which is always – as we have seen – 
already located within some theoretical framework, and collide it with 
another datum. In the free-will debate, for example, we collide the 
datum of ‘Determinism’ with that of ‘Freedom’. But since they are both 
set in their respective theoretical surroundings, such a ‘collision’ is only 
possible if we formulate a new theory that includes both the data. We 
have to speculate, and try to come up with a theory that includes, but 
transforms the initial data. Only if the new theory can include both data, 
have we been successful, and we have a better theory than we had before 
– and thus we have made real philosophical progress. Whitehead 
describes this in his famous metaphor: 
“The true method of discovery is like the flight of an airplane. It starts from the 
ground of particular observation; it makes a flight in the thin air of imaginative 
11 It is possible, though, that at this stage some theory proves inconsistent. In this case, we 
either abandon the attempt at explanation of all of it and restrict our attention to some 
consistent 'subset' of the data, or we 'live with' the inconsistency, hoping that it will 
disappear along the way to more comprehensive theories. Further note that circularity, of 
the form A → B → C → A, or partial circularity, should not be considered a lethal flaw for 
a theory at this stage. All we do is articulate the structure of a datum, and if it includes 
such loops, then so be it. We are – after all – not looking for self-evident premises to 
affirm! 
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generalization; and it again lands for renewed observation rendered acute by 
rational interpretation.” (PR 5) 
How are we to understand that a theory ‘includes, but transforms’ the 
data? Something has to remain the same about them and something has 
to change about them. To put it briefly: What remains the same is the 
structure of the initial data, what changes is their position regarding the 
rest of the (now much bigger) system. An example could be how, even 
after integration into a theory of ‘Human agency and natural laws’, the 
datum ‘Determinism within mathematical physics’ still maintains its 
mathematical shape; for example the Picard–Lindelöf theorem still 
holds, and relevant differential equations still have unique solutions. 
What changes is how we interpret this mathematical structure, that is, 
how the different elements in it relate to the other parts of the theory. 
This is what Whitehead means when he says that ‘renewed observation 
is rendered acute by rational interpretation’. 
Note that this interpretative inclusion in a wider framework also 
can, and should, provide many conceptual relations between different 
data that were previously absent: Now, within the larger theory, we gain 
a better understanding of the terms than we previously had within our 
smaller theories, as they are also explained in terms of one another. 
Coherence – understood as intelligibility – has increased. 
Possibly, and indeed probably, not all the vagueness that we felt lay 
in the initial data, has disappeared yet. Then, what we do is, we include 
more data. If – for example – you are not satisfied with your theory of 
‘Human agency and natural laws’, even after formulating it in a 
systematic way that includes all the initial data, then drag in data from 
the philosophy of mind. 
In fact, according to the universal aspiration of philosophy – which 
strives to be not just a conjunction of different topics, but a unified 
theory – any datum that has not yet been included will keep ‘pushing in’, 
asking for expression in the theory, forcing us, again and again, to give 
up the orthodoxy of a closed theory to admit the next datum, leading, in 
turn, to a just-a-bit-more-intelligible theory. This openness to data, in 
contrast with a tendency to explain away or ignore anything that does not 
fit a theory, is something that Whitehead thought very important, and 
admired about Locke: “The enduring importance of Locke’s work comes 
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from the candor, clarity and adequacy with which he states the evidence. 
[...] He explained, in the sense of stating plainly, and not in the more 
usual sense of ‘explaining away’” (PR 145). 
Eventually – this is the hope – we will end up with a “coherent, 
logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every 
element of our experience can be interpreted” (PR 3). Of course, there 
are problems with this notion of an ideal system: Can we really ever get 
there and know we are there? Is it certain that there is just one of these? 
Is it always clear which theory includes more data, or is more coherent? 
It seems to me that the answer to all these questions might well be ‘no’.  
Yet, the mere fact that we can ask them shows that we are capable of 
quite general thought, so there is hope for achieving relatively universal 
systems of thought that respect hugely diverse data and integrate them 
coherently. And every attempt along this road is surely better and more 
constructive than the ‘unhappy stalemates’ between different positions – 
each denying the other’s assumptions – which I described above. 
Therefore, clearly, the Puntel-Whitehead method shows much more 
promise of leading to real progress in academic philosophy.12 
4. Other coherentist approaches and the inclusion of natural science 
Of course Puntel and Whitehead are not the only ones who came up 
with the idea that the search for knowledge in philosophy should 
proceed in a broadly coherentist kind-of-way. Puntel quotes Rescher 
12 What about the truth? Did I not promise that, with this method, the truth lies, if not at 
the beginning, then at least at the end of the investigation? Well, in order to get one's 
hands on the truth, one needs a philosophical system capable of expressing what 'truth' is. 
And this is how it should be. For what is truth other than a theoretical notion to be decided 
within a theoretical framework of some sort? The framework will have to be very universal, 
and will have to include metaphysics in a very robust sense. Lack of space prohibits the 
presentation here, but let me mention that both Whitehead and Puntel (the latter in much 
more detail) develop a theory of truth within their attempts at a comprehensive 
philosophical system. Using a strong notion of truth at any previous step within the 
methodological process would – and in fact often does – lead only to different parties 
contradicting each other over who is 'right', without a clear notion of what 'being right' 
really means. This inner-theoretic notion of truth also disarms the problem faced by 
coherentist approaches that define truth extra-theoretically as maximum coherence, which 
is that then, since we probably never reach the ideal system, we never say anything true. 
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extensively, and Whitehead certainly read Bradley. So, to a certain extent, 
the choice of these two philosophers as champions of this method is 
arbitrary and reflects personal preference. But that is not the whole 
story. Whitehead and Puntel have also distinguished themselves through 
the fact that they have tried to live up to the challenge of the above 
described method all the way and have both formulated a universal 
philosophical system.13  
We see, thus, that this method does not have some inherent 
limitations – as coherentism is sometimes thought to have14 – but is, in 
fact, capable of fulfilling the demand that philosophy is a universal and 
fundamental discipline, stopping with nothing short of an explanation of 
everything. 
In the modern context, it is especially important that both these 
systems include natural sciences, but reach metaphysical conclusions 
that are in no way reducible to them. This makes them viable in a world 
where the existence and importance of natural sciences is hardly 
deniable, but where their status as a metaphysics-against-their-will has 
brought us nothing but problems. We see, thus, that the method 
suggested here does not go against the scientific method – in fact it 
accepts all experiments and scientific theories as perfectly valid and 
highly interesting data; what it does is, it notes that there are many 
things that interest us, that need explaining (i.e. are data in the present 
sense), which are not in any way treated by the natural sciences. 
Persons, ethics, modality, time, emotions, mathematics, art, religion, 
history, etc. are a few examples.15 
13 What these systems are like and whether they wholly adhere to the methodology 
described cannot be discussed here. Also, the fact that these systems are very different in a 
fundamental aspect – Whitehead is concerned with 'taking mental experience really 
seriously' and Puntel with language as 'taking the linguistic turn really seriously' – could 
be seen as a serious problem for the method described here; for it seems that there is no 
real progress now anyway. Although this question is extremely difficult to answer (it 
involves two whole metaphysical systems!), I think that there are points of contact that 
show there is a possibility of comparison and integration of some sort between to two (one 
of them could be a 'language of thought', the possibility of which Puntel mentions briefly 
in a centrally important passage in SB 96). 
14 Puntel characterizes Rescher's position as “fundamentally epistemically rather than 
ontologically oriented” (SB 48), and considers that a shortcoming. 
15 Simply saying that all of these things are reducible to natural science is, by the way, a 
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That a wider conception of data is called for, one that includes more 
than positions of pointers, has been noticed by other philosophers – 
although it has not been precisely articulated: Kriegel compares 
scientific data to “the role of data being played by pre-theoretic verdicts 
about what falls in the extension of a certain phenomenon”16  in 
philosophy, and thinks that ‘(quasi-)empirical adequacy’17 to these – 
more widely conceived – data is one of the virtues a theory should have. 
Chisholm seems to think along the same lines when he says that certain 
facts, e.g. about persons, are “pre-analytic or pre-philosophical data. Any 
philosophical theory which is inconsistent with any of these data is 
prima facie suspect.”18 
Including such data, along with ones from the natural sciences – 
but neither data as ‘ready-made’, but merely as the starting point of our 
philosophical theorizing – and bringing them together into one 
universal, or at least rather general, way of thinking, is one of the many 
things that the Puntel-Whitehead method, as I have called it, is good at 
and good for. The question most people – including scientists from 
other, possibly neighboring, fields – ask themselves upon hearing a 
specific result of natural science is: “What does that mean?” The answer 
to such a question cannot be anything else than an integration of the 
scientific result with other data, or other theories, that the person asking 
has about herself and the world. If this second set of data were not 
included, the spirit of the question “What does that mean?” would not be 
answered. The result of the integration, using the method suggested 
here, would be a new theory that adequately includes all the data in a 
coherent way, but goes beyond all the component theories in central – 
possibly metaphysical – ways. Such a theory then increases the 
intelligibility of the world. 
And, I dare say, if a time-traveler could explain to Plato how his 
ideas are now integrated in a much wider unified theory, including the 
philosophy of language, of mind, of modality, including different natural 
philosophical thesis – and not a scientific one – and thus requires philosophical 
argumentation. 
16 Uriah Kriegel, The Sources of Intentionality (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011), 172. 
17 Kriegel, The Sources of Intentionality, 172. 
18 Roderick M. Chisholm, Person and Object (London: George Allen & Unwin 1976), 18. 
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sciences, etc. – and all the important ideas and arguments these and 
other fields have developed over the years – he would be impressed.19 
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On Rudolf Carnap’s Aufbau 
and its Interpretations 
Rafał Wodzisz and Piotr Lipski 
(John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin) 
In this paper we deal with a subject which gained its importance in 
the 1990's. At that time, scholars, such as Alan Richardson and 
Michael Friedman, raised the question about how Rudolf Carnap's 
Der logische Aufbau der Welt should, or can, be interpreted. More 
importantly, they raised several objections against the received view 
of Carnap's early work and pointed to a wider variety of inspirations 
that influenced him. The received view was established mainly by 
Wilard V. O. Quine, Alfred J. Ayer and Nelson Goodman. All three of 
them read Aufbau as an attempt to realize the project of empiricists 
formulated at the beginning of the 20th century by Bertrand Russell. 
That is the basis of the phenomenalist, reductionist reading of the 
discussed book. This view focuses on the particular constitutional 
system developed by Carnap in Aufbau. Friedman and Richardson, 
on the other hand, argue quite convincingly that Carnap's aim was 
more general and consisted of creating a constitutional theory, a 
methodology of creating all sorts of systems, and that phenomenalist 
system presented in the book serves only as an exemplification. 
1. Introduction
Although Rudolf Carnap is one of the most prominent philosophers of 
the 20th century, his accomplishments were often neglected in the past. 
It was, to some extent, due to his association with the radical positivists 
of the Vienna Circle, who were very anti-metaphysical in their approach. 
Carnap’s work was straightforwardly interpreted as positivistic and anti-
metaphysical. This interpretation was mistaken, especially with respect 
to his early views, developed in Der logische Aufbau der Welt.1 In this 
paper, we wish to investigate how the received view of Aufbau came 
about and how some recent investigations contributed to the change that 
has occurred with respect to the reception of the book. 
1 Later on referred to as Aufbau for convenience. 
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We carry out our task in the following order: Firstly, we will present 
the project of Aufbau, and it will be done by summarizing the book. 
Secondly, we will give an account of classical interpretations of Aufbau. 
Thirdly, modern interpretations of the given book will be described. 
Finally, we will attempt to discuss a change that occurred with respect to 
the reception of Aufbau, i.e. a shift from classical to modern 
interpretations. To achieve our goal, we take a mostly historical 
approach. We will analyze the works of the authors who devoted a 
significant part of their professional careers to deal with Carnap’s 
Aufbau.  
Throughout the text we use the Chicago Manual of Style for 
references, with only one exception: references to Aufbau are given 
merely by indicating the paragraph. 
2. The project behind Aufbau 
Aufbau is divided into five parts, each of which is divided into some 
chapters, which are in turn divided into paragraphs – the smallest units 
of the text. Each unit is at most a few pages long. In the first part, 
Carnap indicates the establishment of a constitutional2 system as the 
aim of the whole Aufbau project (§1). A constitutional system should be 
understood as a family tree of all concepts having cognitive content. 
Some basic terms are ‘roots’ of that ‘tree’, and for every single concept it 
is possible to present its constitution, starting with those basic terms. To 
constitute some object out of some other objects means to deliver a 
method of translating every sentence containing a name of the former 
object into a sentence with names of the latter objects only (§2). 3 What 
is important for us is the fact that the aim of the Aufbau does not lie in 
any particular form of the constitutional system, but in the mere 
possibility of constructing any such system. Therefore Aufbau should be 
primarily seen as an exposition of the constitutional theory, i.e. a theory 
2 In Rolf George’s translation of Aufbau, the term “constructional” is used instead of 
“constitutional”. Throughout our paper we use the latter, which is in accordance with 
contemporary literature. 
3 Plus the expressions of logic. 
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presenting formal and methodological aspects of constitutional systems 
in general. 
The second part starts with a very important distinction between two 
possible kinds of description of any given domain – property description 
and relation description (§10). The former consists in listing features of 
members belonging to the given domain, the latter in describing 
relationships connecting these members. Giving the age of individuals 
from some group can serve as an example of a property description of 
the group, whereas indicating the relation of being older/younger, which 
holds between these individuals, delivers a relation description of the 
group. 
There is a special type of relation description, namely structure 
description (§12). In order to present a structure description based on 
some relationship, one has to list all pairs of objects which are connected 
by that relationship. Similary one can show a diagram of that 
relationship (where arrows indicate which objects are connected and in 
which direction they are connected). Yet another way of expressing it is 
that structure description of any domain means presenting the structure 
of a relationship which holds between the members of the domain. Thus 
it should be clear that a structure description delivers only information 
about formal features of the relationship. Carnap uses structure 
description to introduce the idea of purely structural definite 
descriptions (§§13, 14). In general there are two ways of referring to any 
object, either by pointing at the object (ostensively) or by describing it 
definitely, i.e. in a manner which allows one to distinguish that 
particular object without confusion. Structure description of a given 
domain allows (at least in some cases) one to refer to every member of 
that domain by description, appealing only to structural features of a 
relation constituting basis for the structure description (§§15, 16).  
In literature there is a well known example of such purely structural 
definite description, which is due to Alan Richardson4, who gave an 
easier version of Carnap’s original  example (§14). Let us think of a 
simple railway network consisting of just two lines: one going from 
4 Alan Richardson, Carnap’s Construction of the World. The Aufbau and the Emergence of 
Logical Empiricism (New York: Cambridge University Press 1998), 47-51.
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West to East, and one leading from South to North. At the crossing point 
of the two lines there is a central station. Imagine further that there is a 
different number of stations in every direction from the central station 
(e.g. one station northwards from central station, two stations 
southwards, three westwards and four eastwards). The structure of the 
described railway network may serve as a basis for structure description, 
which in turn can deliver structurally definite descriptions. The central 
station, for instance, can be purely structurally and definitely described 
as the only station which neighbors on four different stations and – as 
another example – the most northern station can be described in a 
similar manner, as the only station which neighbors on only one station, 
and that is the central station. In a similar way, every single station from 
the above example can be referred to. If some of the structure 
descriptions are not sufficient to deliver purely structural definite 
descriptions of every member of the given domain, then one should look 
for another structure description of that domain in order to obtain those 
definite descriptions. In principle, it should be possible to refer to every 
object just by a purely structural definite description. 
One remark is required at this point. The above enclosed 
presentation is highly detailed because it concerns topics which are – as 
we will see – crucial for understanding interpretations of Aufbau. The 
following summary of Carnap’s work will not be so thorough. 
The second part of Aubau finishes with a distinction between three 
basic kinds of objects (physical, psychological and cultural) (§§18, 23) 
and five types of relations holding between objects of these kinds: 
(psychophysical, expression, designation, manifestation and 
documentation relations) (§§19, 24). It is quite important because every 
constitutional system should have, as an outcome, a constitution of 
objects of all those kinds. 
The third part of the discussed book is the longest one and covers 
constitutional theory. As we said above, constitutional theory is devoted 
to giving a general exposition of formal aspects of constitutional 
systems. Carnap divided this exposition into four chapters, each of 
which presents different kind of forms. Firstly, ascension forms are 
under scrutiny. These are forms that appear repeatedly throughout every 
constitution. They can be thought of as bricks used to build more 
66 
complex units). There are two such forms: classes and relations (§§33, 
34, and 40). The second chapter deals with system forms, i.e. possible 
shapes of a constitutional system as a whole. It is precisely in this place 
where Carnap clearly states that the constitutional system with auto-
psychological objects as a basis is not a necessity (§54), for it is plausible 
to obtain a system with (for instance) physical objects as basic ones (§59). 
The issue of the basic forms is discussed in the third chapter, where the 
basic elements and the basic relationship for a particular constitutional 
system, as presented in Aufbau, have been chosen (§§64, 78). Finally, 
there is an overview of object forms, i.e. ways of constituting some 
particularly important types of objects. 
The fourth part of the book contains an outline (in some initial parts 
very precise and formal) of a specific constitutional system put forward 
by Carnap in Aufbau. The order of constitutions in that system is 
following: 
1. Recognition of similarity is selected as a basic relation of a system
(§108) and is, in fact, its only basic concept.
2. Upon this relation all auto-psychological (private, subjective)
objects are constituted.
3. Physical objects are obtained.
4. Objects from 3. And 4. serve as a basis for the constitution of
psychological objects of other individuals (i.e. hetero-
psychological objects).
5. The final step of creating the system exhausts the constitution of
the intersubjective world (§148) and cultural objects.
In the last part of Aufbau – which is quite typical for Carnap – previously 
established results are applied to classical philosophical issues. 
Problems of psychophysical relationships, of reality and of the limits of 
science are addressed among others.  
3. Classical interpretations of Aufbau 
The popularity of the interpretations discussed below was possible 
thanks to a delay in the publication of the English translation of Aufbau. 
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It was first published in 1967, and so it was almost 40 years after the 
original version appeared (1928). During this time, the classical 
interpretation of Aufbau had been established. It is a generally accepted 
fact5 that we owe this interpretation to Alfred J. Ayer6, Wilard V. O. 
Quine7 and Nelson Goodman8. They read Aufbau in the light of logical 
positivism, and therefore their reading puts the emphasis on the 
empiricist program that, according to them, can be found in the book. 
These authors propagated what is now called the ‘received view’ of 
Aufbau, and this is placed under scrutiny below. The view focused 
around the main doctrines of the Vienna school: verificationism and 
radical empiricism, which both suggest a phenomenalist interpretation 
of Aufbau. 
Quine describes Carnap’s work with the following words: 
Radical reductionism, conceived now with statements as units, sets itself the 
task of specifying a sense-datum language and showing how to translate the rest 
of significant discourse, statement by statement, into it. Carnap embarked on 
this project in Aufbau. […] In a series of constructions, in which he exploits the 
resources of modern logic with much ingenuity, Carnap succeeds in defining a 
wide array of important additional sensory concepts which, but for his 
constructions, one would not have dreamed were definable on so slender a 
basis. He was the first empiricist who, not content with asserting the 
reducibility of science to terms of immediate experience, took serious steps 
toward carrying out the reduction.9 
According to Quine, the basic program of Aufbau consists of two steps 
in which a radical empiricist project is being undertaken. Firstly, 
statements referring to our sense experience have been chosen as a basis 
5 Cf. Michael Friedman, Reconsidering Logical Positivism, (New York: Cambridge 
University Press 1999); Michael Friedman and Richard Creath (Eds.), The Cambridge 
Companion to Carnap, (New York: Cambridge University Press 2008); Alan Richardson, 
"How not to Russell Carnap’s Aufbau," PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the 
Philosophy of Science Association 1990, (1990): 3-14; Idem., "Logical Idealism and 
Carnap’s Construction of the World," Synthese 93, (1992): 59-92; Idem., Carnap’s 
Construction of the World. 
6 Alfred J Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, (New York: Penguin Books 1978). 
7 Willard V. O. Quine, From a Logical Point of View, (New York: Harper Torchbooks 
1963); Idem., Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, (New York: Columbia University 
Press 1969). 
8 Nelson Goodman, The Structure of Appearance, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 
1977). 
9 Willard V. O Quine, From a Logical Point of View, 39. 
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– phenomenalism. Secondly, by means of modern logic, the complete
body of our knowledge was supposed to be translated into those basic 
experiences – reductionism. This idea has been tied up by Quine with 
Bertrand Russell’s empiricist program: 
[...] in Our Knowledge of the External World and elsewhere he addressed 
himself to the epistemology of natural knowledge, on its conceptual side. 
To account for the external world as a logical construct of sense data – such, in 
Russell's terms, was the program. It was Carnap, in his Der logische Aufbau der 
Welt 1928, who came nearest to executing it.10
Quine read Aufbau as the latest attempt to realize Russell’s empiricist 
program.11 Its origins are to be found somewhere in the works of David 
Hume, and at least one serious endeavor of completing this project in 
the modern era can be found in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus.12 
According to Quine, the goal at which Carnap aims is unachievable in 
principle, mainly because Carnap has not provided any means of 
translating statements of the form ‘quality q is at point-instant x, y, z, t’ 
into the statements about elementary sense experience. Hence, the 
crucial problem lies at the very heart of the constitutional system 
presented in Aufbau. 
In a similar fashion – i.e. as a phenomenalist, reductionist project – 
the book has been interpreted by Goodman: 
In Der logische Aufbau der Welt, Carnap's purpose is to sketch a particularistic 
system13 much more coherently and comprehensively than any proposed 
before. Starting with the few positive findings of earlier particularistic thought, 
he avails himself of the methods and the model of symbolic logic in developing 
his constructions. If the resulting system remains rudimentary and inadequate 
in many respects, the advance it makes must still not be overlooked.14 
10 Idem., Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, 73-74. 
11 Carnap even used Russell’s motto at the beginning of his book: “The supreme maxim in 
scientific philosophizing is this: wherever possible, logical constructions are to be 
substituted for inferred entities.” 
12 Cf. Friedman and Creath (Eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Carnap, 130-131. 
13 Particularistic in this context simply means a kind of phenomenalistic system, i.e. a 
system with phenomenal basis [RW, PL]. 
14 Goodman, The Structure of Appearance, 151. 
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Goodman is honest when he admits the advancement achieved by 
Carnap, but, simultaneously, he stresses the elementary character of the 
construction in Aufbau. Goodman, in his critique of the book, has 
focused mainly on the method used there – so called quasi-analysis, and 
on the ontological assumptions, which, according to him, are 
indispensable for Carnap's project.15 However, Goodman was not 
completely skeptical about the constitutional system developed in 
Aufbau. This follows from the fact that he considered his critique as a 
means of improving it: “[t]he purpose of my critical scrutiny is not to 
disparage his accomplishment, but to determine just where the 
remaining problems lie and perhaps to pave the way for their 
solution”.16 
The third of the above mentioned authors – Ayer – stressed yet 
another important tenet of Carnap's work. According to Ayer, but also to 
many other philosophers, the project undertaken by Carnap is highly 
anti-metaphysical in nature.17 The verification principle states explicitly 
that statements which cannot be translated into statements about 
experiences coming from the ordinary senses are meaningless, therefore 
the whole metaphysical discourse, which is not expressible in 
phenomenalistic language remains meaningless. As Ayer puts it: “If a 
putative proposition fails to satisfy this principle [of verifiability], and is 
not a tautology, then I hold that it is metaphysical, and that, being 
metaphysical, it is neither true nor false but literally senseless.”18 Ayer’s 
personal attitude towards the verifiability principle is unquestionable, 
but he also explains to whom he is most indebted for the promise of 
bringing this principle into life: “The philosophers with whom I am in 
the closest agreement are those who compose the ‘Viennese Circle’, 
15 Cf. Paweł Kawalec "Wstęp," [Introduction] in Logiczna struktura świata by Rudolf 
Carnap, translated by Paweł Kawalec, (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN 2011), 
xciv-xcvi. 
16 Ibid. However, Hannes Leitgeb noted that problems raised by Goodman are in principle 
indispensable, see Hannes Leitgeb: "A New Analysis of Quasianalysis," Journal of 
Philosophical Logic 36, (2007): 181-226. 
17 Quine expresses a similar view in his essay “Epistemology naturalized”, where he writes: 
“Carnap and the other logical positivists of the Vienna Circle had already pressed the term 
>>metaphysics<< into pejorative use, as connoting meaninglessness” (cf. Quine, 
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, 82). 
18 Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, 41. 
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under the leadership of Moritz Schlick, and are commonly known as 
logical positivists. And, of these, I owe most to Rudolf Carnap.”19 Ayer 
names Carnap as his greatest inspiration, and it is rather evident that 
what he must have meant by this, is – among other things – Carnap’s 
attempt to put the verifiability principle into reality. 
With the above discussion, we wished to establish the facts about 
the long-lasting interpretation of the project that was undertaken by 
Carnap in Aufbau. All quoted authors agree with regard to the main 
ideas in this work. The logical positivist reading of Aufbau was indirectly 
supported by the fact that a lot of time passed before the English 
translation of the book was published, which allowed for a direct analysis 
of Carnap’s work. Up to that time, works of Ayer, Quine and Goodman 
served as the main source of information about Carnap’s project and 
perforce were responsible for the received view of Aufbau. We will now 
move on and describe contemporary interpretations of the book under 
discussion, by which we hope to show a significant change that took 
place at the beginning of the 1990’s.20 
4. Contemporary interpretations of Aufbau 
The received view of Aufbau has become less significant recently, and 
this is mostly due to works of Michael Friedman and Alan Richardson. 
They suggested that Carnap’s book should be placed in the context of 
Kantian or neo-Kantian thought, rather than within the empiricist 
tradition. Friedman puts it in the following way in the final part of one 
of his articles: 
The preceding analysis results in a very different picture of the epistemological 
significance of the Aufbau than that which has been customary within 
contemporary Anglo-American philosophy. The Aufbau is not best understood 
as starting from fundamentally empiricist philosophical motivations and then 
attempting to put these into effect – on the basis of the new mathematical logic 
of Principia Mathematica – in a more precise and rigorous way than had been 
previously possible. The epistemological motivations of the Aufbau begin rather 
19 Ibid., 42. 
20 Historically speaking it was Susan Haack who, in her 1977 paper, first noted the Kantian 
features of Aufbau. This remark was made by Richardson, "Logical Idealism and Carnap’s 
Construction of the World," 60. 
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with the concerns and problems of the neo-Kantian tradition: with a concern for 
depicting how the cognitive process transforms inherently private and subjective 
sensations into fully objective experience capable of validity and truth, and with 
the corresponding problem of carrying out this project is an essentially “logical” 
- that is, non-metaphysical and non-psychological – fashion.21 
Similar conclusions can be found in Richardson’s well-known book, 
Carnap’s Construction of the World. The Aufbau and the Emergence of 
Logical Empiricism: 
[…] for Carnap the problem is how we achieve objective knowledge in the 
sciences, despite the subjective origin of empirical knowledge in private 
sensation. The key to the answer is the idea that all streams of experience have a 
common form. This understanding of the problem of epistemology and its 
solution clearly has greater affinity to the Kantian critical philosophy than it does 
to the foundationalism of either the traditional empiricist or rationalist camp.22 
The quotations above clearly indicate important constituents of 
contemporary interpretations of Aufbau. It should be transparent that 
the discussed book was not meant as an advancement of the empiricist 
and reductionist program. The significance of a particular version of a 
constitutional system presented in the book does not stem from the fact 
that it is a phenomenalistic system (with an auto-psychological basis), 
but rather that it serves as an example of any constitutional system. To 
put it in other words, according to current interpretations, constitutional 
theory is of greater importance than any specific constitutional system. 
One could ask, why this is the case. The answer would be: by developing 
a constitutional theory, which allows the construction of any 
constitutional system, one can attempt to demonstrate the objectivity of 
all scientific statements. That attempt – very Kantian in its nature – is 
recognized as the central aim of the project behind Aufbau. 
Friedman and Richardson differ slightly when they try to describe 
the way in which Carnap approached this central aim. According to 
Friedman, the objectivity of scientific statements is achieved thanks to 
purely structural, definite descriptions. Although our sense experiences 
constitute a subjective starting point, the structure of experiences 
remains the same for different individuals. Therefore, objectivity is 
21 Friedman, Reconsidering Logical Positivism, 141. 
22 Richardson, Carnap’s Construction of the World, 28. 
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guaranteed by similarity of structures and the possibility of purely 
structural reference to every possible object investigated by science. 
Richardson has a somewhat different view on this matter: he claims that 
there are actually two projects in Aufbau. The first one is as just 
described, and the second one aims at achieving the objectivity of 
scientific statements by creating an intersubjective world. The 
constitution of this intersubjective world is possible thanks to the 
similarity of psychological objects of different subjects. Hence, the world 
of objective scientific statements is, in a sense, compiled out of many 
private ‘frameworks’ created by individuals. 
The discrepancy between Friedman and Richardson results in the 
fact that they give different reasons why Carnap has not achieved his 
aim. According to Friedman, it is because purely structural definite 
descriptions are used to define all but one concept, but the crucial one. 
The central concept of the recollection of similarity relation remains 
undefined in the required manner. Therefore, Friedman concludes that 
Carnap’s attempt is a failure. Richardson, on the other hand, pointed out 
a certain tension in Aufbau, caused by the presence of two projects, 
which are not completely compatible with each other. 
5. Discussion between two views on Aufbau 
It has been pointed out that Aufbau was traditionally interpreted as a 
realization of Russell’s empiricist project. However, this view has been 
recently challenged, as we could observe in the previous part of our 
paper. Below, we present some arguments to support our claim that 
there has been a certain shift, and now different elements of Carnap’s 
philosophy are being highlighted. We wish to stress this change that 
took place around two decades ago, because it has brought new light to 
research on Carnap.  
The classical interpretation of Aufbau is justified at least to some 
extent. Even Carnap himself admits that in the preface to the second 
edition of the book:  
In this book I was concerned with the indicated thesis, namely that it is in 
principle possible to reduce all concepts to the immediately given […] I wanted 
to attempt, for the first time, the actual formulation of a conceptual system of 
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the indicated sort; that is to say, I was going to choose, to begin with, some 
simple basic concepts, for instance sensory qualities and relations, which are 
present in the raw material of experience; then I was going to formulate on this 
basis further definitions for concepts of various kinds.23 
However, it has to be underlined that both Quine and Goodman read 
Aufbau in the light of the particular constitutional system that was 
developed by Carnap, and as we saw in the second part of our paper, the 
particular constitutional system presented in Aufbau was not Carnap’s 
primary aim. Rather, his task was more general and consisted of 
creating a constitutional theory, a methodology of creating all sorts of 
systems, equally acceptable. The interpretation put forward by Quine 
and others overemphasizes the importance of part of Carnap’s work, 
which displays only the exemplification of his broader idea. 
Moreover, we wish to point to the fact, that logicism determines 
Carnap’s work in a similar way. Let us take a look at the quotation where 
Carnap explains the importance of Russell’s approach to philosophy: 
The new type of philosophy has arisen in close contact with the work of the 
special sciences, especially mathematics and physics. Consequently they have 
taken the strict and responsible orientation of the scientific investigator as their 
guideline for philosophical work, while the attitude of the traditional 
philosopher is more like that of a poet.24 
This quotation indicates that what Carnap actually found the most 
interesting in the works of Russell was not his empiricist project, but 
rather the idea of scientific philosophy based on the firm ground of 
logic.25  
Another issue concerns verificationism – which is often recalled 
when discussing Aufbau. The idea definitely has its origin in the Vienna 
Circle, and as Carnap points out, its actual development was due to 
Wittgenstein: 
23 Rudolf Carnap, The Logical Structure of the World and Pseudoproblems in Philosophy, 
translated by Rolf A. George (Chicago: Open Court 1969), vi. 
24 Ibid., xvi 
25 The Russellian inspirations of Carnap are discussed to a great extent in: Christopher 
Pincock, "Russell’s influence on Carnap’s Aufbau," Synthese 131, (2002): 1-37. It has to be 
noted that Carnap attended Frege’s lectures in Jena between 1910 and 1914, and these 
were another contribution to Carnap’s respect for logic. 
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The most decisive development in my view of metaphysics occurred later, in the 
Vienna period, chiefly under the influence of Wittgenstein. I came to hold the 
view that many theses of traditional metaphysics are not only useless, but even 
devoid of cognitive content. They are pseudo-sentences… […] The view that these 
sentences and questions are non-cognitive was based on Wittgenstein's 
principle of verifiability. This principle says first, that the meaning of a sentence 
is given by the conditions of its verification and, second, that a sentence is 
meaningful if and only if it is in principle verifiable, that is, if there are possible, 
not necessarily actual, circumstances which, if they did occur, would definitely 
establish the truth of the sentence.26 
The principle under discussion was introduced by Wittgenstein and it 
was defended by him until his turn towards ordinary language 
philosophy. Carnap admits in this passage that he was committed to the 
principle of verification, but it is a historical fact that he was not the first 
one who came up with the idea. Therefore Carnap should be seen as the 
one who only makes use of the idea that was put forward and 
predominantly defended by others. It is of vital importance to keep that 
fact in mind because Carnap’s anti-metaphysical attitude was absent in 
his writings until his Scheinprobleme der Philosophie27, but at that time 
Aufbau had already been completed. 
Associating Carnap’s work with verificationism had major 
consequences. The main one was an anti-metaphysical reading of the 
theses promoted by him in Aufbau. It is clearly present in Ayer, as we 
have already seen.28 Carnap’s views on metaphysics at the time of 
publication are not entirely transparent. However, when one considers 
his general aim (as discussed above) and the appropriate sections of 
Aufbau (§§ 12, 16), then it is at least possible to accept his neutrality with 
respect to metaphysics. The language of the constitutional system is 
neutral, and serves equally well for realistic and idealistic formulations 
of theses. According to Carnap, the language of logic is universally 
applicable and has great expressive power, which makes it a perfect 
means for scientific philosophy. 
26 Rudolf Carnap, "Intellectual Autobiography," in The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, 
edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp (Chicago: Open Court, 1963), 45. 
27 Published in 1928. 
28 Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, 41. 
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Furthermore, Carnap’s general aim is revealed by the analysis of the 
story behind the choice of the title for his book.29 First of all, it has to be 
noted that Carnap planned to write two books: one presenting the 
phenomenalistic constitutional system - this is the one he actually wrote 
- and another one which would contain the physicalistic constitutional 
system. In both cases, the systems being developed served only as an 
exemplification, rather than as an expression, of the actual beliefs of 
Carnap with regard to the constitution of the world. There is a high dose 
of contingency in the fact that Carnap first wrote a book containing the 
phenomenalistic system, and that he never completed his second book. 
What is more, it was actually the second book that was supposed to be 
titled Der logische Aufbau der Welt, while the first one was supposed to 
be titled Der logische Aufbau der Erkenntnis. This indicates that the title 
refers only to the particular constitutional system presented in the 
book.30 
The final point that we want to raise stems from the work by 
Friedman and Richardson. Their thorough investigations show that 
there is strong Kantian import in Carnap’s early work. The main 
question, to which he was seeking an answer, was: how do we obtain 
objective scientific statements about the world, considering a subjective 
starting point, i.e. our sense experiences? According to Friedman and 
Richardson (although their interpretations are somewhat different), only 
if we focus our investigations around the above formulated question, 
will we be able to fully appreciate and adequately comprehend the ideas 
hidden behind Aufbau. 
We do not wish to say that one interpretation of Aufbau is better 
than the other. Our aim is not to go so far. We limit ourselves only to 
broadening the perspective. Both classical and modern interpretations of 
Aufbau constitute the extremes of a broader spectrum of approaches to 
29 Cf. Alberto J. Coffa, The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap: The Vienna Station, 
(New York: Cambridge University Press 1991); Richardson, "How not to Russell Carnap’s 
Aufbau," 10. 
30 An even more direct indication comes from private correspondence between Carnap and 
Schlick from 1927. The title that Carnap was considering at that time was: Der logische 
Aufbau der Welt. Versuch einer Konstitutionstheorie der Begriffe [The logical structure of 
the world. An attempt at the theory of constitution of concepts], cf. Coffa, The Semantic 
Tradition from Kant to Carnap: The Vienna Station, 231.
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the book. Carnap found inspiration for his ideas in a variety of different 
sources, ranging from Gottlob Frege and Russell’s logicism, to Ernst 
Cassirer and Heinrich Rickert’s neo-Kantianism. Therefore, the scope of 
possible interpretations of Aufbau is equivalently broad. 
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Stroud’s Dissatisfaction with Kant:  
On the Indispensability of “Certain Ways of Thinking” 
Elvira Basevich 
(The Graduate Center, CUNY) 
In his recent book, Engagement and Metaphysical Dissatisfaction, 
Barry Stroud criticizes Kant’s contention that certain indispensable 
ways of thinking, which are necessary features of the a priori 
structure of human cognition and experience, generate insights into 
the objective nature of the external world. Because the a priori 
features of human cognition necessarily correspond to the external 
world, Stroud argues that Kant achieves an undue metaphysical 
“satisfaction.” As part of his transcendental idealism, Kant simply 
stipulates that the a priori structure of human understanding and 
experience corresponds to the objective structure of the external 
world. This essay argues that Stroud mischaracterizes Kant’s 
epistemological project in the Critique of Pure Reason. Part of Kant’s 
critical grounding of theoretical reason involves demonstrating that 
the a priori structure of human cognition and experience does not 
reveal any truths about the fundamental nature of objective reality; 
only sensible intuition furnishes us with a limited insight into 
objective reality. This essay shows that Stroud a) attributes an 
unjustifiable metaphysical realism to Kant that contends that one can 
“read off” the objective structure of the external world from the a 
priori structure of human cognition and experience, and b) ignores 
the role of sensible intuitions in Kant’s account of knowledge. 
1. Introduction
Barry Stroud’s recent book, Engagement and Metaphysical 
Dissatisfaction, analyses the aspirations of metaphysics in the history of 
Western philosophy. Stroud argues that philosophers cannot ground 
metaphysics on a stable foundation because it is impossible to justify a 
metaphysical position – any metaphysical position – with any certainty. 
For this reason, metaphysical inquiry is bound to lead a philosopher to 
“dissatisfaction.” Stroud conceives metaphysics as the study of the 
fundamental nature of reality and emphasizes that it is primarily an 
epistemological project. He adds the important proviso that reality as it 
exists independently of the subject is the object of metaphysical inquiry. 
79
This poses the question of how – and whether – a subject with a limited 
and partial perspective of the external world can have objective 
knowledge of it. For, there is a distinction between knowledge of reality 
and reality as it is in itself. Broadly speaking, then, his question is: What 
epistemic warrant do we have to affirm any metaphysical truth, if we 
lack a sufficiently impartial epistemic point of view simply by virtue of 
being finite sensible subjects? 
Whether a finite sensible subject can have access to the 
fundamental nature of reality, and thus acquire justified beliefs, is a 
perennial question of Western philosophy. It is also Kant’s question in 
his Critique of Pure Reason. There, Kant attempts to demonstrate that 
knowledge is not only possible, but also firmly grounded. He, however, 
abandons the hope that finite sensible subjects can have access to reality 
as it is in itself, understood as some metaphysically real entity existing 
completely independently of the subject. As a consequence, 
metaphysical truths are based on appearances relative-to-us rather than 
on the thing-in-itself. The a priori structure of the human mind 
generates the necessary conditions for human knowledge and provides 
the cognitive framework by virtue of which phenomenal objects appear 
to us. That the conditions for knowledge are dependent on the a priori 
structure of the human mind does not count against the “objectivity” of 
metaphysical knowledge. Rather, those conditions serve to constitute the 
epistemic criterion of objectivity. Part of that criterion dictates that 
critical theoretical reason must ultimately rely on sensible intuitions for 
its content. The thing in-itself, which is beyond our sensibility, is 
relegated outside the scope of justifiable metaphysical knowledge. 
Although objectivity is an epistemic criterion dependent on the a priori 
structure of the human mind, it does not render metaphysics hopelessly 
partial. The charge of partiality only makes sense in the context of a 
feasible alternative, one that shows how a finite sensible subject can 
grasp the thing-in-itself. Kant claims that such an alternative is 
epistemically incoherent.  
Stroud is not impressed with Kant’s method for finding 
metaphysical truth, or, as he puts it, “satisfaction.” He believes that Kant 
wrongly contends that the necessary conditions for human knowledge 
and experience shed light on the fundamental nature of reality. He 
argues that Kant achieves an unjustified metaphysical satisfaction by 
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asserting that the principles, beliefs, and concepts that are indispensable 
for human thought necessarily represent objective reality. For Stroud, 
the indispensability of “certain ways of thinking” is precisely the obstacle 
for grounding metaphysical inquiry on a stable epistemic foundation.1 
He defends his position with the philosophical truism that the fact that a 
particular human being thinks something – or even that all human 
beings think something – does not reveal any truth about objective 
reality.  
In criticizing Kant, Stroud’s principal mistake is supposing that for 
Kant the mere indispensability of “certain ways of thinking” (e.g., 
principles, beliefs, concepts) reveals insight into the fundamental nature 
of objective reality. Stroud is imprecise in his use of the terms “belief,” 
“principles” and “propositions,” which he groups together as “certain 
ways of thinking.” Kant’s metaphysical project in the Critique of Pure 
Reason distinguishes the a priori forms of sensibility from the a priori 
categories. These two elements serve very different functions in Kant’s 
epistemology and, taken together, do not reveal any necessary truths 
about objective reality as it is in itself. This essay argues that, first, part 
of Kant’s critical grounding of theoretical reason involves demonstrating 
that theoretical reason does not reveal any truths about objective reality 
as it is in itself; only sensible intuition furnishes us with limited insight 
into it. This is part of Kant’s metaphysical modesty.2 In this sense, 
Stroud shares the same concern with Kant about the uncritical use of 
theoretical reason in making judgments about objective reality. Second, 
Stroud ignores the role of sensible intuitions in human knowledge, 
whereas Kant takes great pains to illustrate the importance of external 
sensible inputs for knowledge in the Critique of Pure Reason.  
In the first section, I outline Stroud’s criticism of Kant’s 
epistemological project and focus on his contention that Kant relies on 
“certain indispensable ways of thinking” in attempting to gain insight 
into objective reality.3 In the second section, I present Kant’s distinction 
1 Barry Stroud, Engagement and Metaphysical Dissatisfaction: Modality and Value (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), 125. 
2 This brings his criticism of Leibniz to the fore. 
3 I use the term ‘objective reality’ the same way as Stroud does. For him, objective reality 
means a totally subject-independent external world --- equivalent to the Kantian thing-in-
itself.    
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between the epistemic roles of the understanding and sensibility and 
show how Stroud’s interpretation misses Kant’s metaphysical modesty. 
In the concluding section, I show some of the epistemological and 
metaphysical implications of Kant’s project in the Critique of Pure 
Reason in light of Stroud’s criticisms. In illuminating how Stroud 
mischaracterizes Kant’s project in the Critique of Pure Reason, I hope to 
demonstrate that that latter is more plausible and coherent than is often 
supposed in contemporary analytic Anglo-American philosophy. At the 
very least, I hope to show what sorts of philosophical assumptions one 
cannot make when criticizing Kant’s metaphysical and epistemological 
theses in the Critique of Pure Reason. 
2. Stroud’s Criticism of Kant on the Indispensability of
‘Certain Ways of Thinking’ 
Stroud argues that for Kant the indispensability of certain ways of 
thinking is “the key to the very possibility of putting metaphysics once 
and for all on the secure path of a science.”4 He rejects this starting 
point for metaphysics by claiming that the indispensability of certain 
ways of thinking is more likely to lead one to uncertain, rather than 
certain, knowledge.5 According to Stroud, Kant holds that human 
thought and experience reveals insights into objective reality and thus 
provides us with indubitable metaphysical truths. Since the necessary 
conditions of thought and experience must correspond to a subject-
independent, objective reality, one can  “deduce” from these conditions 
truths about objective reality.6 That is, given that certain cognitive 
elements must obtain in human cognition in general, they too must 
obtain when on thinks about the subject-independent external world. 
Stroud attacks Kant by asking a straightforward question: What is the 
relationship between our indispensable ways of thinking and objective 
reality?  
Stroud separates the question of what sort of things necessarily 
constitute human thought and experience from the metaphysical 
4 Stroud, Engagement, 126. 
5 Stroud, Engagement, 143. 
6 Stroud, Engagement, 130. 
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question concerning the nature of objective reality.7 According to him, 
Kant’s mistake is to assume that there is an essential connection 
between the former and the latter. He interprets Kant as claiming that 
the elements necessary for human cognition disclose objective reality 
because these elements are indispensable for human cognition. Given 
that human cognition must take a certain form, our thoughts about and 
experiences of the external world must conform to the general pattern 
necessary for human cognition. A question nonetheless remains for 
Stroud about what the world is “independently of us and our responses 
to it,”8 one he thinks Kant does not take sufficiently seriously.  
Stroud’s analysis of the relationship between human cognition and 
objective reality within the Kantian framework assumes that the mere 
existence of thought and experience discloses something about objective 
reality, including questions about causality, substance, space and time, 
and other “indispensable” cognitive elements. He claims that Kant’s 
deduction, if successful,  
would show…that there are enduring objects in space and time, that all events 
stand in causal relations to other events that happen, that there are thinking, 
experiencing, active subjects who hold these and other such general beliefs 
about the world. If Kant is right, all these things must be so if anyone thinks or 
has experiences of anything at all; they are among the necessary conditions of all 
thought and experience. They state the way things must be, given that there is 
any thought and experience.9
So, Stroud contends that certain “things…must be so” if anyone has any 
thoughts or experiences. There is an obvious ambiguity in his phrasing 
of the relationship between what he takes to be transcendentally real 
objects – “things” – and the necessary conditions for thought and 
experience. Stroud is especially unclear in his characterization of 
objective reality, referring to it simply as “the way things must be.” He 
seems to think that Kant’s epistemology, which analyzes the a priori 
conditions necessary for thought and experience, also commits Kant to 
the independent metaphysical status of those conditions in the external 
7 As I will show, separating these two is a mistake, although it is crucial for Stroud’s 
argument. 
8 Stroud, Engagement, 125. 
9 Stroud, Engagement, 130. 
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world.10 He interprets Kant as saying that we have access to these 
metaphysical truths “if anyone thinks or has experiences of anything at 
all” and, at the same time, those truths hold entirely independently of 
the subject, so long as there is someone thinking something. “The 
necessary conditions of all thought and experience” somehow guarantee 
the independent metaphysical status of cognitive elements that are 
indispensable for human thought and experience. The implication of 
this reading of Kant is that the indispensability of certain beliefs entails a 
set of robust metaphysical commitments. Stroud apparently supposes 
that Kant’s epistemology is a peculiar type of correspondence theory that 
guarantees the independent “metaphysical” status of the elements 
indispensable for our cognition. For him, “the full resources of Kantian 
metaphysics…would reach beyond indispensability to the relation 
between the contents of those indispensable beliefs and what is so in the 
world.”11 But how does Kant guarantee that certain indispensable ways 
of thinking necessarily correspond to the external world? 
Stroud thinks Kant’s solution to this problem was to introduce 
idealism. In order to defend the claim that our indispensable beliefs 
hold in the external world, Kant has to defend idealism as a metaphysical 
doctrine. Idealism allows for an essential and necessary correspondence 
between our beliefs and the external world. “To conclude that the beliefs 
must represent the way things really are because they are beliefs that any 
thinker must accept sounds like the familiar but hollow arrogance of 
idealism: things must be a certain way because we thinkers must think 
things are that way.”12 Stroud does not see that this reading of Kant 
turns Kant into a Berkeleyan subjective idealist, for whom reality is mere 
thought, and thus generated by a grand mind. For Stroud, the only way 
to guarantee the necessary correspondence between human cognition 
and reality is to assume that the two are essentially identical. Our 
cognition corresponds to the external world because the external world is 
just made up of thought.  
The foundation of the external world for Kant is not an omniscient 
and omnipresent mind of god à la Berkeley; this is not how knowledge 
10 Stroud, Engagement, 132. 
11 Stroud, Engagement, 139. 
12 Stroud, Engagement, 143. My emphasis. 
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of the external world is grounded for him. As I will show in the next 
section of this essay, such a position is untenable for Kant because 
knowledge would have to rely on the intellectual intuition of an 
omniscient mind, the truth of whose judgment is not reliant on sensory 
inputs. The genius of Kant is that he does not comment on the ultimate 
metaphysical status of objects, let alone provide their foundation. In 
transcendental idealism the foundation of epistemology is grounded in 
the a priori structure of the human mind, not in the transcendental 
reality of (god’s) thought. In approaching metaphysics through a 
delineation of our transcendental psychology, Kant hopes to avoid 
having to make any sort of commitments about the necessary features of 
the external world. He can thus limit himself to describing the necessary 
features of human cognition and experience without stipulating that 
these features are in any way necessary attributes of the external world. 
Moreover, Stroud fails to realize that his interpretation of Kant’s 
idealism excludes truly external sensory inputs. He seems to think that 
the content of the categories and, more importantly, of our sensibility is 
already implicit in the mind. Anything we can assert about the external 
world is already contained in the a priori features of our cognition. The 
mere existence of human thought and experience “yields substantial13 
conclusions about the world.”14 This follows naturally given that Stroud 
thinks that for Kant the external world is mere thought. Quite 
understandably, having minimized the role of sensible intuitions and 
unwittingly ascribed a transcendental realism (in the form of a 
Berkleyan omnipresent and omniscient mind) to Kant, Stroud questions 
whether the conditions indispensable for human thought and 
experience establish the fundamental nature of the external world. He 
asks: 
Can we proceed by secure necessary steps from our thinking and experiencing 
things in certain ways, or even from our thinking and experiencing anything at 
all, to conclusions about how things actually are whether they are thought about 
or experienced or not? Can you get a whole independent world out of nothing 
13 Stroud also uses the word “substantive” in other parts of his book to describe the kind of 
conclusions he has in mind here. 
14 Stroud, Engagement, 131. 
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more than thought of a world or a world-like course of experience? Can you get a 
rabbit out of a silk hat?15
What Stroud fails to realize is that Kant’s answer, like his own, to all 
these questions is a resounding ‘No!’ Like Stroud, Kant holds that “the 
world carries no implications about thinkers thinking anything.”  
3. How to Get Kant Wrong: Conflating Understanding and
Sensibility 
Emphasizing the indispensability of certain elements of human 
cognition in general is the wrong approach for understanding Kant’s 
project in the first Critique. Kant does not think that certain ways of 
thinking generate metaphysical truths about the fundamental nature of 
external reality, unless one is a perfect being privy to intellectual 
intuitions. Stroud attributes a metaphysical realism to Kant that the 
latter rejects. In this section, I will show how Stroud’s interpretative 
approach fails to distinguish the distinct epistemic roles of the pure 
forms of sensibility and the categories of the understanding. Such an 
approach ignores Kant’s overarching project of checking the uncritical 
use of theoretical reason in making metaphysical claims. A central part 
of Kant’s project is to show that human cognition does not proffer 
insight into objective reality as it is in itself. In the following section, I 
delineate some implications of Kant’s epistemological and metaphysical 
project in context of Stroud’s criticism. 
To be sure, Stroud is right to emphasize the role of human 
cognition in Kant’s metaphysics. As Allen Wood writes, “Kant 
understood the term metaphysics in epistemological terms. That is, for 
the purposes of metaphysics, ‘nature’ is what is known through 
experience, and so ‘metaphysics’ is a science demarcated not by a set of 
objects with which it deals but by the a priori epistemic status of its 
principles.”16 Yet, the perception of objects that are given in experience 
is nonetheless a crucial feature of Kant’s epistemology. Kant thinks that 
15 Stroud, Engagement, 132. 
16 Allen M. Wood, Kant: Blackwell Great Minds (Malden, Oxford, and Carlton: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2005.), 24. 
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his emphasis on perception dovetails with his conception of the formal, 
a priori framework of metaphysical knowledge. In failing to distinguish 
the role of the understanding from sensibility, Stroud minimizes the 
contribution of sensible intuitions to knowledge.  
Kant begins the Critique of Pure Reason by underscoring the “fact 
of experience” (Faktum der Erfahrung). He argues that two main 
faculties are critical for knowledge: the passive sensibility and the active 
understanding. Both are parts of the a priori structure of the human 
mind and could be isolated independently of experience; in fact, our 
sensibility precedes any particular perception and ultimately makes 
experience itself possible for us.17 But this does not mean that the mind 
alone somehow “generates” perceptions imminently, as Stroud’s 
interpretation suggests. On his reading of Kant’s idealism, the mind – 
presumably of god – gives human beings their sensible intuitions.  
In the Transcendental Aesthetic, however, Kant defines sensibility 
as “the capacity (receptivity) to obtain representations through the way in 
which we are affected by objects in the senses.”18 The capacity to be 
affected by objects via perception is part of the a priori structure of our 
minds. Kant calls this the pure form of sensibility. Insofar as we are 
capable of passively receiving sensory stimuli and having experiences, 
our mind has “immediate” and “direct” reference to external objects;19 
this is “at which all thought aims.”20 Although our pure form of 
sensibility makes it possible for us to receive sensory inputs, it does not 
“constitute” those inputs; those inputs are given from without. “Objects 
are therefore given to us by means of our sensibility.”21 Although our 
sensibility delimits the form our experiences can take, our sensibility 
does not “determine” the content of sensory inputs in perception nor 
does it entail any robust metaphysically commitments. For, as we shall 
see, having an experience of an appearance in space and time does not 
entail affirming the transcendental realism of space and time. Nor are 
we warranted in attributing a transcendental realism to the objects to 
17 Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Pure Reason, translated and edited by Marcus Weigelt 
(London: Penguin Group, 2007), A24/B39. 
18 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A19/B33. 
19 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A21/B35. 
20 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A19/B33. 
21 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A19/B33. Emphasis added. 
87
which we have immediate and direct access in perception. 
Sensory inputs, which are given to our sensibility, are the 
indispensable starting points for metaphysical knowledge. Kant claims 
that without them knowledge is empty.22 He is adamant about this 
point, arguing that “things, which cannot be given to us by any 
experience, are nothing for us.”23 The understanding is that by means of 
which we “think” a sensible intuition, but they “by themselves” cannot 
“yield knowledge of objects.”24 On the other hand, a sensible intuition 
without the categories would not be cognizable by our minds. Sensible 
intuitions occasion the application of the pure principles of the 
understanding.  
In the absence of sensible intuitions, “the understanding runs the 
risk of making, through mere sophism, a material use of the merely 
formal principles of the pure understanding, and thus making 
judgments indiscriminately about objects which are not given to us, nay, 
which perhaps can never in any way be given.”25 The “material use” of 
the “formal principles of the pure understanding” is the mistake he 
attributes to Leibniz and his followers. They tried to derive substantial 
conclusions about the world by appealing to nothing other than logical 
consistency and the principle of non-contradiction; that is, they appealed 
to nothing other than thought. With the exception of moral reasoning, 
the “empirical use of the understanding” is thus the only appropriate 
use of it.26 
Moreover, Kant does not think that the general form of human 
cognition entails any robust metaphysical commitments. One cannot say 
in any “satisfying” sense that space and time are transcendentally real or 
that the principle of causality objectively obtains. With regard to the 
latter, for example, what one can say is that in order for experience to 
have a coherent form, where one event follows another with necessity, 
the understanding applies the pure principle of causality to appearances. 
Necessity is never empirically perceived or manifest as some sort of 
metaphysical property of empirical objects. Part of Kant’s metaphysical 
22 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A63/B87. 
23 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A50/B74. 
24 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A19/B33. 
25 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A63/B88. 
26 The exception here is moral considerations. 
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modesty is his refusal to ascribe objective reality to the principle of 
causality that extends beyond the phenomenal world of appearances. 
Even in its application to the phenomenal world, the principle of 
causality (and substance) conceptualizes given sensory inputs without 
positing the principles in a transcendentally real sense. But this does not 
mean that external reality is a systematically organized illusion of the 
human mind, since immediate sensory inputs are required for the 
instantiation of the principle of causality or any of the categories in the 
first place.27 Phenomenal appearances are thus perfectly congruent with 
empirical realism. “Experience is not limited to the private domain of 
our own representations, but includes an encounter with ‘empirically 
real’ spatiotemporal objects.”28 In fact, experience limited to the private 
domain would be impossible, for it must begin with a sensible input that 
is given from without. Appearances are at the same time metaphysically 
“hollow” in that they lack a fundamental metaphysical foundation 
outside the formal, a priori structure of our sensibility and 
understanding.  
4. Some Implications of Kant’s Epistemological and
Metaphysical Project 
Now that we have a sense of the role of sensibility in Kant’s 
epistemology, we can begin to see that Kant’s idealism is not nearly as 
“arrogant” as Stroud seems to think. Objects do not necessarily exist 
because of certain indispensable aspects of human thought and 
experience. Stroud’s account of transcendental idealism countenances 
that metaphysically real “things” essentially and necessarily correspond 
to certain indispensable elements of human cognition. Necessity, 
however, is a mark of the a priori and thus reflects the structure of the 
mind. That empirical objects necessarily appear to us in a certain form 
and under certain conditions does not mean that those objects 
themselves possess any necessary features or even exist as subject-
27 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B69. 
28 Henry Allison, “Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: Chapters 1 and 2,” in Kant’s Critique of 
Pure Reason: Critical Essays, edited by Patricia Kitcher, 181-217. (Lanham, Boulder, New 
York and Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998), 185. 
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independent transcendentally real “things” bearing those features. This 
is exactly the kind of metaphysical commitment Kant wants to avoid 
making. For “in relation to the merely subjective conditions [of our 
sensibility] all objects are appearances and do not exist for themselves as 
things given to us in this way.”29 Contextualizing objects in relation to 
our a priori epistemic framework, which includes the understanding and 
the form of our sensibility, prevents us from ascribing any properties to 
things-in-themselves.  
Sensible intuitions “are not such that through it itself the existence 
of the object is given (such an intuition, so far as we can understand, can 
belong only to the primordial being).”30 The empirical use of the 
understanding does not disclose anything about reality in itself. Even the 
transcendentally real “existence of the object” as we conceptualize it is 
not taken for granted. This means that, contra Stroud, the necessary 
conditions for thought and experience do not correspond to 
transcendentally real “things.” For Kant, we do not, as Stroud suggests, 
“proceed by secure necessary steps from our thinking and experiencing 
things in certain ways, or even from our thinking and experiencing 
anything at all, to conclusions about how things actually are whether 
they are thought about or experienced or not.” Kant never contends that 
we have the epistemic license that would allow us to make these kinds of 
claims nor does his transcendental idealism wed him to such claims.  
As Michelle Grier puts it, Kant does not have an ontology, the latter 
being exactly what Stroud attributes to Kant.31 She points to a passage 
where Kant argues that ontology is replaced by the categories of the 
Transcendental Analytic. In contrast to previous philosophers who in 
delineating the categories of Being at the same time affirmed their 
transcendentally real status, Kant limits himself to explaining and 
justifying them in their universal and necessary application to sensible 
intuitions. This is all that is required to ground knowledge. As part of 
the a priori structure of the human mind, the categories are universal 
and necessary, but there is no sense in which the existence of objects, as, 
29 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B72. 
30 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B72. 
31 Michelle Grier, “Kant's Critique of Metaphysics,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Summer 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (Ed.), URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2012/entries/kant-metaphysics/> 
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for example, their appearance in space and time, is necessary. Stroud 
seems to think that in employing indispensable ways of thinking we 
have access to what is necessarily so.32 According to Kant, finite, 
sensible beings cannot know this. What necessarily obtains in the 
phenomenal world in relation to the pure form of our sensibility and 
understanding is not what obtains in the noumenal world of the thing-
in-itself. 
Stroud might question why the pure forms of sensibility and the 
understanding are not arbitrary starting points for epistemic inquiry. If 
we want to gain knowledge of the external world, what is the epistemic 
value of affirming a starting point that is totally arbitrary from an 
“objective” point of view? For, after all, we could have acquired in the 
course of evolution an entirely different sensibility. Why assume that 
appearances in space and time are the only ways to conceive the 
phenomenal world? The pure form of our sensibility just happens to rely 
on spatial and temporal appearances necessarily, but this does not shed 
any light onto the fundamental nature of the external world. Nor does it 
preclude the possibility that knowledge could take other forms or that 
other types of sensibilities could receive appearances that are not in 
space and time. Kant says as much. He is emphatic that he is talking 
about “the human standpoint” and that it is only from this standpoint 
“that we can speak of space, extended objects, etc.”33 Because space and 
time are transcendentally ideal, that is, they reflect the pure form of the 
sensibility that human beings happen to have, Kant is comfortable with 
the idea that other beings might exist with a different form of sensibility. 
There might be a multiplicity of possible sensibilities, of which we 
happen to have one – that of space and time. This shows that Kant cannot 
allay a deep skepticism that questions why our sensibility must take the 
form of space and time or why only a certain set of categories can 
conceptualize sensory inputs. These questions are unanswerable for Kant. 
Before we grow too disheartened with Kant, however, let’s evaluate 
Stroud’s alternative model of impartial knowledge. The charge of 
epistemic partiality presupposes a model of impartial knowledge that 
attempts to gain access to reality independent of any form of sensibility 
32 Stroud, Engagement, 133. 
33 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A27/B43. Emphasis added. 
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and even understanding. Stroud admits that perhaps aspects of our 
cognition are necessary, but this counts against our capacity to have 
insight into objective reality. With regard to their ultimate metaphysical 
status, he thinks that as finite sensible creatures we do not have enough 
information to judge one way or the other: perhaps our “indispensable 
beliefs” are features of objective reality, perhaps they are not. This is why 
metaphysics is bound to end in dissatisfaction. He prefers to avoid 
passing a positive or a negative metaphysical verdict and, in effect, 
relegates metaphysics to an amusing pastime we cannot seem to do 
without, but whose projects are doomed from the start. 
Stroud can avoid this cynical outcome if he reevaluates his model of 
epistemic impartiality. Kant avoids this metaphysical aporia by rejecting 
from the start certain assumptions that Stroud makes. Stroud tacitly 
assumes that one ought to be able to evaluate “objectively” the 
indispensable elements of human cognition and by stepping outside 
one’s self and comparing them to things-in-themselves. Affirming this 
ideal epistemic perspective is a key assumption of his criticism against 
Kant. The problem is that even according to Stroud it is impossible to 
define what this ideal amounts nor could we ever achieve it: 
If we could never detach ourselves even temporarily from our acceptance of 
indispensable beliefs…, we could not subject them to the kind of scrutiny that an 
impartial metaphysical assessment of their relation to reality would seem to 
require….Beliefs that are indispensable to any thinker’s conception of a world 
would have to be retained as part of any conception that had been put under 
metaphysical assessment and survived. All indispensable ingredients of that 
original conception would necessarily survive any such alleged assessment.34
Stroud unjustifiably assumes that an ideal, godlike subject could simply 
compare human cognition with the subject-independent external world. 
Kant, unlike Stroud, is ultimately agnostic about whether such a 
transcendental world even exists. He contends that affirming such a 
standard of knowledge for finite, sensible subjects is unwarranted. 
Moreover, Stroud fails to articulate on what grounds the ideal epistemic 
subject would evaluate our indispensable beliefs. In what respect would 
their evaluation be sufficiently impartial? What object would one have to 
have in mind when one undertakes such an impartial metaphysical 
34 Stroud, Engagement, 141. 
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assessment? To say simply reality itself is not enough. For even a god 
would have to have some type of method (e.g., intellectual intuition) for 
achieving insight into reality. Stroud does not bother to articulate what 
ideal insight, independent of all forms of sensibility and human 
understanding, would amount to.  
For Kant, on the other hand, an ideal of knowledge that is totally 
independent of a subject – whether sensible or divine – would 
completely lack content: 
Now a general [impartial] criterion of truth would be one that is valid for all 
knowledge, whatever its object may be. But it is clear that such a criterion 
abstracts from all contents of knowledge (reference to its object), while truth 
concerns these very contents. It is impossible and absurd, therefore, to ask for a 
sign of truth of such contents, and therefore a sufficient and at the same time 
general indicator of truth cannot possibly be given…[O]f the truth of knowledge, 
as far as its matter is concerned, no general indicator can be demanded.35
Kant’s point here is that a Stroudian model of impartiality demands a 
“general indicator” of truth, which “abstract[s] from all contents of 
knowledge.” It is precisely this general indicator that cannot be given. 
Stroud is comfortable with the fact that we will never find such a general 
indicator of truth and nonetheless continues to affirm it as a desirable 
model for metaphysical knowledge. But why hold on to such a model of 
truth in the first place, especially if, as Stroud argues, it leads to 
dissatisfaction? Stroud leaves this question unanswered. 
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I Can’t Get No (Metaphysical Dis-)satisfaction! –  
Why I’ll be satisfied with my metaphysical conquests 
Carly Minsky  
(University of Oxford) 
Stroud’s theory of metaphysical dissatisfaction ostensibly presents a 
controversial and troubling conclusion to the effect that specific met-
aphysical inquiries we pursue are inevitably unsatisfiable, since we 
are necessarily unable to justifiably endorse a positive or negative 
commitment about the existence of the metaphysical phenomena in 
question. I argue that Stroud has not sufficiently explicated the notion 
of inconsistency that he claims undermines an endorsement of a 
negative metaphysical conclusion, nor has he shown that, when this 
inconsistency obtains, endorsing a negative metaphysical conclusion 
does not satisfy the aims of the inquiry. I further argue that meta-
physical dissatisfaction is not inevitable, since Stroud’s conditions on 
metaphysical satisfaction are too strong in requiring metaphysical 
conclusions to be independently supported. On this basis, I reject 
Strouds’ claim of pervasive metaphysical dissatisfaction. 
1. Introduction
In successive books, Stroud (2001, 2011) claims that there are specific 
metaphysical inquiries that are inevitably doomed only to provide dissat-
isfactory answers, if any at all. These questions characterise a large part 
of the ‘metaphysical project’, namely, the part that is concerned to estab-
lish what the world is really like by understanding the relation between 
the world itself  and our conception of the world. He supports this claim 
by showing that for each of the specific subject areas (e.g. causality, mo-
dality and value), the inquiry into whether these phenomena inde-
pendently exist in ‘objective reality’ result in a dilemma: either we can 
conclude a ‘negative metaphysical result’ that the object in question is 
only a feature of our subjective conception of the world, but only at the 
cost of consistency, or else we can accept a positive metaphysical conclu-
sion that the object in question objectively exists simply because the 
negative conclusion is unavailable and the inquiry was never genuinely 
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open. Both horns of the dilemma are dissatisfying with respect to our 
aims when we pursue these metaphysical questions. Therefore, Stroud 
concludes, we cannot avoid metaphysical dissatisfaction since the aims 
of a significant portion of our metaphysical inquiry are unsatisfiable 
from the outset. 
I have some pressing questions that arise in response to Stroud’s 
project and its conclusion. First and foremost, what exactly is the incon-
sistency he claims prevents us from endorsing negative metaphysical 
conclusions? Should we take the inconsistency to always undermine the 
satisfaction of metaphysical projects of this kind? Even if we can neither 
consistently endorse nor reject the negative metaphysical conclusions, 
might we nonetheless overcome this dissatisfaction by providing sup-
port for the positive metaphysical conclusion and provisionally accepting 
it instead? In general, how significant is Stroud’s metaphysical dissatis-
faction, if indeed his conclusion stands up?1 
I will address these questions in the following paper, ultimately ar-
guing metaphysical dissatisfaction should not be taken too seriously for 
three reasons: first, there are persistent question about what kind of 
inconsistency could and does undermine the acceptance of negative 
metaphysical conclusions; second, there is reason to think that in some 
cases, metaphysical satisfaction can be achieved by endorsing negative 
metaphysical results in spite of the inconsistency; thirdly, there is poten-
tial to argue for positive metaphysical conclusions even if we cannot rule 
out the negative conclusions, since our fundamental partiality towards 
positive metaphysical conceptions should not, on its own, undermine 
metaphysical satisfaction. 
2. Stroud’s Metametaphysics
The part of metaphysics that is the object of Stroud’s metametaphysical 
scrutiny is the project of reflecting on beliefs about the world that are 
taken for granted, a ‘shared human conception of the world’ in order to 
1 There are many other questions I can’t address here. For example, is it true that positive 
conceptions of causality, modality and value are indispensable to human thought? And if 
so, is it also true that this necessarily renders negative metaphysical conclusions available 
only at the cost of consistency? In what follows I grant Stroud these claims for the sake of 
argument. 
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establish whether this conception ‘goes beyond anything that is strictly 
speaking in reality’2. This project aims at refining our world-view by 
correctly identifying which of our beliefs capture the way the world actu-
ally is in an independent, objective reality. Stroud assesses this meta-
physical project: 
…I want to investigate this kind of metaphysical reflections to see how its con-
clusions are to be reached and what support can be found for them… My main 
question is whether or how any active, engaged human person…can carry out a 
reflective philosophical project like this and arrive at metaphysical conclusions 
he or she can believe and find illuminating.(Stroud 2011:4-5) 
In identifying the starting point of such a metaphysical project as the 
beliefs people do in fact have about the world, Stroud is intentionally 
advocating a loosely-Kantian metaphysical approach: ‘metaphysics from 
within’ (ibid: 7) - metaphysics which investigates the conditions for us 
having the beliefs about the world that we want to subject to metaphysi-
cal scrutiny. However, whilst Kant prescribed this feature of metaphysics 
as essential to achieving metaphysical satisfaction, Stroud endorses this 
methodological approach as the only way metaphysics could be done, 
and ultimately argues it is inevitably dissatisfying. He also contrasts his 
metametaphysics with that of the logical positivists, who viewed meta-
physics as unsatisfiable by its very nature, due its essential aim of acquir-
ing non-empirical knowledge of the world, which is directly incompati-
ble with the empiricism they advocated. Stroud does not claim that the 
very conception of metaphysics necessarily implies it cannot succeed, 
although at points it certainly looks as if his position will retrospectively 
imply this3. His view is that metaphysical dissatisfaction does not lie in 
the conception of metaphysics but in the relation between specific meta-
physical questions and fundamental features of human thought. Given 
this view, we would expect Stroud to offer conditions for metaphysical 
2 Stroud (2011:4): “Metaphysical reflection is meant to reveal how those thoughts and 
beliefs of ours are really related to the independent world they appear to be about.” 
3 For example, the claims that some positive metaphysical conceptions are indispensable to 
human thought, and that metaphysical satisfaction requires impartial, open inquiry, com-
bine to imply that the project of ‘metaphysics from within’ is unsatisfiable from the outset, 
due to its aim to independently assess and refine our metaphysical commitments. 
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satisfaction in order to then argue that they cannot be met in certain 
cases. And this is exactly what he does with the case of beauty4. 
He claims (2011: 10-15) that to reach a satisfactory answer to the 
metaphysical question of whether beauty objectively exists in the world, 
rather than just as a feature of human thought and responses, we would 
need to answer three interconnected questions: 
How is it to be established that the metaphysical answer is correct? (ibid:10-12) 
What are our actual beliefs about beauty that we are subjecting to metaphysical 
scrutiny? What are these beliefs like? (ibid: 12-13) 
Can we establish whether we do in fact think and respond in the ways proposed 
by the answer to (2), and simultaneously accept the metaphysical verdict about 
beauty? (ibid:13-14) 
The first condition requires that the metaphysical verdict has epistemo-
logical support, which seems like a reasonable condition on any philo-
sophical result. Stroud assesses some candidates for the epistemological 
grounds for a negative metaphysical verdict which says that beauty is 
only ‘in the eye of the beholder’. A potential candidate to support the 
negative metaphysical verdict is the claim that a judgement of beauty is 
simply an expression of a personal response to an object, that is, ‘that 
nothing more than the effects objects have on our minds…is relevant to 
the judgements we make about the beauty of things – that the “behold-
ers’” responses themselves are enough to account for all the differences 
amongst different judgements of beauty.’ (ibid).  
The claim that judgements of beauty are essentially subjective sup-
ports the claim that beauty is only a feature of our subjective conception 
of the world if and only if our judgements of beauty are in fact like this. 
Stroud’s second condition therefore requires that the description of our 
actual conception of the world and our actual beliefs that we are testing 
do in fact have the features that support for the metaphysical verdict 
depends on. For example, with respect to beauty, the description of our 
beliefs that the subjectivist verdict depends on will be false if our judge-
ments of beauty are in fact ascribing an objective property to objects, 
4 ‘The apparently uncontroversial case of beauty seems to support at least the general 
feasibility of some such project.’ Stroud (2011:10) 
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rather than expressing our personal attitude towards them. This would 
not undermine a subjectivist verdict about beauty, for it could be that 
our judgements of beauty are categorically false for attempting to ascribe 
an objective property which does not in fact exist, but a false description 
of our beliefs would undermine the support for the metaphysical verdict, 
and, Stroud (2011:12-13) claims, undermines the metaphysical aim of 
drawing a connection between our conception of the world and the 
world itself. 
So the final condition for metaphysical satisfaction is that we are 
able to verify that the description of our actual beliefs is accurate ‘prior to 
and independently of accepting any particular metaphysical verdict’ 
(Stroud 2011:13), i.e. whether we can verify the accuracy of the descrip-
tion of our beliefs and at the same time accept the metaphysical verdict 
(ibid:14) 5. 
In summary: metaphysical satisfaction requires that we have both 
an accurate account of how we think about the world, and an account of 
how the world is, and that the former supports the latter, and that we are 
able to verify this with independent support. Metaphysical satisfaction 
can also be achieved when we find that the way we think about the world 
is inconsistent with an independently supported metaphysical verdict. In 
such a case, satisfaction requires rejecting or revising our previously 
held beliefs about the world. So a further condition on metaphysical 
satisfaction is that we are able to reject or revise the relevant beliefs if 
they are undermined by a metaphysical verdict (Stroud 2011:15-16). 
If our metaphysical verdict says of some our beliefs about the world 
that they are false, then accepting the metaphysical verdict is incon-
sistent with continuing to endorse these beliefs. Here we arrive at 
Stroud’s metaphysical dissatisfaction thesis.  If we cannot help but con-
tinue to endorse these beliefs, then we find ourselves facing a dilemma 
5 However, Stroud’s insistence that we know that the description of our beliefs that sup-
ports a metaphysical verdict is correct seems unreasonably strong to me. If we are external-
istic about epistemic justification, all that matters is that the description is likely to be 
correct, rather than that we are justified in believing it to be correct. In effect, Stroud 
argues that metaphysical satisfaction requires that we have second order justified beliefs 
about our support for our metaphysical verdict, and that dissatisfaction occurs when we 
cannot have these second order beliefs at the same time as endorsing the verdict, or at all. 
These standards for metaphysical success and satisfaction seem far too high, and I shall 
address this in the final section. 
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of either accepting the metaphysical verdict at the cost of consistency, or 
else failing to reach a satisfying metaphysical verdict at all.  Stroud 
claims that certain concepts are indispensable to human thought, such 
that we cannot possibly give up beliefs to the effect that the objects in 
question do in fact exist in the world, so we would be in an inconsistent 
state if we accepted a negative metaphysical verdict about them. And 
furthermore, the indispensability of these beliefs imply that a positive 
metaphysical verdict is unsatisfying since default support for it is not 
enough, since the question was never truly open due to the positive met-
aphysical conception that human thought has to presuppose.   
Stroud’s metaphysical dissatisfaction thesis relies on two phenome-
na: the inconsistency in accepting a verdict that undermines other en-
dorsed beliefs, and the indispensability of positive beliefs about certain 
metaphysical objects in human thought. Importantly, he takes these two 
phenomena to undermine the satisfaction of the aims of metaphysical 
reflection. I’ll dispute that claim by question what the inconsistency 
might be, and arguing that it is too hasty to conclude that this incon-
sistency necessarily undermines metaphysical satisfaction, particularly 
before we have a clear handle on what this inconsistency is. I will also 
dispute the claim that indispensability undermines the metaphysical 
satisfaction resulting from accepting a positive metaphysical verdict.  
3. Identifying the Inconsistency
As Stroud acknowledges (2011:137), the inconsistency involved in ac-
cepting negative metaphysical verdicts about causality, modality and 
value which says that our conception of the world is false, is analogous 
to the inconsistency involved in Moorean sentences of the type ‘It is 
raining but I do not believe it is raining’6. The varied examples display 
an apparent inconsistency between two or more propositions, but it 
cannot be logical inconsistency since the propositions do not logically 
contradict: their truth is compatible. In the Moorean example above, it 
could be true both that it really is raining, and that I do not believe it is 
raining. This potential has been realised on multiple occasions, for in-
6 As discussed, for example in Moore (1944, 1993) and by Wittgenstein in Philosophical 
Investigations, part II, x (1958:190). 
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stance, whenever I forget how miserable a British summer can be, and 
am convinced it cannot be raining, though it in fact is. With respect to 
Stroud’s cases, the inconsistency is between the negative metaphysical 
verdict ‘x is not part of objective independent reality’ and implicit com-
mitments to the effect of the belief-state ‘I believe that x is objectively 
functional in the world’. As before, the inconsistency is not logical in-
consistency; there is no contradiction for it is possible them both to ob-
tain, that is, for x not to be objectively part of the way the world is, but for 
me to have commitments such that I believe and act as if x is part of the 
way the world is. An analysis of this type of inconsistency could have 
important bearing on Stroud’s thesis. 
Before I get to that, I want to address some initial confusions with 
Stroud’s inconsistency in particular. Stroud sees inconsistency in the 
commitment to a negative verdict which says that our indispensable 
positive metaphysical conception is false. The contents of these incon-
sistent beliefs are at least indirectly logically inconsistent, but since 
Stroud claims explicitly that endorsing negative verdicts are not instanc-
es of logical inconsistency, it is plausible to think that the inconsistency 
lies instead between the belief-states themselves, or else in the commit-
ments, the denials and acceptances of certain beliefs7. It often sounds as 
if Stroud’s thesis is that being in a ‘believing a negative metaphysical 
verdict’-state is incompatible with the state we have to be in to think at 
all, since this state essentially involves commitments to positive meta-
physical conceptions (e.g. Stroud 2011:131-137). In this sense, the ‘in-
consistency’ would merely be psychological incompatibility, such that 
the overarching metametaphysical thesis reduces to the claim that our 
cognitive limitations necessarily prevent us from endorsing negative 
7 For example, Stroud (2011:137): “[C]ertain propositions P and Q and R … necessarily, if 
there is any thought and experience at all then thinkers think those propositions are true. 
…no thinker could consistently deny any proposition that occupies this special indispensa-
ble position in our thought. Anyone who denied any of those propositions would also 
accept them, since denying them involves thinking, and accepting them is required for 
thought. […] Someone who both asserts that he believes that it is raining and denies that it 
is raining is inconsistent in asserting what he does. The two different propositions he 
claims to believe are not inconsistent with each other; it is possible for someone to believe 
that it is raining when it is not raining. Its being believed does not imply its truth. But no 
one who asserts or believes both that he believes that it is raining and that it is not raining 
could be consistent in asserting or believing what he does.”
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metaphysical verdicts or indeed reaching any satisfying metaphysical 
result in certain domains.  
However, this cannot be the thesis Stroud intends to put forward, 
since it is demonstrably false that our unable to endorse negative meta-
physical verdicts about causation, modality or value; there are a good 
number of philosophers, sociologists and even scientists who at the very 
least appear to be committed to such fundamental subjectivism. It could 
be argued that these people only appear to endorse subjective verdicts, 
but that this apparent commitment is either not-representative of their 
belief-state, or not a genuine, deep, complete or permanent commit-
ment. Nonetheless, there are further reasons to reject the claim of psy-
chological incompatibility. To start, it is hard to deny that people often 
have logically inconsistent beliefs. We are not logically infallible, and 
whether due to faulty reasoning, unconscious beliefs, or some other 
factor, even thoughtful, intelligent, careful agents can arrive at incon-
sistent beliefs8.  And so if we are psychologically capable of being in 
these logically-inconsistent states, it would be odd if we were psychologi-
cally incapable of committing to Moorean-style inconsistencies. 
In fact, in other places Stroud’s allusions to hypothetical examples 
in which people do endorse negative verdicts reveals that this almost 
certainly isn’t his claim. For instance, he discusses a hypothetical person 
who denies an indispensable proposition and endorses a negative meta-
physical verdict. 
The inconsistency that anyone who denied an indispensable proposition would 
fall into would show the denier to be confused, or self-deceived, or to be acting 
somehow in bad faith…a negative metaphysical verdict about what are in fact in-
dispensable beliefs could therefore seem to reveal the metaphysical status of 
their contents only if that indispensability is overlooked, or forgotten or sup-
pressed. But suppressing or avoiding or even denying that indispensability 
would not undermine it, and so would not eliminate the inconsistency. Stroud 
(2011:137-138) 
8 Though not an example of psychological evidence that people have logically inconsistent 
beliefs, Wason (1968) experiments with a selection task which reveals a confirmation bias 
that demonstrates widespread errors in applying deductive rules of reasoning. It is reason-
able to think that the prevalence of  similar fallacies and biases implies that on occasions, 
incidents of faulty deductive reasoning or logical errors do result in people endorsing 
logically inconsistent beliefs. 
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We can infer from what Stroud says here that it is indeed psychologically 
possible for a person to endorse a negative metaphysical verdict whilst at 
the same time endorsing the propositions that are somehow incon-
sistent with it. On Stroud’s view, anyone who does endorse a negative 
verdict necessarily also commits to the propositions inconsistent with it, 
for they are indispensable to any human thought at all and therefore 
implicitly endorsed by every human thinker. So given that the belief-
state of accepting a negative metaphysical verdict is not incompatible 
with the unavoidable belief-state of committing to a positive metaphysi-
cal conception, the inconsistency in such instances has yet to be ex-
plained. 
I turn, then, to the attempts to explain Moorean inconsistencies. 
The suggestion I just explored, that the inconsistency is in fact psycho-
logical incompatibility between the belief-states, could be taken as a 
variant of the solution which explains Moorean inconsistencies as ‘unbe-
lievable’. As Sorensen (1988:20) points out, attempting to explain 
Moorean inconsistencies by claiming that they cannot be believed (or 
similarly, claiming they cannot be asserted) just pushes the question 
back, since no account has been provided of what constrains believing 
(or asserting).  A prospective account is provided, for example, by Hin-
tikka (1962) who diagnoses Moorean inconsistencies as ‘epistemically 
indefensible’ by using doxastic logic, and then proposing indefensibility 
as a constraint on belief. Whilst this approach takes it as given that 
whatever is wrong with Moorean sentences is a violation of a constraint 
on belief, Stroud takes it as given that the problem in his dissatisfaction 
examples is precisely that they involve inconsistency, and so he does not 
need to claim they cannot be believed . We can potentially apply Hin-
tikka’s approach to Stroud’s project by applying the doxastic logic to 
show that the inconsistencies in Stroud’s examples are instances of epis-
temic indefensibility. 
However, Hintikka’s solution appeals to assumptions and condi-
tions that Stroud cannot use9. His doxastic logic uses the rule that belief 
9 Not least because the approach is quite generally problematic for its use of rules and 
assumptions that many would not accept. For example, It has been shown (Linsky 1968) 
that this doxastic logic is too strong for entailing that the perfectly acceptable non-Moorean 
beliefs that someone else believes in an inconsistent proposition, is indefensible in the 
same way as Moorean sentences. 
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collects over conjunction, and the rule that a belief in a proposition im-
plies a second-order belief that one believes in that proposition. In this 
way, a Moorean-style sentence becomes belief in a logical inconsistency, 
and Hintikka then proposes one condition of indefensibility as precisely 
believing a logical inconsistency.  For example, the sentence ‘It is rain-
ing and I believe it is not raining’ becomes ‘I believe that it is raining 
and it is not raining’, which is indefensible for being a belief in the logi-
cal contradiction ‘It is raining and it is not raining’. 
For Stroud’s cases, the inconsistency does not necessarily lie directly 
between two conscious beliefs which, conjoined, amount to the proposi-
tion ‘x and I do not believe that x’.  For there to be the kind of incon-
sistency Stroud worries about, the beliefs that are inconsistent with the 
negative metaphysical verdict need only be derivable from the indispen-
sable positive metaphysical views, rather than included in them. In its 
application to Stroud’s cases, Hintikka’s doxastic logic would need to be 
adapted to extend the rule that belief in p implies a belief that one be-
lieves p, to the rule that belief in p implies belief in all the beliefs deriva-
ble from p.  We then get a belief in a proposition like ‘I believe that x and 
I believe that not x’ where x is a sentence positing a positive metaphysi-
cal view of something. As before, we can then apply belief collection over 
the conjunction to get a belief in a logical inconsistency, which is ‘inde-
fensible’ by Hintikka’s logic.  
Though this is how Hintikka’s approach might be used to explain 
Stroud’s notion of inconsistency, I don’t think the approach is available 
to Stroud, due to the necessary extension of the rules. Stroud claims that 
the inconsistency arises even when the indispensability of the positive 
metaphysical beliefs are denied, that is, when the beliefs are uncon-
scious or suppressed. Since Hintikka’ approach only explains the prob-
lem with the apparently inconsistent Moorean examples when the 
Moorean sentence is believed, it does not help explain what is incon-
sistent or problematic about the situations that Stroud claims are incon-
sistent, but do not involve beliefs in propositions whose contents are 
inconsistent. In the same vein, the rule of belief-collection is inappropri-
ate for Stroud’s cases, since he claims that the inconsistency is between 
the distinct commitments rather than a feature a singular commitment 
to an inconsistent conjunction. So Hintikka’s account does not help 
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explain what Stroud means when he says that endorsing negative meta-
physical verdicts involves inconsistency. 
An alternative proposal, then, is to see the inconsistency as an ‘in-
ternal disharmony’ in which there is a conflict of commitments even 
when there is no conscious commitment to an inconsistency. The idea is 
that the actual commitments have the potential to lead to a direct com-
mitment to a logical inconsistency, or would involve belief in a direct 
logical inconsistency if all the implications of the commitments were 
also believed10. If we were to accept such suggestions, we could nonethe-
less ask as to the severity of the problem with being potentially logically 
inconsistent, or having commitments that are otherwise structurally 
flawed or disharmonious. As an answer, it might be claimed that being 
potentially inconsistent, or structurally flawed, violates a normative re-
quirement on us, since an ‘ideal’ rational agent would not be in such a 
state. However, a normative standard requiring rational or logical om-
niscience is far too strong, and even if we did not need to go this far, we 
might nonetheless be troubled by appeals to ideal agents in order to 
condemn the actual commitments of actual people as ‘dissatisfying’. In 
general, as I shall argue in the next section, it is simply not obvious that 
the kind of inconsistency found in Stroud’s cases implies that such cases 
fail to meet some normative standards. 
It is hard to deny that accepting a negative metaphysical verdict 
which says that other beliefs we commit to are false is inconsistent and 
problematic in some way. But though there is clearly something to 
Stroud’s claims, it remains unclear exactly what this inconsistency and 
this problem is. Though there is plenty of room left to explicate the no-
tion of inconsistency, as it stands, it is far too hasty to conclude that the 
prevalence of this inconsistency undermines commitments to negative 
metaphysical verdicts. 
10 These suggestions are discussed by Sorensen (1988:36-40) e.g.: “By claiming that Bohr is 
committed to a direct inconsistency, we are not attributing a direct inconsistency to him. 
In order to arrive at the undesirable commitment, we began with Bohr’s bizarre belief and 
deduced further beliefs. These deductions are not plausible if they intended to be psycho-
logically accurate…” (ibid:36) and “Although incompleteability is not inconsistency, in-
completeable belief-structures carry the danger of collapsing into inconsistent ones… the 
potential harm need never actualize.” (ibid:37) 
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4. Overcoming Dissatisfaction
For the sake of argument, I will now just assume that the notion of in-
consistency claimed to prevail in endorsements of negative metaphysical 
verdicts can be satisfactorily explicated. I will also grant Stroud’s very 
arguable claim that commitments to the objective ontological status of 
causality, modality and value are indispensable to human thought, 
though I’ll admit to being less than convinced on these points. My chal-
lenge is to the claim that the indispensability of certain thoughts and the 
inconsistency that therefore arises is so problematic as to render the 
particular metaphysical projects dissatisfying. In short, I’ll argue that it 
is possible to satisfy our metaphysical aims in understanding modality, 
causality and value in spite of the indispensability and the inconsistency. 
First I’ll explore an example in which a negative verdict is accepted and 
yet the inconsistency does not seem as dissatisfying as Stroud would 
have it. Second, I’ll explore the potential for satisfaction in accepting 
positive metaphysical verdicts, in spite of the fact that indispensability 
implies that the question was not entirely open to start with. 
Stroud’s thesis essentially relies on the view that the inconsistency 
involved in accepting negative verdicts undermines the satisfaction of 
the aim of inquiry. Examples of dissatisfactory results seem be cases in 
which a person unwittingly commits to inconsistent beliefs by not rec-
ognising this inconsistency, or not recognising the indispensability of 
the inconsistent thoughts. But what about the metametaphysician, in-
clined to be reflective on the prospect of metaphysical inquiry? If she 
recognises that endorsing a negative metaphysical verdict involves some 
kind of inconsistency, or is aware that certain metaphysical commit-
ments, though not necessarily true, are essential to human thought, 
might she not fare better with respect to her metaphysical ambitions? 
As already cited above, Stroud (2011:137-138) claims that a negative 
metaphysical verdict will seem to reveal a metaphysical truth ‘only if’ the 
indispensability of the relevant inconsistent commitments is not attend-
ed to. From this, we can infer that being in an inconsistent state neces-
sarily requires that the person does not consciously accept that he is 
unable to give up the commitments that are inconsistent with the nega-
tive verdict. Stroud’s view seems to be that anyone who came to a nega-
tive conclusion would, taking it to contradict with a positive metaphysi-
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cal conception, deny that he was committed to that positive conception, 
or else resolve to reject any prior commitment to the positive conception. 
In contrast, if a person does accept indispensability, Stroud presumably 
believes that they will not deny their implicit commitment to a positive 
conception, nor will they attempt to reject the positive conception. So 
Stroud’s condition denies the potential for the metametaphysician to 
endorse a negative metaphysical verdict whilst being aware that she has 
indispensable positive metaphysical commitments, since the negative 
verdict will seem compelling only if the indispensable beliefs are denied 
or suppressed.  Stroud apparently commits to the view that it is impos-
sible for a person to recognize that some of her commitments are inevi-
tably false, or at least, impossible for a person to believe that a commit-
ment she cannot give up is false. I suggest that not only is this possible, 
it is a situation in which a person can reach a satisfying metaphysical 
verdict. 
As an example, we can imagine the metametaphysician endorses a 
negative verdict about causality but recognizes that a positive metaphysi-
cal conception of causality is indispensable to any thought at all. She 
therefore commits to a belief that causality is not part of objective reality 
(negative metaphysical verdict) and a belief that she inevitably commits, 
to the contrary, to a positive conception of causality (acceptance of indis-
pensability), and to a positive conception of causality (indispensable 
commitment). Whatever is wrong with this state is still not logical in-
consistency, since again, the content of the commitments are compati-
ble; this does not change with the addition of a conscious awareness of 
indispensability.  
Since the negative negative verdict is not directly logically incon-
sistent with the indispensable positive conception, we need to represent 
the commitment to a negative verdict and the commitment to the indis-
pensable positive conception as commitments of different orders, or else 
commitments whose implications are logically inconsistent, but whose 
contents are not. For example, endorsing a negative metaphysical verdict 
might involve the belief ‘I believe that causality is not part of objective 
reality’ without the commitment to the first order belief itself, or the 
indispensable positive conception might involve a belief that ‘causality 
plays a role in the world’ which does not contradict the negative verdict, 
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though a logical consequence of it, that there is such a thing as causality 
in the world’, does. 
If the former, the metametaphysician who is aware of indispensabil-
ity could be represented as committing to: 
1. I believe that causality is not part of objective reality (negative
metaphysical verdict),and
2. I believe that causality is part of objective reality (acceptance of
indispensability), and
3. causality is part of objective reality (indispensable positive
commitment).
This state is not logically consistent, since it might be true that the 
metametaphysician has conflicting beliefs about causality, and that cau-
sality is part of objective reality. If it is true, then the metametaphysician 
would be logically inconsistent for having the contradicting beliefs she 
believes she has, and so believes something (not stated above) that is 
false. If it isn’t true, then at least one of the metametaphysician’s beliefs 
stated above is false, though she is not necessarily logically inconsistent. 
Perhaps this seems even more dissatisfying than Stroud’s original ex-
planation of inconsistency, but I contend that it isn’t. It is possible to 
have a rational belief-set containing false beliefs. More controversially, it 
is possible to have a rational belief-set that is logically inconsistent. 
Sorensen (1988:24) discusses some examples, including ‘propositional 
attitude paradoxes’ (MacIntosh 1984) such as the ‘sophisticated preface 
paradox’ which says ‘At least one of my first order beliefs is false’. As 
Sorensen (1988: 23) notes, logical consistency is just one desirable fea-
ture amongst competing desiderata for belief-states. And so if rationality 
is given significant weight in the aims of metaphysical inquiry, a 
metametaphysician who recognises that she cannot help but commit to 
a positive conception but nonetheless commits to a negative verdict 
might achieve metaphysical satisfaction in spite of the inconsistency that 
Stroud diagnoses, and in spite of a potential logical inconsistency. It may 
be objected that this is unsatisfactory precisely because the 
metametaphysician inevitably beliefs something false, and at the very 
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least, metaphysical satisfaction requires true results. Though this is a 
valid objection, and certainly central to Stroud’s claims, I see the re-
quirement that all our beliefs be true to be unreasonable and far too 
strong. If a negative metaphysical verdict is true, and acceptance involves 
rational commitments, then this seems like a metaphysically satisfying 
result to me, particularly if the false beliefs are the indispensable ones 
that the negative verdict we commit to says are false. 
Finally, I think we can avoid the metaphysical dissatisfaction con-
clusion by denying that satisfaction requires a genuinely open inquiry, 
that is, an impartial starting point. Stroud claims: 
I think the indispensability of certain fundamental ways of thinking presents an 
unavoidable obstacle to any metaphysical satisfaction of the kind we seek. That 
is what stands in the way of our gaining the kind of distance we need for reach-
ing a satisfying verdict one way or the other on the metaphysical status of those 
ways of thinking. 
For propositions whose acceptance is indispensable to any conception of a world 
at all, it looks as if we could never face a genuinely open question about their 
capturing or not capturing the way things are in the independent world. 
If we can never detach ourselves even temporarily from our acceptance of indis-
pensable beliefs of those kinds, we could not subject them to the kind of scruti-
ny that an impartial metaphysical assessment of their relation to reality would 
seem to require. (Stroud 2011:140) 
Whilst I agree with Stroud that the impossibility of consistently accept-
ing a negative metaphysical verdict gives no independent support for a 
positive metaphysical verdict, I do not share his view that the indispen-
sability of positive metaphysical conceptions undermines any support 
for a positive verdict. It is fair to say that any support we could give 
would not, strictly speaking, be independent of our prior commitment to 
a positive conception, since the thought and argument itself depends on 
it, if Stroud’s indispensability claims are true. But this is not to say that 
we have no positive reason to endorse a positive verdict, nor to say that 
such endorsement is dissatisfying. There are many cases in philosophy 
where the support for a conclusion is only compelling if presupposed. 
‘Meta-inductive’ arguments, such as No Miracles Argument in support 
of scientific realism, and the pessimistic meta-induction in support of 
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anti-realism, are such examples11. In these cases, the support is not 
independent, but this does not necessarily imply that the argument is 
viciously circular. It even might show that the position is at least not 
internally incoherent, which could well be a satisfying result. 
We almost never start philosophical reflection from impartial posi-
tions, and even recognizing this rarely leads to despair about the satis-
faction of our projects. Stroud imposes a stricter standard for the satis-
faction of the particular metaphysical inquiry he assesses because it 
involves scrutinizing our own beliefs, which seems to demand impartial-
ity on pain of circularity or inconsistency. I think the demand of impar-
tiality, of metaphysical reflection which does not presuppose a commit-
ment either way, is unreasonable and unsatisfiable from the outset. 
Since Stroud claims that it is not the very conception of metaphysical 
inquiry which prevents its satisfaction, in contrast to the claims of the 
logical positivists, impartiality cannot be an essential feature of satisfia-
ble metaphysical projects, even when these projects involve ‘metaphys-
ics-from-within’. Though there is much more to say on this matter, in 
short, I claim that Stroud’s conditions for metaphysical satisfaction are 
too strong for requiring that we are able to independently support our 
results. This, in turn, requires that we can verify the accuracy of our 
support for our conclusions without presupposing the conclusion itself, 
which is to hold metaphysical inquiries to a higher standard than many 
other philosophical pursuits.  
5. Conclusion
I’ve here proposed three reasons why I do not take Stroud’s 
metametaphysical thesis as conclusive. First, more needs to be said for 
us to understand the inconsistency that Stroud takes to be pervasive in 
endorsing negative metaphysical conclusions to certain inquiries. Sec-
ond, Stroud has not convinced me that this inconsistency necessarily 
undermines the satisfaction of these metaphysical inquiries, even grant-
ing his conditions for satisfaction. Third, and finally, his conditions for 
satisfaction are too strong for requiring that a conclusion can be inde-
11 See, for example, Psillos (1999) for discussions of No Miracles Arguments, and Laudan 
(1981) on the Pessimistic Meta-Induction. 
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pendently supported. Whether I give up the demand for consistent 
commitments, or impartial inquiries, I claim that it is reasonable to 
think that my metaphysical conquests can satisfy. 
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Skepticism, Invulnerability,  
and Epistemological Dissatisfaction 
Chris Ranalli 
(University of Edinburgh) 
How should we understand the relationship between the contents of 
our color, causal, modal, and evaluative beliefs on the one hand, and 
the color, causal, modal, and evaluative properties, on the other? 
According to Barry Stroud’s recent book (2011), he thinks that 
because of how we should think about the contents of those kinds of 
beliefs, we should think that what he calls a “negative metaphysical 
verdict” on the latter is not one that we could consistently maintain. 
The metaphysical project aims to arrive at an improved conception of 
ourselves and our relation the world, no matter if that conception is 
positive or negative. But if Stroud is right that we cannot consistently 
arrive at the view that all of our causal, modal, and evaluative beliefs 
are systematically false, we will see that we cannot consistently reach 
the negative verdict. But failure to reach the negative verdict doesn’t 
mean that we have reached the positive verdict. Stroud calls this 
philosophical failure “metaphysical dissatisfaction”. In this paper, I 
argue that we can appropriate a meta-epistemological response to the 
problem of the external world which shares its core features with 
Stroud’s (2000a, 2011) arguments, but which nevertheless leaves us 
with a distinctive kind of epistemological dissatisfaction. 
1. Introductory Remarks
Since at least the publication of P. F. Strawson’s Individuals, there has 
been a renewed interest in the prospects of overcoming skepticism about 
the external world using transcendental arguments. These arguments 
move from a premise about our cognitive states, such as that we think, 
believe, or have experiences of certain kinds, and a premise about how 
certain non-cognitive facts, such as that there are material objects, or 
that our cognitive apparatuses are reliable, are required for the truth of 
the cognitive premise, to a conclusion about the non-cognitive. But in 
his Transcendental Arguments and elsewhere, Barry Stroud argued that 
these arguments cannot be successful. However, his reasoning targeted 
more ambitious transcendental arguments, whose main premise 
connected the cognitive with the non-cognitive. We can still ask whether 
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or not more modest transcendental arguments, whose main premise 
connects cognitive states with other cognitive states, can have anti-
skeptical consequences without admitting of the same problems that 
plagued the ambitious arguments. 
In this paper, I argue that we can adapt epistemological arguments, 
following Davidson (1991), Stroud (1994; 2004) and a reading of 
Wittgenstein (1969), which aim to undermine the problem of the 
external world, shares its core features with modest transcendental 
arguments, and also parallels the kind of arguments Stroud mounts 
against various kinds of error theories in his recent Engagement and 
Metaphysical Dissatisfaction. The upshot of this investigation is that a 
better understanding of how Stroud deals with the reductionist and error 
theorist about color, causation, modality, and value, might bring into 
sharper focus another avenue of response to the problem of the external 
world. However, I conclude echoing Stroud’s (2011), with a 
metaepistemological point. The point is that even a successful modest 
transcendental argument should leave us epistemologically dissatisfied. 
2. Stroud’s Metaphysical Project: An Outline
The main goal of Stroud’s (2011) investigation was to discover whether 
or not we can arrive at significant philosophical conclusions about the 
nature of causation, modality, and value, after we have given an 
explanation of the nature of causal belief, modal belief, and evaluative 
belief. It is crucial here that we understand how Stroud conceives of this 
metaphysical project. According to Stroud, we start out with all of our 
beliefs, thoughts, and experiences of the world on the one hand, and we 
go on to ask among all of these features of human beings, which of 
them reflect how the world really is, and which of them distort it. 
Whatever survives this assessment will be what we continue to maintain, 
and so will receive a positive verdict. On the other hand whatever does 
not survive this assessment will be what we dispense with, and so will 
receive a negative verdict. According to Stroud, the goal of this project is 
to: 
[A]chieve an enhanced—a metaphysically corrected—conception of what the 
world is like. It is meant to tell us, contrary to the way we (perhaps uncritically) 
took things to be at the beginning, how things really are (Stroud 2011: 8). 
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But Stroud’s main focus is on the prospects of a negative outcome of 
this kind of investigation. For example, we might consider a philosopher 
of color who maintains that, while we all have beliefs about the colors of 
things, nevertheless nothing in the world around us is colored.1 What 
does it take to be a philosopher who maintains this view about the 
nature of color and color belief? Stroud considers first what it takes to 
have the kinds of beliefs about color that this theorist is interested in. 
According to Stroud, the contents of our color beliefs cannot be reduced 
to contents which can be understood in non-color terms. The truth of 
this claim rules out the contents of color beliefs from being understood 
in terms of the surface reflectance properties of objects causing us to 
have certain kinds of sensations, or from them being understood in 
terms of just patterns of responses to the surface reflectance properties 
of objects, and so on. After all, these are all properties of things which 
can be understood, if not in our current science of color vision and 
material objects, then in a completed science of color vision and material 
objects. This claim gives us one of Stroud’s core claims: 
(Anti-Reductionism) The contents of our color beliefs are irreducible to the non-
colored. 
If Stroud is right that anti-reductionism is true of the nature of our color 
beliefs, then the next question to pursue is this: are there really colors in 
1 It’s not easy to bring the full picture of what Stroud means by the “philosophical project” 
into view. One might compare it to Nagel’s (1986) philosopher who attempts to reach a 
“view [of] the world from nowhere within it” (Nagel 1986: 67). Stroud expresses the 
“philosophical project” he’s interested as follows: “If we want to find out what is really so, 
we have no choice but to start where we are, with what we already believe or think we 
know, and go on from there. We have to keep some beliefs or other, or get new ones which 
win out over those we used to have. But the philosophical project also requires a certain 
withdrawal or detachment from the things we believe. We have to be able to examine and 
assess them independently of our believing them or having very good reasons to believe 
them. The question is not simply whether they are true or whether we should continue to 
accept them. Even if all the beliefs we examine are the outcome of careful investigation and 
are as strongly supported as they can be, the question is not their epistemic credentials but 
the further metaphysical question of their relation to an independent reality. It is perhaps 
not surprising that a metaphysical enquiry into the relation between our beliefs and reality 
should require both engagement with and detachment from our beliefs about the world. 
The question is whether we can take those opposing attitudes towards the same set of 
beliefs. And there is the further question whether the project requires that we do so at the 
same time” (Stroud 2000a: 28). 
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the world around us? According to Stroud, his opponent finds it difficult 
for colors to fit into the natural world order. The core thought here is 
that if we aim to understand human color vision in terms of the science 
of color vision: 
We would see that there dose not have to be a world of coloured things to 
explain why we believe that there is one. Colours, therefore, would be exposed or 
unmasked as no part of the world as it is independently of us. They would still 
fall at best on the side of ‘appearance’, of as something ‘subjective’ (Stroud 2000: 
76-77). 
Let us focus on the last two sentences. Here, Stroud describes his 
opponent as someone who thinks that colors are not part of the mind-
independent world: the world which is, in Bernard Williams diction, 
“there anyway”. So we might characterize this thesis as follows: 
(Subjectivism) Colors do not exist in the mind-independent world. 
This is not to claim that colors fail to exist full stop. Instead, the 
colors of things are something which arise due to our distinctive 
responses to things, or are otherwise properties of certain kinds of 
mental states like visual experiences. In either case, color properties 
count as being mind-dependent: properties whose existence depends 
upon the existence of minded creatures. 
At this juncture, Stroud asks a good question. He asks whether or 
not the reductionist about the content of color beliefs can also be a 
subjectivist about colors. His answer is ‘no’, because he thinks that in 
order for us to ascribe color beliefs to ourselves and others, we must also 
believe that objects are colored. In his words, the ascription of the belief 
that some things are colored is indispensible to ascribing others with 
color beliefs. They are indispensible in the sense a necessary condition 
of our ascribing color beliefs to people is our actually believing that 
objects are colored.2 This gives us the claim that: 
(Stroud’s Color Thesis) A necessary condition of believing that S has color 
beliefs is believing that some things are colored in the world around us. 
2 Here’s how Stroud expresses it: “no one could abandon all beliefs about the colours of 
things and still understand the colour terms” (2000a:168). 
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Stroud’s master argument, then, amounts to this. If anti-reductionism 
and Stroud’s Thesis are true of the nature of our color beliefs, then the 
philosopher of color cannot consistently arrive at subjectivism about 
color. In more general terms, what we discover about the nature of color 
beliefs constrains what we can learn about the metaphysics of color. 
According to Stroud, what we cannot learn is that there are no colored 
things independently of us. But it’s not that we cannot learn that there 
are no colored things independently of us because there are colored 
things independently of us. Stroud doesn’t think that the failure to reach 
the negative conclusion about the colors of things implies that we have 
successfully reached the positive conclusion. Instead, we will be faced 
with the dissatisfying conclusion that one of two possible outcomes of 
our metaphysical project is unreachable, but not because the other 
possible outcome has been reached. 
We can abstract from the details of the color case, and express 
Stroud’s general line of argument as follows: 
Template Stroudian Argument: 
(Belief Claim) S believes that a, b, c, and so on, are F. 
For example, S might believe that certain events cause others, or that 
people do things for reasons, or that some propositions couldn’t have 
been false. But now suppose that there is no causation in the 
independent world, no reasons in the independent world, and so on. In 
general: 
(Negative Verdict) There are no F’s. 
At this stage, we register Stroud’s core thesis that indispensible to 
believing that a causes b is believing in material objects, or that 
indispensible to believing that people have color beliefs is believing that 
things are colored, or that indispensible to having beliefs at all is 
believing things for reasons. In general: 
(Indispensability) A necessary condition of believing that a, b, c, and so on, are 
G, is believing that a, b, c, and so on, are F. 
Therefore, 
(Invulnerability) S cannot consistently maintain that a, b, c, and so on, are G 
while accepting the Negative Verdict: that there are no F’s 
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Of course, an important and difficult part of this project is filling out the 
Belief Claim. This is what we might call Stage 1 of the Metaphysical 
Project: to give the correct account of the contents of our beliefs in the 
relevant domain. Stroud wants to make sure that he has given the 
correct account of the contents of our beliefs in the relevant domain. 
Consider causation. He thinks that to believe that a caused b is to believe 
that there is some necessary connection between a and b, irreducible to 
counter-factual analysis and dispositional analysis. But if we then go to 
the world to see whether or not anything ever satisfies the contents of 
those beliefs, it seems as if nothing could. Call this Stage 2 of the 
Metaphysical Project. What Stroud finds interesting is whether we can 
consistently maintain the verdicts of Stage 1 of the Metaphysical Project 
with the verdicts of Stage 2 of the Metaphysical Project. If we cannot, 
then we have failed our Metaphysical Project. Following Stroud, call this 
Metaphysical Dissatisfaction.  
If Stroud is right that substantive areas of our thought, such as our 
causal, modal, and evaluative thoughts, are indispensible to our thinking 
at all, or to our thinking in certain fundamental ways, then it seems he 
would also be right in thinking that the outcome of our general 
assessment of them cannot be negative. The sense in which the outcome 
cannot be negative is not the strong modal sense in which it cannot be 
true that people fail to have these kinds of thoughts. After all, it is 
possible for us not to exist, as we once did, and so possible for us not to 
have thoughts at all. Instead, Stroud’s point seems to be that it is not 
possible for us have thoughts of those kinds, consistent with accepting a 
negative conclusion about whether or not things in the mind-
independent world answer to those concepts which in part compose 
those thoughts. 
In this way, a negative verdict about the possibility of correctness for 
these kinds of thoughts cannot be reached; so subjecting them to this 
kind of metaphysical assessment, where a negative outcome is seen to 
be one of two possible improvements, should strike us as dissatisfying. 
It’s dissatisfying not because it cannot be rewarding. It can be. It can be 
rewarding to learn that certain ways of thinking are so fundamental to 
thinking anything at all, or thinking in certain ways, that subjecting 
them to metaphysical assessment turns out to be pointless. It can be 
rewarding to learn that certain arguments for unappealing metaphysical 
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conclusions turn out to be fallacious. Rather, Stroud’s point seems to be 
that what promises to leave us dissatisfied is that one of the most 
general goals of metaphysics is to reach a refined and improved 
conception of the world, no matter how magnificent or bleak that 
conception of the world turns out to be. But if arriving at an improved 
conception of the world turns out to be impossible for us, how could we 
be satisfied with that? His point here is not to mount this argument as 
an argument against, say, an error theorist about colors, who believes 
that if our color concepts are ever satisfied in the world independently of 
us, they are satisfied by categorical color properties of objects, but since 
there are no such ‘spooky’ properties in the world around us, it follows 
that our beliefs about the colors of things, that some carpets are red, or 
that lemons are yellow, say, are systematically false. Instead his point 
here is to mount this argument as an argument that is supposed to 
enhance our understanding of philosophical questions, philosophical 
explanations, as opposed to, say, ‘ordinary questions’, ‘scientific 
questions’, ‘religious questions’, ‘ordinary explanations’, ‘scientific 
explanations’, and so on. So the target of his arguments, it seems, are 
meta-philosophical, rather than strictly first-order, philosophical 
concerns. The meta-philosophical point is that certain philosophical 
questions, such as ‘are there any colors independent of anyone?’, are not 
questions we can consistently give a negative answer to, but not because 
the answer to ‘are there any colors independently of anyone?’ is ‘no’. 
Instead, we are unable to consistently believe that, say, there are no 
colors independently of anyone, because, surprisingly, metaphysical 
reflection on the nature of color and color belief revealed that “no one 
could abandon all beliefs about the colours of things and still understand 
the colour terms” (Stroud 2000a:168). 
Now that we have examined the structure and aims of 
Stroud’s(2000a, 2011) meta-philosophical arguments I want to ask 
whether or not this sort of meta-philosophical argument can extend over 
into the epistemological domain, where one of the primary concerns is 
over the possibility of knowledge of the external world. One motivation 
here is that prima facie similarities between the two philosophical 
projects might not turn out to be superficial similarities, but authentic. 
If this is right, then we will be furnished with a novel meta-philosophical 
argument, not against skepticism about the external world, but against 
119 
the prospects of our being able to arrive at skepticism about the external 
world as the improved epistemological conception of ourselves and our 
relation to the world, the kind we might seek as epistemologist who 
want to understand the limits and extent of our knowledge. 
3. The Epistemological vs. the Metaphysical Project
On the face of it, there is an important difference between the 
metaphysical projects and the epistemological project. One of the core 
differences between the problem of explaining how our color, causal, 
modal, and evaluative judgements could be true independently of us and 
the problem of explaining how our knowledge of the world is possible is 
that the latter, unlike the former, seems to present us with a certain kind 
of paradox. 
Consider Stroud’s famous discussion of the problem of the external 
world in his (Chapter 1, 1984). There, Stroud argued that the problem of 
the external world seems to be grounded in “platitudes we all accept” 
(Stroud 1984: 82). But if the problem is grounded in grounded in 
“platitude we all accept”, then this presents us with a distinctive 
metaepistemological problem: how is it possible to avoid epistemological 
dissatisfaction when it comes to responding to the problem of the 
external world? After all, if Stroud is right that what makes a skeptical 
answer to that problem look plausible is that the argument in favor of 
skepticism about the external world trades on nothing more than 
platitudes, then a response to that argument would have to reject 
platitudes. But what kind of epistemological satisfaction does that 
promise? Call this Stroud’s Paradox. Any resolution to Stroud’s Paradox 
seems to leave us with a kind of epistemological dissatisfaction. On the 
one hand, skepticism about the external world does not reflect how we 
think of ourselves and our epistemic relation to the world. After all, we 
think of ourselves as knowing about the world around us. On the other 
hand, if the argument in support of that thesis trades on mere 
platitudes, then in order to avoid skepticism, we would have to revise 
one or more of the platitudes that we all would otherwise accept. But this 
kind of revisionism in our epistemological thinking is at the same time 
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what we seek to avoid in our philosophical theorizing, but also what we 
cannot avoid if we are to oppose skepticism about the external world. 
The problem here for our purposes is not Stroud’s Paradox, but that 
it is hard to see how our response to skepticism about the external world 
could parallel Stroud’s response to the subjectivist and reductionist 
about colors, causation, value, and so on, if the former, but not the latter, 
is grounded in mere platitudes. To help sharpen the problem, consider 
the dissatisfaction which Stroud argues accompanies the project of 
explaining how our color, causal, modal, and evaluative beliefs could be 
independent of our responses to the world. On his view, it arises out of 
the relationship between a view about the content of those kinds of 
beliefs, and what we think is one of two possible outcomes of the 
distinctive philosophical project of explaining how those kinds of beliefs 
could ever be true. One outcome is the negative outcome where none of 
them could be true. Of course, this might be a disappointing result 
because we perhaps want to think that our modal, evaluative, and causal 
beliefs, for example, could be true of the world around us. But what is 
not disappointing as a philosopher is that we could arrive at the truth of 
how things are in the world around: that it is possible to arrive at a 
conception of the world where none of our modal, causal, color, or 
evaluative discourse represents the world as it is. The problem here, 
then, is appears to be a stark contrast between the two projects, and the 
source of the philosophical dissatisfaction each project seems to 
recommend. Call this the Contrast Problem. 
One problem our account faces, then, is the Contrast Problem. How 
should it be overcome? In what follows, I argue that the Contrast 
Problem is in fact not a genuine problem for giving a response to 
skepticism about the external world which parallels Stroud’s response to 
the subjectivist and the reductionist. On this view, while there seems to 
be a problem for giving some such response, appearances are 
misleading. 
What we should examine now is the problem of the external world, 
and the distinctive epistemological project of explaining how our 
knowledge of the world around us is possible. Concerning the problem 
of the external world, Stroud wrote at the beginning of his Significance 
of Philosophical Scepticism, that: 
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[T]he problem has no solution; or rather that the only answer to the question as 
it is meant to be understood is that we can know nothing about the world 
around us (Stroud 1984: 1). 
Notice that this quotation presents us with an intellectual challenge, 
because Stroud is not himself a skeptic. So we should ask what he 
means if not that skepticism about the external world is true. One 
interesting point to highlight about this quotation is that Stroud makes it 
look like once we understand the problem as it is “meant to be 
understood”, we too will find that the answer is that we can know 
nothing about the world around us. But how do reconcile a commitment 
to this claim with the commitment that skepticism about the external 
world is false? 
Perhaps the place to start is this: how should we understand the 
epistemological problem of the external world? After all, it might be that 
the problem has “no solution” because a solution would show how we 
can or do have the kind of knowledge that skepticism claims we cannot 
have, given the distinctive challenge to that knowledge which it presents 
us with. So, perhaps Stroud thinks that there is “no solution” to the 
problem because no proposed solution could show how our perceptual 
knowledge of the world around us is possible, given the distinctive 
obstacles which make that knowledge look impossible. Compare with 
Zeno’s challenge: how is motion in general possible if it is also true that 
we must traverse an infinite distance in order to move at all? Zeno’s 
challenge is to show how movement is possible given those ‘facts’ about 
motion that he raises. The challenge is not to show how movement is 
possible full stop. If that were right, we could just run around a track, or 
open a door. 
Moreover, notice that understanding the question like this reveals 
that our question ‘how is knowledge of the external world possible?’ is 
elliptical for ‘how is knowledge of the external world possible given such-
and-such obstacle which makes it look impossible?’ On this reading, the 
question is a conditional question. It does not ask how something is 
possible full stop. Instead, it is, at least at the semantic level, what 
Cassam (2007) has called an obstacle-dependent question: a question 
which is raised at all because something makes the target of the 
question look impossible. 
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But what is it that makes knowledge of the world look impossible? 
As it stands in the literature, the answer to this question is ‘all sorts of 
things’.3 Of course, we could inquire into which of these obstacles is 
more basic than the others, in the sense that it might be that one of 
them is indispensible to raising the problem of the extenral world, and 
sustaining the skeptical answer to that problem, but this would bring us 
too far afield. Instead, I want to bracket this important question, and just 
focus on what Stroud has taken the obstacle to our knowledge of the 
world to be. Let us therefore consider a core statement of the problem as 
Stroud understands it: 
The Cartesian problem of our knowledge of world therefore becomes: how can 
we know anything about the world around us on the basis if the senses give us 
only what Descartes says they give us [my emphasis] (Stroud 1984: 12). 
3 One obstacle is thought to be grounded in the Closure Principle and the contraints it puts 
on propositional knowledge. The Closure Principle can be expressed as follows: if S knows 
that p, and S knows that p implies q, and deduces q from p while retaining her knowledge 
that p throughout, S thereby comes to know that q. The problem the Closure Principle 
raises is two-fold. On the one hand, if we plug in certain skeptical scenarios, such as that 
we are brains-in-vats, the Closure Principle puts us in a position to reason as follows: I 
know that having hands entails that I’m not a handless brain-in-a-vat. So, from the Closure 
Principle, it follows that if I know that I have hands, I know that I’m not a brain-in-a-vat. 
But how do I know that I’m not a brain-in-a-vat? At this juncture, Nozick (1981) and 
Dretske (2005, 1970) argued that we cannot know that we are not brains-in-vats, because if 
we were brains in vats, we would nevertheless believe that we weren’t. Still, it apparently 
strikes some as just obvious that we couldn’t know some such proposition (Cf. DeRose 
1995: 2). But this is where the second problem arises. The Closure Principle seems to be 
no more than a theoretical expression of the basic idea that deduction can be a means of 
our extending our knowledge (Cf. Williamson 2000). So the Closure Principle presents us 
with the two-sided problem of having to show how it is possible to know that we are brains-
in-vats even though it’s ‘obvious’ that we couldn’t know some such proposition, or 
showing that Closure Principle is false, even though it seems like nothing more than an 
expression of the platitude that deduction can be a means of our extending our knowledge 
to the known implications of what we know. Another obstacle is about sense perception 
and its relation to empirical knowledge. Since at least the publication of Descartes’ 
Meditations, most philosophers have thought that it is possible to that we have all of the 
sensory experiences that we have, even if everything we believe about the world is false. 
Call this the Underdetermination of sensory experience. For responses to this obstacle in 
particular, see Burge (1998), Bruekner (1994, 2010), McDowell (2008, 1995), Pritchard 
(2012), Pritchard and Ranalli (forthcoming), Stroud (2009), and Cassam (2007). However, 
there are some philosophersContextualistswho think that the obstacle is grounded in 
a misrepresentation of our linguistic practices and their relationship to our standardards 
for knowldege-attribution. See Unger (1975, 1984) and DeRose (1995). For a survey of the 
recent work on radical skepticism, see Pritchard (2002). 
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So what, according to Descartes, do the senses give us? 
What we gain through the senses is on Descartes’ view only information that is 
compatible with our dreaming things about the world around us and not 
knowing anything about the world by means of the senses. The Cartesian 
argument presents a challenge to our knowledge, and the problem of our 
knowledge of the external world is to show how that challenge can be met 
(Stroud 1984: 13). 
So, as Stroud presents the problem at least, the skeptical challenge to 
our knowledge of the world is this: 
(Skeptical Challenge) How is knowledge of the external world possible if it is 
also true that our knowledge of the world comes to us through our senses, but 
we could have all of the sensory experiences that we have even if we knew 
nothing about the world around us?4 
Notice here that the skeptical challenge is not framed in terms of an 
adeversial dispute between the ‘Skeptic’ and the ‘Anti-Skeptic’. If this 
were the challenge, what would be required for an epistemologically 
satisfying response to the challenge would be different. After all, if the 
challenge is framed in terms of a dispute between us and ‘Skeptics’, 
then one goal would be to convince the skeptic to be one of us: to believe 
what we believe. Call this the Convince-the-Skeptic Challenge. As several 
philosophers have argued, however, this challenge appears to end in 
favor of the Skeptic.5 Indeed, as Wright (1991) has pointed out, if 
4 Stroud frames the obstacle in different terms from his (1984) to his (1994). In the firse 
case, the obstacle is that it is possible to have all of the experiences that we have even if we 
are all dreaming. In the second case, the obstacle is that it is possible to have all of the 
experiences that we have, even if everything we believe about the world is false. However, 
note that these obstacles all give expression to the same core idea: that there is a gap 
between our sensory experience and the world around us, such that no amount of sensory 
experience is ever sufficient for knowledge of the world around us, contra the intuition that 
sensory experience sometimes seems to just give us knowledge of the world without any 
cognitive effortwithout any reasoning or reflective thinking in play. 
5 Prime examples where this case is made include Stroud (1984, 1989), Pritchard (2005, 
2012), Bryne (2004), Pryor (2000), Wright (1991), Williams (1991), and Rorty (1979). It 
seems like one of the core arguments of Stroud’s (1984) was to show that the Convince-
the-Skeptic Challenge must end in favor of the skeptic. There, Stroud argued that Austin, 
Moore, Kant, and Quine all failed on this front, in part because they were engaging in the 
Convince-the-Skeptic Challenge. But given Stroud’s argument of his (1984), that 
skepticism is a paradox grounded in platitudes, he also seemed right in thinking that 
responses within the Convince-the-Skeptic Challenge would end in failure. For a 
discussion on how one might intergate a transcendental response along diagnostic lines, 
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Stroud’s thesis about the problem of the external world is right, a sound 
argument against skepticism makes the problem even more acute 
because now we are furnished with two appealing arguments for 
opposing conclusions, which just “intensifies the embarrasment” 
against the ‘Anti-Skeptic’ (Wright 1991: 89). 
Under the influence of Stroud (1984) and Williams (1991), most 
philosophers have now abandoned the Convince-the-Skeptic Challenge, 
and have instead embarked on the challenge of showing how the 
problem of the external world is far less of paradox than Stroud made it 
seem. On this view, the problem of the external world, and its attandent 
skeptical argument, do not trade on mere “platitudes that we would all 
accept”, platitudes which are grounded in our pre-theoretical thinking 
about knowledge and sense-perception ” (Stroud 1984: 82). Call this the 
Diagnostic Challenge. A successful response to the Diagnostic 
Challenge, it seems, would allow for epistemological satisfaction, since 
the goal would then be to expose where in the skeptical argument there 
are more than just platitudes in operation. But there would be no 
dissatisfaction in unmasking these principles as far less than 
platitudinous, since then we would see that we were not presented with 
the problem of the external world qua paradox. We would instead be in a 
position to see that the problem of the external world is more of a 
paradox along the lines of Skolem’s or Cantor’s paradox, where rejecting 
an assumption amounts to no more than problems for our theories, 
rather than the Sorites and the Liar paradox, where rejecting an 
assumption seems to have ramifcations for more than just our theories, 
but also the correctness of our use of ordinary concepts. 
To see this, consider the following expression of the Skeptical 
Paradox: 
(1) I don’t know that I am not a brain-in-a-vat, deceived by an evil demon, and so 
on. 
(2) If I don’t know that I am not a brain-in-a-vat, deceived by an evil demon, and 
so on, then I don’t know that there are tables,  trees, computers, and so 
on. 
as opposed to Convince-the-Skeptic lines, and how this bears on the arguments from 
Stroud, Williams, Davidson, and Rorty, see Pritchard and Ranalli (forthcoming). 
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(3) I know that there are tables, trees, computers, and so on. 
What makes this paradox look like it is grounded in “platitudes we all 
accept”? Consider first premise (2). This premise can be supported along 
the following lines. Intuitively, if one knows, say, that they are in 
Washington Square park, New York City, then they know that they 
aren’t in Patriarch’s Ponds park in Moscow, Russia. Generalizing, if one 
knows that p, and one knows that p implies q, then they know that q.6 
This is one expression of the principle that knowledge is closed under 
known-entailment. One might think that this principle just gives 
theoretical expression to a core principle that operates in our assessment 
and attribution of knowledge in everyday life. After all, deduction seems 
to be one way of extending our knowledge to the known consequences of 
what we already know. The Closure Principle just articulates this 
intuition. And since I know that having hands, or there being trees, and 
so on, implies that I’m not a brain-in-a-vat, or deceived into thinking that 
there are hands, trees, and so on, then from Closure it follows that if I 
know that I have hands, I know that I’m not a brain-in-a-vat. But how 
could I know that I’m not a brain-in-a-vat? Of course, I don’t often 
consider these kinds of far-fetched possibilities. But that I don’t consider 
them just registers an epistemic failing on my part: a failure to consider 
all the possibilities relevant to whether or not I know about the world 
around me. And once such possibilities are raised, it looks like it is part 
of our everyday criteria for assessing and making knowledge attributions 
that we withdraw the claim that we know that we aren’t victims of those 
types of scenarios, just as a lawyer might get a witness to withdraw their 
claim to seeing the suspect, after other possibilities have been raised.7 
Moreover, if any sensory experience I have is logically neutral with 
6 In order to avoid obvious counter-examples to K(S, p) and K(S, [p → q]) entails K(S, q) 
one the basis of the failure of the analogue principle for belief, B(S, p) & B(S, [p → q]) 
entails B(S, q), because S can fail to believe that q and because knowledge entails belief, 
K(S, p) → B(S, p). So, one needs to modify the closure principle so that if K(S, p) and K(S, 
[p → q]), then if S deduces q from p, whilst retaining their belief that p and q throughout, S 
thereby comes to know that q. This called ‘Single Premise Closure’; for a discussion and 
defense, see: Hawthorne (2005). 
7 Cf. Stroud’s ‘Cleveland’ example from his Chapter 1 ‘The Problem of the External World’, 
in his (1984). 
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respect to the world around me, how could any sensory experience 
alone, or any amount of sensory experience, put me in a position to 
know that those skeptical possibilities do not obtain? But I after all do 
know about the world around me.  So now we are furnished with a set of 
mutually inconsistent propositions, all of which are individually 
plausible, and look as if they are grounded in nothing more that 
common sense. 
Thus far, we have seen what look like important points of departure 
between the epistemological project and the metaphysical project. The 
main point is that the former, unlike the latter, seems to arise out of the 
goal of trying to resolve a distinctive kind of paradoxindeed, a paradox 
which is supposedly “grounded in platitudes we all accept” (Stroud 1984: 
82). But there are also important points of contact between the two 
projects: 
(1) Both can be framed as an attempt to resolve certain philosophical ‘How-
Possible?’ questions. 
(2) Both seek to arrive at an improved conception of ourselves and our epistemic 
relation to the world, no matter if this conception is positive or negative. 
(3) Both cases seem to lure the threat of philosophical dissatisfaction of some 
kind.  
In the next section, I aim to strengthen the comparison between the two 
projects, and so overcome the Contrast Problem. In order to do this, I 
will first examine the role of transcendental arguments can take as 
responses to skepticism about the external world, but later show how 
one can appropriate a transcendental argument from Davidsonian 
content externalism which shares its core features with Stroud’s 
response to the error theorists. The goal here is to show how the two 
kinds of problems admit of similar responses. In section 4, I argue that 
there is another potential source of philosophical dissatisfaction other 
than the kind I reviewed earlier. While the former kind of philosophical 
dissatisfaction arises from attempting to respond to the problem of the 
external world if it is also true that it is grounded in platitudes, this kind 
of philosophical dissatisfaction resembles, in its structure, the kind 
Stroud identified arises from responding to the various forms error 
theories and subjectivism. 
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4. Transcendental Arguments: Strategies and Problems
4.1 Ambitious Transcendental Arguments 
Since at least the publication of P. F. Strawson (1959) Individuals, there 
has been a renewed interest in the prospects of transcendental 
arguments against various kinds of skepticism. The aim of Strawson’s 
transcendental reasoning, like Kant’s before him, was to reveal certain 
substantive facts about the world around us on the basis of a priori 
reasoning about the conditions required for certain substantive mental 
phenomena. For example, in his (1959), Strawson argued that we have a 
certain cognitive capacity, a capacity to re-identify what he called 
“particulars” in experiencethese are the referents of our demonstrative 
expressions like ‘this’ or ‘that’, and can be things like ordinary material 
objectsand that a necessary condition of having this capacity is the 
continued existence of particulars unperceived. From these two 
premises a substantive fact about the world around us follows: that 
particulars continue to exist unperceived. 
But in his (1968), Stroud famously argued that transcendental 
reasoning of this kind must end in failure. According to Stroud, there 
are two basic problems with transcendental reasoning. The first problem 
is that the conclusions of these kinds of arguments do not follow unless 
some kind of idealism or verification principle about meaning is true. 
But both of these doctrines are contentious. And what is more, either of 
them alone are sufficient to block the skepticism the transcendental 
reasoning was meant to avoid. Thus transcendental reasoning is either 
ineffectual or superfluous. Ineffectual because if we dispense with either 
idealism or the verification principle, these arguments lose their anti-
skeptical consequences. Superfluous because if we keep either idealism 
or the verification principle, the transcendental reasoning adds nothing 
to the anti-skeptical consequences of these positions. Call this Stroud’s 
Dilemma.8 
8 For an excellent collection, and explanation of, traditional arguments in epistemology,
see Stern (1999). 
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4.2 Stroud’s Dilemma 
What supports Stroud’s Dilemma? In order to understand this claim, we 
should look at a concrete case of transcendental reasoning. Consider 
Strawson again. We can represent the structure of his reasoning as 
follows: 
(P1) We can re-identify particulars in sensory experience. 
(P2) A necessary condition of the capacity to re-identify particulars in sensory 
experience is the existence of particulars unperceived. 
Therefore, 
(C) Particulars exist unperceived. 
The problem Stroud raised is that, if S is a proposition whose truth is a 
necessary condition for the possibility of thought, experience, belief, and 
so on, “the skeptic can always very plausibly insist that it is enough to 
make [thought, experience, belief, …] possible if we believe that S is true, 
or if it looks for all the world as it is, but that S needn’t be actually true” 
(Stroud 1968: 225). Call this the Hedging Move. After the Hedging Move 
is made, the transcendental claim will be: 
(P2*) A necessary condition of the capacity to re-identify particulars in sensory 
experience is that we believe in the existence of particulars unperceived. 
But now the validity of the argument turns on establishing a necessary 
connection between our believing in the existence of particulars 
unperceived and the existence of particulars unperceived. In general, the 
criticism is that if the Hedging Move is legitimate, then the validity of 
transcendental arguments turns on establishing a necessary condition 
between believing that S is true and S being true. Otherwise, the 
arguments are invalid. 
At this juncture, one would need to appeal to some principle in 
order to bridge the gap between our believing that S is true and S being 
true. Call this the Bridge of Necessity move. On this point, Stroud says 
that: 
It would seem that we must find, and cross, a bridge of necessity from the one 
to the other. That would be a truly remarkable feat, and some convincing 
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explanation would surely be needed of how the whole thing is possible (Stroud 
2000: 158-159). 
But is it possible to close this gap unless we appeal to some kind of 
idealism or verificationism, which deflates the gap between our 
believing what we believe and the truth of what we believe? Stroud 
thinks the answer to this question is ‘no’. But then this renders the 
transcendental argument superfluous, since these doctrines alone have 
anti-skeptical consequences. 
Now, one might dispute either the Hedging Move, the Bridge of 
Necessity Move, the claim that idealism or verificationism are required 
to cross that bridge, or that these doctrines alone have anti-skeptical 
consequences. I want to bracket all of these responses, and instead 
concentrate on the Hedging Move. We might think that even if the 
Hedging Move is legitimate, this does not prevent the transcendental 
argument from having anti-skeptical consequences. For example, if it’s 
true that our believing certain non-psychological propositions are 
necessary conditions of us realizing certain psychological states, we 
might wonder whether more ‘modest’ transcendental claims of this kind 
can protect us from skepticism.  
4.3 Davidsonian Externalism and Modest Transcendental Arguments 
Recall that the Hedging Move weakens the core premise of the 
transcendental argument from: 
(Ambitious Claim) S could not have certain cognitive states (reidentification of 
particulars), unless certain non-cognitive states obtained (particular exist 
unperceived). 
To: 
(Modest Claim) S could not have certain cognitive states (reidentification of 
particulars), unless S believed that certain non-cognitive states obtained 
(particular exist unperceived). 
The proponent of a modest transcendental argument thinks that 
weakening the core premise in this way does not diminish the anti-
skeptical force of a transcendental argument. But how is this possible? 
Unlike their ambitious cousins, modest transcendental arguments move 
130 
from premises about how certain psychological states or attitudes 
require certain other psychological states or attitudes. But the claims are 
not supposed to be trivial. The claims are supposed to link two kinds of 
seemingly different types of psychological states or attitudes. For 
example, Stroud argued in his (2000b) that a necessary condition of 
attributing beliefs about colors to people is believing that certain things 
are colored. Of course, this should sound surprising. After all, I can 
attribute beliefs about ghosts to people without believing that there are 
ghosts. So what makes beliefs about the colors of things so special? 
Indeed, this is one of the goals of modest transcendental arguments: to 
explain what is so special about certain kinds of psychological states or 
attitudes. 
But even if the claims are supposed to be non-trivial, the question 
still stands: how could anything anti-skeptical follow from propositions 
about how certain psychological states or attitudes are necessary 
conditions of certain others? Let us consider the externalism about belief 
content found in the work of Donald Davidson. Davidson’s brand of 
content externalism hinges on his notion of triangulation. Triangulation 
is a causal relationship, holding between at least two persons and one 
object, where each person ‘triangulates’ on, or identifies and is receptive 
to, a common cause of their belief or utterances. Crucially, Davidson 
seems to think that triangulation is required for us to have beliefs and 
utterances with determinate contents at all. For example, he says that: 
Without this sharing of reactions to common stimuli, thought and speech would 
have no particular content that is, no content at all. It takes two points of view to 
give a location to the cause of a thought, and thus to define its content. We may 
think of it as a form of triangulation: each of two people is reacting differentially 
to sensory stimuli streaming in from a certain direction. If we project the 
incoming lines outward, their intersection is the common cause. If the two 
people now note each other’s reactions […] each can correlate these observed 
reactions with his or her stimuli from the world. The common cause can now 
determine the contents of an utterance and a thought. The triangle which gives 
content to thought and speech is complete. But it takes two to triangulate. Two, 
or, of course, more. (Davidson 1991: 159-60) 
Since, on Davidson’s view, triangulation is required for determinate 
content, this makes his view a kind of content externalism, because the 
causal nexus between the persons and the common cause is of course 
external to what the person can access in introspection, or otherwise is 
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external to the intrinsic properties of those persons. Of course, all that 
that passage revealed is that Davidson endorses a certain kind of 
externalism about the content of belief and speech. But this alone does 
not tell us what it is about some such view which lends it to anti-
skeptical argument. On this front, we should consider another statement 
of Davidson’s view: 
It should now be clear what ensures that our view of the world is, in its plainest 
features, largely correct. The reason is that the stimuli that cause our most basic 
verbal responses also determine what those verbal responses mean, and the 
content of the beliefs that accompany them. The nature of correct interpretation 
guarantees both that a large number of our plainest beliefs are true, and that the 
nature of these beliefs is known to others (Davidson 1991: 160-161). 
From this passage, we can extract the following core statement of 
Davidson’s externalism. The first reading of his view concerns the truth 
of our beliefs: 
(Non-Epistemic) Davidsonian Externalism: A necessary condition of having and 
attributing beliefs with determinate contents to ourselves and others is that 
some of those attributed beliefs are. 
But the passage also permits an epistemological reading: 
(Epistemic) Davidsonian Externalism: A necessary condition of having and 
attributing beliefs with determinate contents to ourselves and others is that we 
are in a position to know the causes of some of those beliefs, and so in a 
position to know that some of them are true. 
The latter entails the former, and it is hard to see how Davidson would 
allow the first version of the thesis to stand without also endorsing the 
second version. After all, if in order to attribute beliefs with determinate 
contents to ourselves and others, how could I fail to be in a position to 
know the causes of those beliefs, if the content of those beliefs are what 
we triangulate on in our environment? Instead, it looks more like, if we 
were unable to know the causes of what we attribute to ourselves and 
others, then Davidsonian externalism would end up entailing that we 
could not know what we believe.  
This issue takes us to an important point of interest. We saw that 
Stroud raised what looked like knock-down arguments against the anti-
skeptical prospects of ambitious transcendental arguments. But it does 
not look like Davidsonian content externalism lends itself to the same 
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general criticism. After all, how could Davidsonian content externalism 
presuppose idealism or verificationism, when it is just a thesis about the 
relationship between having thoughts with certain contents and the 
world around us? The implication is that if we have thoughts of a certain 
kind, then we have had causal-contact with the world. But what is it 
about that conditional which is verificationist or idealistic? Moreover, we 
can accept that Stroud is right that even an ambitious transcendental 
argument from Davidsonian content externalism would be susceptible 
to the Hedging Move. But the response would be that the Hedging Move 
counts as a good objection to the anti-skeptical prospects of an ambitious 
transcendental argument insofar as the aim of these arguments are to 
convince the skeptic: to engage in the Convince-the-Skeptics Challenge. 
But if the aim is instead to reveal an interesting relationship between 
thought and the world, irrespective of the Convince-the-Skeptic 
Challenge, it’s not obvious what would be wrong with some such 
argument. The thought here is that one can mount an transcendental 
argument for more reasons than just anti-skeptical reasons; so we 
shouldn’t see arguments against the anti-skeptical prospects of 
transcendental arguments as arguments against the interestingness and 
usefulness of transcendental arguments. 
Indeed, the point can be pressed futher: what prevents one from 
giving an ambitious transcendental argument from Davidsonian 
Externalism? Davidsonian externalism would have anti-skeptical 
consequences in conjunction with knowledge of the contents of our 
thoughts. The thought here is that, provided that I know what I believe, 
and provided that I know that certain external conditions, such as that a 
certain external object caused me to have the belief that I have, are 
necessary conditions of having a belief with that content, I am now in a 
position to know, by deduction, about those external causes. This would 
be a straightforward argument from self-knowledge and content 
externalism to claims about the external world. Indeed, since the 
premises move from propositions about belief and the external 
conditions required for having beliefs, to conclusion about the external 
world, it is unclear what prevents us from motivating an ambitious 
transcendental argument from externalism about content. 
As it turns out, in certain places it looks as if Stroud rejects the core 
statement of Davidsonian externalism. Davidsonian externalism seems 
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to have the straight-forward implication that from a thinkers having a 
thought with a certain content, it follows that a certain kind of object is 
present in the thinker’s environment. But according to Stroud: 
What calls into question the validity of the last step of would‐be transcendental 
arguments from the way we think to the way things are is the apparently simple 
logical observation that something's being so does not follow from its being 
thought or believed to be so. Something's being so does not follow from 
everyone in the world's believing it to be so, from everyone's fully reasonably 
believing it, even from every reasonable person's being completely unable to 
avoid believing it (Stroud 2000: 166-167). 
Here, it looks like Stroud is just registering the logical intuition that 
propositions about belief and thought do not entail propositions about 
the world around us, and vice-versa. Whether or not one ought to have 
the intuition is a good question. After all, intuitions are defeasible, and it 
seems like content externalism gives us principled reasons for thinking 
that, while propositions about the world do not entail propositions about 
thought and belief, it is possible for some propositions about thought 
and belief to entail propositions about the world, when the content of 
those states are externalist in character. For example, if content 
externalism is true, then if I am thinking that water is wet, and if the 
concept WATER has externalist individuation conditions, it does follow 
that water exists, even though from the fact that water exists, it does not 
follow that someone is thinking about water. Of course, this is all 
compatible with thinking that if the direction of entailment went from 
water exists to someone is thinking about water is valid, then we are 
compromising our view that the world is mind-independent because it 
would mean that there just could not be a situation in which p obtains 
but no thinker is thinking that p. Still, externalism should make the 
direction from thought to world look less clear. If the existence of certain 
kinds of things are necessary, not for our thinking at all, but for our 
thinking about those kinds of things in particular, then what is wrong 
with thinking that propositions describing that we are thinking about 
them entail that those things are there to be thought about? 
So, it is not obvious what reason Stroud might have for avoiding the 
ambitious transcendental argument from content externalism, modulo 
the intuition we registered above. Of course, even if he were to endorse 
some such argument, he would still face what looks like formidable 
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obstacles to that argument.9 But those reasons would not be among the 
general reasons he levied against the success of ambitious 
transcendental arguments. 
Let us now move on the core question of this section: how might 
Davidsonian content externalism have anti-skeptical consequences if it 
figures in a modest transcendental argument? Recall that we saw the 
challenge to our knowledge of the external world could be put as follows: 
(Skeptical Challenge) It is possible that, while I believe propositions about the 
world on the basis of experiences which are compatible with their falsity, I 
cannot know that those propositions are true. 
The epistemological reading of Davidsonian Externalism permits a 
straightforward response to this challenge. After all, the problem of the 
external world is the problem of explaining how knowledge of the world 
around us is possible. The question arises because certain obstacles like 
the one above make knowledge of the world look impossible. So what we 
want to explain is how it is possible that, while we have all these beliefs 
about the world around us, we can ever know that these beliefs are true. 
One answer to this question is skeptical. It says that we can’t ever know 
that any of our beliefs about the world are true. So this is supposed to be 
one of two possible outcomes. It’s the negative outcome. The positive 
outcome maintains that we can know that some of our beliefs about the 
world around us are true. Davidsonian externalism implies that the 
negative outcome cannot be consistently reached. On the first non-
epistemic reading, Davidsonian externalism implies that the truth of 
some of our belief about the world is a necessary condition of our 
9 The core challenge on this score is that transcendental arguments from content 
argument seem to license unacceptable forms of reasoning. The first premise is a premise 
expressing some piece of self-knowledge (e.g. that I am thinking about water); the second 
premise is a premise expressing what we know, on the basis of a priori argument, to be 
required for that kind of self-knowledge (e.g. that content externalism implies that if I am 
thinking about water, then water exists), to conclusions about the external world (e.g. that 
water exists). But, so the objection goes, how can I deduce that certain propositions about 
the external world are true, from non-empirical propositions? The upshot is that 
priviledged self-knowledge looks incompatible with content externalism. This is called the 
McKinsey Paradox, after Michael McKinsey’s original statement of the problem. See 
McKinsey (1991); for responses see Wright (2008), Davies (1998); for recent work on 
McKinsey’s Paradox, see Kallestrup (2010). 
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maintaining them. So if the problem is to assess all of our beliefs about 
the world around us, and ask whether and how knowing that any of 
them are true is possible, our going on to do what the problem of the 
external world asks us to doidentify a wide portion of our 
beliefsguarantees, by externalist lights, that we find that some of them 
are true. On the second, epistemic reading, Davidsonian externalism 
implies that the possibility of knowing that some of our beliefs about the 
world around us are true is a necessary condition of attributing beliefs 
with determinate content to ourselves and others. So we could not 
consistently arrive at the conclusion that, while we have all sorts of 
beliefs about the world, it is nevertheless not possible that we know any 
of them.  
In order to raise the problem of the external world, and engage with 
it, I have to assess some beliefs about the world around me. This implies 
that I at least know what I believe about the world around me. From this 
claim and Davidsonian externalism, it follows that I am in a position to 
know that some of those beliefs are true. I provided a tentative argument 
for the view that it is unclear how Stroud’s general critique of ambitious 
transcendental arguments applies to this case, because it looks like 
Davidsonian externalism provides that bridge we needed in order to 
move from premises about our  cognition to conclusions about the non-
cognitive world, without presupposing a problematic idealism or 
verificationism.  
However, we can also mount a modest transcendental argument 
from Davidsonian externalism. The first things we need to do is hedge 
the Davidsonian claim: 
(Epistemic) Davidsonian Externalism*: A necessary condition of having and 
attributing beliefs with determinate contents to ourselves and others is that 
believe we are in a position to know the causes of some of those beliefs, and so 
in a position to know that some of them are true. 
With this hedged definition of Davidsonian externalism in play, we are 
now in a position to provide the following argument: 
Modest Davidsonian Argument: 
(Belief Claim) S believes, and attributes to others, that there is water, trees, 
people, planets, and so on, for all beliefs about the external world. 
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(Negative Verdict) S cannot know whether or not propositions about the external 
world are true. 
(Modest Davidsonian Indispensability) A necessary condition of the truth of the 
Belief Claim, is that we believe that we can know whether or not some of those 
propositions are true. 
Therefore, 
(Modest Davidsonian Invulnerability): I cannot consistently maintain that while 
I believe that there is water, trees, people, planets, and so on, that nevertheless I 
cannot know whether or not those beliefs are true. 
Three points to notice about this argument. The first point is that this 
argument is not targeting skeptical arguments which seek to show that 
knowledge of the world is impossible. If it were targeting those kinds of 
arguments, we would have slipped back into the Convince-the-Skeptic 
Challenge, which we presumed ends in favor of would-be skeptics. 
Instead, the argument is targeting the epistemological project itselfthe 
goal of explaining how it is possible for us to know about the world 
around us. The conclusion of the Modest Davidsonian argument is not 
that the epistemological project is meaningless or uintelligible. Instead, 
the conclusion of the Modest Davidsonian argumetn is that it is not one 
that we can consistently engage in. 
The second point is that the arguments against the success of 
ambitious transcendental arguments are ineffectual here because our 
core transcendental claim is modest rather than ambitious. Of course, 
this does not mean that the argument is unproblematic. Instead, it just 
means that the problems with the argument are not grounded in general 
problems with transcendental arguments. 
The third point and final point is that Negative Verdictthat 
skepticism about the external world is trueneed not be established in 
order for the Modest Davidsonian argument to be effective. We can see 
straight-off that the negative outcome of the epistemological project is 
that it’s not possible to know that our beliefs about the world around us 
are true. After we’ve identified that as one outcome of the 
epistemological project, we can go on to ask whether it is possible for us 
to reach that negative conclusion rather than the positive conclusion. 
Prima facie at least, it seems like it should be possible. After all, we can 
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ask similar epistemological questions, such as whether it is possible to 
know that some of our beliefs about ghosts and hauntings are true. The 
negative answer would be that we cannot. So what makes the general 
epistemlogical question about our knowledge of the world around us any 
different?10  
Notice too that this makes it look like first two premises of the 
Modest Davidsonian argument are secure. The soundness of the 
argument therefore seems to turn on whether or not it’s true that if we 
have beliefs about the world around us, we must also believe that we can 
know that some of those beliefs are true. To be sure, this view isn’t 
obvious. But neither is any interesting philosophical thesis. 
Finally, what is the anti-skeptical important, if any, of the Modest 
Davidsonian argument? Recall that if the aim of the epistemological 
project is to arrive at an improved conception of the epistemological 
relations between ourselves and the world around us, the Davidsonian 
argument implies that the negative outcome of this project is 
unreachable. But it is unreachable not because the argument has shown 
that skepticism about the external world is false. Instead, it is 
unreachable because our epistemologist must, at the same time, have 
some beliefs about the world in order to subject them to epistemological 
assessment, but also, according to the core Davidsonian claim, believe 
that it is possible to know that some of those propositions are true. The 
latter is seen as required for the former, and this renders the negative 
skeptical outcome unreachable. 
To sharpen the issue, it seems the problem facing the 
epistemological project arises from a tension between the following 
three ideas: 
10 Williams (1991) thinks there is a significant difference. To ask what epistemological 
class our ‘knowledge of the  external world’ is in, is to ask whether there is a common 
factor between all of the things we claim to know in that class from which a general 
explation can be given. Prima facie, knowledge of the external world is knowledge of tables, 
chairs, people, ice-cream, churches, phones, and so on.  It is a kind of knowledge which 
would be about the objects, properties, and events we know about in the world around us. 
But Williams is skeptical that this forms a genuine epistemological class from which a 
general epistemological question should be raised.  
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(Epistemological Goal) The goal of arriving at an improved epistemological 
conception of our relation to the world around us, no matter whether or not this 
conception is positive or negative. 
(Belief Possession) Epistemologists engaging in the (Epistemological Goal) 
must have some beliefs about the world around them in order to engage in the 
problem of explaining how our beliefs about the world around us could ever 
amount to knowledge. 
(Modest Davidsonian Indispensability) If S has beliefs about the world around 
them, then S believes that it is possible for us to know whether or not some of 
those beliefs are true. 
On the one hand, Belief Possession and Modest Davidsonian 
Indispensability make it look impossible to achieve the Epistemological 
Goal because it implies that one of two possible outcomes cannot be 
reached, but not because the positive verdict is false. But since Belief 
Possession seems to be secure, this result might make us look at 
whether or not the Epistemological Goal is intelligible, or the truth of a 
modest form Davidsonian externalism. Perhaps because the 
intelligibility of the Epistemological Goal and the centrality of Belief 
Possession to that goal are non-negotiable, this might put pressure on 
Davidsonian externalism.  
5. Indispensability & Invulnerability
So far, we’ve see that if Davidsonian externalism is true, one can mount 
a certain kind of meta-epistemological argument against the possibility 
of reaching a negative epistemological conclusion to a core question of 
epistemology: ‘how is it possible to know that any of our beliefs about 
the world around us are true?’. What I want to explore in this section is 
whether there are any other philosophical theses which might make our 
target epistemological question one that cannot consistently be given a 
negative answer, but not because it is impossible for us to know 
anything about the world around us.  
Let us work backwards. We can understand the core premise of the 
transcendental argument in Stroud’s terms as follows: 
The truth of Q is indispensible to truth P. 
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In that: 
S could not have (P) certain cognitive states (reidentification of particulars) 
unless (Q) certain non-cognitive states obtained (particular exist unperceived). 
In broad terms, we can call this kind of indispensability Truth 
Indispensability. Thus the core features of the more ambitious 
transcendental arguments are that certain non-cognitive states are truth-
indispensable to certain cognitive states. Of course, there are different 
classes of what might called truth-indispensible propositions. For 
example, a proposition might be truth-indispensible to our having any 
cognitive states at all. This would be an extreme case. But less extreme 
cases are also possible, such as with Strawson’s transcendental 
argument. In that case, the obtaining of certain non-cognitive states of 
affairs were truth-indispensible to a particular kind of cognitive-state, 
rather than them all. 
This is where modest transcendental arguments diverge from the 
ambitious arguments. Modest transcendental arguments weaken the 
core premise of the transcendental argument as follows: 
It is not possible that S have (P) certain cognitive states (e.g., reidentification of 
particulars), unless (Q) S believed that certain non-cognitive states obtained 
(e.g., particular exist unperceived). 
Call this Conceptual Indispensability, because it maintains that certain 
cognitive states, such as belief, are indispensible to certain others, in the 
sense that the having of one kind of cognitive state or attitude is a 
necessary condition of having another kind of cognitive state or attitude. 
The modest Davidsonian transcendental argument is an example of an 
argument which argues from conceptual indispensability to 
invulnerability: the invulnerability of certain beliefs of ours to certain 
kinds of challenges. 
Are there other kinds of Indispensability which fit the format of 
modest transcendental arguments? Consider the following: S could not 
engage in practice P unless S believed that certain non-cognitive states 
obtain. Call this Methodological Indispensability. A belief in a 
proposition can be methodologically indispensible if it satisfies the 
following principle: 
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(Methodological Indispensability) If S is engaging in practice P, then S cannot 
consistently reject Q if believing Q is a necessary condition of engaging in 
practice P. 
Methodological Indispensability implies Methodological Invulnerability: 
(Methodological Invulnerability) If S is engaging in practice P, then S cannot 
consistently reject Q. 
After all, if it’s true that our believing Q is a necessary condition of 
our even engaging in practice P, then how could we consistently engage 
in that practice, and nevertheless reject Q? It would not be possible. Of 
course, it would be possible to engage in the practice, and reject Q. But 
we would just be inconsistent. 
An example of an argument from methodological indispensability to 
methodological invulnerability can be found, I think, in Wittgenstein’s 
notes publised as On Certainty. A core idea that Wittgenstein discusses 
is tthat of a ‘hinge’ commitment. One expression of the idea can be 
found in the following passage: 
[...] the questions that we raise and our doubts depend upon the fact that some 
propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those 
turn. That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that 
certain things are in deed not doubted. But it isn’t that the situation is like this: 
We just can’t investigate everything, and for that reason we are forced to rest 
content with assumption. If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put. 
(OC 11 §§341-3) 
How should we understand the metaphor of the ‘hinges’ which belong 
to what Wittgenstein called “the logic of our scientific investigations”?  
One view is that these ‘hinges’ are propositions. But these propositions 
are not just true propositions that are practically necessary or needed in 
order to engage in our scientific investigations. But neither are these 
propositions necessary truths. Instead, these propositions have a certain 
peculiar epistemological role in our epistemological practices such as 
assessment, evaluation, assertion, proving, doubting, conjecturing, 
arguing, and so on. It is these propositions which make intelligible those 
epistemological practices in the sense that those propositions operate 
for, but not within, those epistemological practices. For example, in §125 
Wittgenstein considers a kind of skeptical attack on the claim that he has 
hands: 
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If a blind man were to ask me “Have you got two hands?” I should not make 
sure by looking. If I were to have any doubt of it, then I don’t know why I should 
trust my eyes. For why shouldn’t I test my eyes by looking to find out whether I 
see my two hands? What is to be tested by what? (OC §125). 
His response sharpens the idea that doubting the proposition that he 
has hands, in this case, would constrain what he could appeal to in order 
to alleviate his doubts. If he appealed to his senses, why wouldn’t 
whatever reason he had for doubting his hands not also extend to his 
senses?  
We might put the point like this. Certain propositions are 
methodological necessities, in the sense that their truth, while not 
necessary truths, are necessary for engaging in the kinds of 
epistemological practices we in fact engage in. So the propositions could 
have been false. Moreover, their truth is not guaranteed by our engaging 
in the epistemological practices we engage in. We could engage in those 
epistemological practices, and those propositions could nevertheless be 
false. But what we could not consistently do is accept that our 
epistemological practices are legitimate while denying those 
propositions. This furnishes us with another example of an anti-
skeptical argument which fits our Stroudian template. Plausible hinge-
propositions might include the proposition that our senses are reliable, 
or that an external world exists. These propositions form part of the set 
of beliefs that we are subjecting to epistemological assessment. But if 
Wittgenstein is right, then these propositions must remain unassessed, 
on pain of making unintelligible the epistemological assessment we are 
engaging in. In this case, our belief in the their truth is required to make 
intelligible the epistemological assessment. But the problem of the 
external world is supposed to be a problem which arises from an 
assessment of all of what we believe about the world around us. Insofar 
as the propositions that there is an external world or that our senses are 
reliable are hinge propositions, then, those propositions cannot enter 
into that assessment. In this fashion, those propositions are invulnerable 
to a negative outcome of that assessment. But those propositions are 
also indispensible to engaging in that assessment. So, if this 
Wittgensteinian argument is sound, it follows that we cannot 
consistently raise the problem of the external world, and so cannot be 
consistently presented with that problem. 
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6. Epistemological Dissatisfaction
Philosophical dissatisfaction represents a kind of philosophical failure. 
Describing the precise nature of this failure and how it arises is an 
important question, but outside the scope of what I want to achieve here. 
The kind I am focusing on here is goal-directed. We have a certain 
philosophical goal in mind, and it turns out that certain compelling 
arguments reveal that that goal cannot be achieved, leading to 
philosophical dissatisfaction. 
Let us return to the third point of §2. Against the Contrast Problem, 
the point was that both the epistemological project and the metaphysical 
project seems to lure philosophical dissatisfaction of some kind. But the 
Contrast Problem highlighted how the philosophical dissatisfaction that 
the epistemological project lures is grounded in a certain conception of 
the problem of the external world. This conception of the problem of the 
external world is a conception where the problem is a paradox grounded 
in “platitudes we would all accept” (Stroud 1984). The problem then is 
that, a response to the problem of the external world would have to reject 
one or more platitudes. But the rejection of mere platitudes is 
philosophically unsatisfying. So there seems to be a stark disanology 
between the epistemological project and the metaphysical project. In the 
epistemolocial case, philosophical dissatisfaction arises, if it does, 
because we have to reject platitudes, and so revise deep-seated intuitions, 
concepts, or principles. But in the metaphysical case, philosophical 
dissatisfaction arises, if it does, from discovering that we are unable to 
consistently reach a certain outcome of an intelligble, perhaps even 
desirable, philosophical goal. 
Recall that is Davidsonian Externalism is true, it does not follow that 
we have knowledge of the world around us. It does not even follow that 
it is not possible that we know nothing about the world around us. All 
that follows is that we could not consistently maintain and so arrive at 
what is supposed to be one of two possible outcomes of our general 
epistemological assessmentthe negative, skeptical outcome. Notice 
that this conclusion is reminiscent of the conclusions that Stroud 
reached in his (2011), strengthing the case against the Contrast Problem. 
What I want to focus on now is one of the consequences Stroud urged 
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followed from those reflections: that we would be dissatisfied with this 
outcome. 
It is important to note that Stroud is not claiming that his 
arguments, and perhaps arguments of the same general kind, will leave 
us dissatisfied. The arguments might be good arguments and in this 
sense should leave us satisfied. Instead, what Stroud is claiming is that, 
given what we were aiming for in asking our general philosophical 
questioneither a positive or a negative verdictin order to arrive at an 
improved conception of the world, no matter if that conception left us 
with a magnificent world or a bleak world, the argument will leave us 
dissatisfied with respect to that philosophical question. But if Stroud’s 
arguments are successful, then we cannot reach the negative verdict: we 
cannot reach what was supposed to be one of two possible outcomes of 
our philosophical assessment. But what is perhaps worse is that failure 
to reach one of the outcomes does not entail that we have reached the 
other possible outcome: the positive verdict. Instead, we would have 
found that while we cannot reach the negative verdict, failure to reach 
that verdict is alone not a reason for believing that we have arrived at the 
positive verdict.  
The next step is appropriating this conclusion for the 
epistemological case. In the epistemological case, we saw that 
Davidsonian externalism seemed to have anti-skeptical consequences, 
even when we applied it in a modest transcendental argument. One 
consequence that was brought out is how a negative answer to the 
problem of the external world could not be reached if Davidsonian 
externalism is true. This would mean that one of two possible outcomes 
of a general assessment of our beliefs about the external world could not 
be reached. We could not arrive at the negative verdict of that 
assessment if Davidsonian externalism is true. But still, does that mean 
we have now explained how knowledge of the world is possible? No. For 
one, that we cannot consistently arrive the negative skeptical verdict is 
not explained, in this case, by its falsity. In this way, we haven’t even 
shown that knowledge of the world around us is possible, if the modest 
transcendental argument from Davidsonian externalism is sound. 
Likewise, Davidsonian externalism alone appears to be silent on whether 
knowledge of the world around us is possible. All it gives us is a 
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conditional claim; so nothing about whether the kind of knowledge it 
quantifies over is possible follows from accepting that conditional. 
Moreover, Wittgenstein’s thesis about hinge-propositions gave us 
the materials for constructing a modest transcendental argument 
against skepticism. It showed us that, if propositions like there is an 
external world are hinge-propositions, then these propositions are 
invulnerable to the negative outcome of the epistemological assessment 
of all of our beliefs about the world, because that proposition makes 
some such assessment intelligible. But that that proposition is included 
in the assessment is indispensible to it as well. In this fashion, the 
argument from Wittgenstein’s hinge-propositions shows us that we 
cannot consistently engage in that kind of assessment, and so cannot 
consistently engage with the problem of the external world. It is here, I 
think, where if Wittgenstein is right about there being a class of 
propositions that are hinge-propositions, a certain kind of 
epistemological dissatisfaction ensues. The dissatisfaction shows up in 
the intuitive thought that the problem of the external world is at least 
intelligible to us, and something that we could engage with as rational 
agents. But the Wittgensteinian point is that that is not the case.11  
If philosophical satisfaction and dissatisfaction are receptive to the 
success or failure to realize our philosophical goals, then it looks like, if 
our modest transcendental arguments are sound, the goal of 
understanding and so explaining how our knowledge of the world is 
possible in general is problematic. It is problematic not because we have 
shown that the positive outcome of pursuing that goal cannot be 
reached. Rather, it was shown that if our modest transcendental 
arguments are sound, the negative outcome of pursuing that goal cannot 
be reached. But then one of two possible outcomesone of two possible 
improvements in our conception of ourselves and our epistemological 
relation to the wider-worldwill have been revealed as unreachable. 
This, I think, should leave us dissatisfied.12 
11 For different treatments of anti-skeptical import of Wittgenstein’s ‘hinge-proposition’ 
strategy, see Pritchard (forthcoming) and Wright (2004). For a review of interpretations of 
Wittgenstein’s response to skepticism, see Pritchard (2011). 
12 I’d like to thank Duncan Pritchard, Allan Hazlett, and Barry Stroud for helpful 
discussions on topics related to this paper. I’d also like to give a special thanks to the 
145 
Literature 
Bruekner, A. “Modest transcendental arguments”, Philosophical Perspectives 10 (1996): 
285–300. 
. “The Structure of the Skeptical Argument”, Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 54 (1994). 
. “~K~SK”. In: Essays on Skepticism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. 
. “Fallibilism, Underdetermination, and Skepticism.” In: Essays on Skepticism. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. 
Burge, T. “Cartesian Error and the Objectivity of Perception.” In: Subject, Thought and 
Context, edited by P. Pettit and J. McDowell, 117-136, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1986. 
Cassam, Q. The Possibility of Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
Davidson, D. “Three Varieties of Knowledge.” In: A. J. Ayer Memorial Essays, edited by A. 
P. Griffiths, 153-166, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991 (reprinted in 
Davidson 2001, chapter 13). 
Davies, M., “Externalism and Armchair Knowledge.” In: New Essays on the A Priori, 
edited by P. Boghossian and C. Peacocke, 384-415, Oxford: Clarendon 2000. 
Descartes, R. The Philosophical Works of Descartes. Translated by E. S. Haldane and G. R. 
T. Ross, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986. 
DeRose, K. “Solving the Skeptical Problem.” Philosophical Review 104 (1995): 1-52.  
Dretske, F. “Epistemic Operators.” Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970): 1007–1023. 
. “Is Knowledge Closed Under Known Entailment? The Case Against Closure.” In: 
Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, edited by Matthias Steup & Ernest Sosa. Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2005. 
Hawthorne, J. “The Case for Closure” In: Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, edited 
by Matthias Steup & Ernest Sosa, Oxford: Blackwell, 2005. 
Kant, I. Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Norman Kemp Smith, New York: St 
Martin's Press, 1965. 
Kallestrup , K. “Recent Work on McKinsey’s Paradox.” Analysis 71, no. 1 (2010): 157-171. 
McDowell, J. “Knowledge and the Internal”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 
55 (1995): 877-893. 
. “The Disjunctive Conception of Experience as Material for a Transcendental 
Argument.” In: Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, edited by A. Haddock & F. 
Macpherson, Chapter 16, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. 
McKinsey, M. “Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access.” Analysis 51 (1991): 9–16. 
Nagel, T. The View from Nowhere. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986. 
Nozick, R. Philosophical Explanations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981. 
organizers and participants of the August 2013 Bamberg summer school in ‘Metaphysics 
or Modernity?’ with Professors Barry Stroud, Jorge Gracia, Saul Kripke, and Richard King.  
146 
Pritchard, D. H. “Recent Work on Radical Skepticism”, American Philosophical Quarterly 
39 (2002): 215-257. 
———. Epistemic Luck, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. 
. “Wittgenstein on Scepticism.” In: The Oxford Handbook of Wittgenstein, edited 
by O. Kuusela & M. McGinn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. 
———. Epistemological Disjunctivism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. 
. “Wittgenstein on Hinges and Radical Scepticism in On Certainty.” In: Blackwell 
Companion to Wittgenstein, edited by H.-J. Glock & J. Hyman, Blackwell, forthcoming. 
Pryor, J. “The skeptic and the dogmatist”, Noûs 34 (2000): 517–49. 
Ranalli, C. and Duncan Pritchard. “Rorty, Williams, and Davidson: Skepticism and 
Metaepistemology”. Humanities” In: Special Issue ‘The Legacy of Richard Rorty’, edited by 
Neil Gasgoine, forthcoming. 
. “Skepticism and Epistemological Disjunctivism”, Continuum Companion to 
Scepticism, forthcoming.  
Rorty, R. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1979. 
, ed. Transcendental arguments: Problems and prospects. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999. 
Strawson, P. F. Individuals: An essay in descriptive metaphysics. London: Methuen, 1959. 
. Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. New York: Doubleday, 1959. 
Stroud, B. “Transcendental Arguments”, Journal of Philosophy 65 (1968): 241-256. 
. The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1984. 
. “Kantian Argument, Conceptual Capacities, and Invulnerability.” In: Kant and 
Contemporary Epistemology, edited by P. Parini, 231–51, Dordrect: Kluwer, 1994. 
. The Quest for Reality: Subjectivism and the Metaphysics of Colour. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000a. 
. Understanding human knowledge: Philosophical Essays. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000b. 
. “Scepticism and the Senses.” European Journal of Philosophy 17, no. 4 (2009): 
559-570. 
. Engagement and Metaphysical Dissatisfaction: Modality and Value. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011a. 
. Philosophers Past and Present: Selected Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011b. 
Unger, P. Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975. 
———. Philosophical Relativity. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984. 
Wittgenstein, L. On Certainty, edited by G. E. M. Anscombe & G. H. von Wright, 
translated by D. Paul & G. E. M. Anscombe, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969. 
Williams, M. Unnatural Doubts: Epistemological Realism and the Basis of Scepticism, 
Oxford: Blackwell, 1991. 
Williamson, T. Knowledge and Its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 
147 
Wright, C. J. G. “Scepticism and Dreaming: Imploding the Demon.” Mind 397 (1991), 87-
115. 
. “Wittgensteinian Certainties.” In: Wittgenstein and Scepticism, edited by Denis 
McManus. Routledge, 2004. 
. “McKinsey One More Time” In: Self-Knowledge, edited by Anthony E. 
Hatzimoysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. 
148 
A Trip to the Metaphysical Jungle – 
How Kripke’s Intuitions Revived Aristotelian Essentialism 
Sebastian Krebs  
(University of Bamberg) 
Besides his substantial influences on other fields of philosophy, Saul 
Kripke is famous for smoothing the way for a new type of Aristotelian 
essentialism. However, Kripke’s comments on essentialism are 
utterly vague and are built entirely on fundamental intuitions about 
the use of language and necessity de re in modal logic. He famously 
disproved Willard Van Orman Quine who, a few decades earlier, had 
banned necessity de re into the metaphysical jungle of Aristotelian 
essentialism – a jungle that a true empiricist must not enter. But not 
only Kripke’s refutation of Quine, but also his own essentialism is 
based on intuition. Kripke thereby overcomes an anti-essentialist 
dogma that was established by Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason. 
But because of its vagueness, one might well call Kripke’s intuitive 
essentialism a ‘metaphysical jungle’. Nevertheless, a trip to Kripke’s 
jungle is a promising milestone on the way to a refreshed Aristotelian 
metaphysics.  
1. Travel arrangements: The rejection of Quine’s anti-essentialism
In Two dogmas of empiricism, Willard Van Orman Quine rejects the 
traditional distinction between synthetic and analytic truths. Among 
others Immanuel Kant suggested this distinction in his Critique of Pure 
Reason. Quine criticizes it as a relic from metaphysical dogmas which a 
pure empiricism (as Quine wants to pursue it) has to overcome: 
[O]ne is tempted to suppose in general that the truth of a statement is somehow 
analyzable into a linguistic component and a factual component. Given this 
supposition, it next seems reasonable that in some statements the factual 
component should be null; and these are the analytic statements. But, for all its 
a priori reasonableness, a boundary between analytic and synthetic statements 
simply has not been drawn. That there is such a distinction to be drawn at all is 
an unempirical dogma of empiricists, a metaphysical article of faith.1 
1 Willard Van Orman Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” in From a Logical Point of 
View. 9 Logico-philosophical Essays (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961), 36-37. 
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As a consequence, Quine gives his empiricism a pragmatic turn. There 
is no longer any necessary truth, but only some ‘web of beliefs’ which 
can be more coherent or less coherent. This is the reason why Quine 
claimed that the search for an object’s essential properties would be in 
vain. For him, the external world is accessible via descriptions only: If 
there is necessity in logic at all, it must be de dicto, since this type of 
necessity is reducible to a semantic predicate. Therefore, Quine accepts 
necessity de dicto at least “for the sake of argument”2, while he in fact 
rejects a modal calculus as a whole – at least he did so in his early papers 
on modal logic. Quine’s idea of a pure descriptive necessity is best 
illustrated by his famous example of a cycling mathematician, 
respectively, a mathematical cyclist:  
Mathematicians may conceivably be said to be necessarily rational and not 
necessarily two-legged; and cyclists necessarily two-legged and not necessarily 
rational. But what of an individual who counts among his eccentricities both 
mathematics and cycling? Is this concrete individual necessarily rational and 
contingently two-legged or vice versa? Just insofar as we are talking referentially 
of the object, with no special bias toward a background grouping of 
mathematicians as against cyclists or vice versa, there is no semblance of sense 
in rating some of his attributes as necessary and others as contingent.3 
Quine regards the cycling mathematician, taken as a person, neither as 
rational nor as two-legged. Only after one has considered the 
descriptions ‘mathematician’ and ‘cyclist’, does he become necessarily 
rational, respectively, two-legged. Kripke summarizes this position as 
follows:  
Whether a particular necessarily or contingently has a certain property depends 
on the way it’s described.4 
Kripke also showed that Quine’s approach (which might well be called 
‘anti-essentialist empiricism’) does require a descriptive account of 
reference, as suggested by Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell. 
Therefore, it is counter-intuitive. He illustrates this counter-intuitivism 
2 Christopher Hughes, Kripke. Names, Necessity, and Identity (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004), 81-82. 
3 Willard Van Orman Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1960), 199. 
4 Saul Kripke: Naming and Necessity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), 40 
(original emphasis).  
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in Naming and Necessity with an example from the U.S. presidential 
election in 1968: 
Suppose that someone said, pointing to Nixon, ‘That’s the guy who might have 
lost’. Someone else says ‘Oh no, if you describe him as ‘Nixon’, then he might 
have lost; but, of course, describing him as the winner, then it is not true that he 
might have lost’. Now which one is being the philosopher, here, the unintuitive 
man? It seems to me obviously to be the second.5 
A similar reasoning applies to Quine’s cycling mathematician: If he is 
described as a ‘mathematician’, he is necessarily rational. If he is 
described as a ‘cyclist’, he is necessarily two-legged. But it would be 
absurd to answer the question whether a certain person, for example 
Smith, is necessarily two-legged in the following way: ‘If you describe 
Smith as a cyclist, he is necessarily two-legged. But if you describe him 
as a mathematician, then he is not.’ Therefore, Quine’s anti-essentialist 
understanding of modality must be rejected because it presupposes a 
counter-intuitive way of language use.  
To stick to the jungle metaphor, we might regard Quine as the 
worried father who thought that our metaphysical adventure of 
exploring essentialism is far too costly, dangerous or philosophically 
pointless. With Kripke, we could say that it is our job to convince Quine 
of the philosophical benefits of such a trip by appealing to some 
fundamental intuitions – which is what I will try to do in the following 
parts of my paper. 
2. Waiting for departure: A plea for intuition-grounded philosophy
Of course, intuition-grounded argumentation causes doubts among 
many philosophers. The main objection could be summarized as 
follows: Intuitions are purely subjective and therefore random – and 
such subjectivity cannot lead to philosophical insight. However, Kripke 
gives, first and foremost, a semantic analysis of language. This means, 
he reflects on what people do, in fact, express when they utter a certain 
sentence. However, a good semantic analysis goes hand in hand with the 
intuitions which language users have about their own language. For that 
5 Kripke, Naming and Necessity, 10.  
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reason, we can well reject any analysis which does not appeal to our 
intuitions.  
To put it more theoretically, we might say that intuitions lead to a 
‘reflective equilibrium’ as John Rawls calls the relating balance of 
intuitions and theory in moral philosophy.6 This basically means that a 
counter-intuitive theory is not a good theory since it does not apply to 
most, and definitely not to all, cases of language use. Hence, Kripke 
gives a well-founded argument to reject Quine’s anti-essentialist 
understanding of necessity. 
However, it seems that Kripke regards intuitions as the unique way 
which leads to philosophical evidence:  
Of course, some philosophers think that something’s having intuitive content is 
very inconclusive evidence in favor of it. I think it is very heavy evidence in favor 
of anything, myself. I really don’t know, in a way, what more conclusive 
evidence one can have about anything, ultimately speaking.7 
Consequently, not only Kripke’s refutation of Quine is intuition-
grounded, but also his own account of essentialism – if one wants to call 
the “better picture”8 Kripke draws in Naming and Necessity an account 
or a theory at all. Anyway, Christopher Hughes claims correctly that 
Kripke’s essentialism neither refers to Aristotle nor to Thomas Aquinas 
(only to mention two famous essentialists in history), but rather to “the 
man on the Clapham omnibus”9. For this stereotype bus passenger, it is 
intuitively evident that individuals have some properties which are 
contingent and some others which are necessary. According to this, 
Richard Nixon, for example, has the contingent property of being elected 
as U.S. president in 1968. But he has the necessary property of being 
human – and not an aardvark or any other non-human creature.10 
Kripke’s intuitions do not only apply to individuals, but also to natural 
kinds. For example, ‘being H2O’ is a necessary property of water, while 
‘being liquid’ is not. I will come back to this example later.  
6 Cf. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971). 
7 Kripke, Naming and Necessity, 42.  
8 Ibid., 94. 
9 Hughes, Kripke, 84. 
10 Cf. Robert Stalnaker, “Possible Worlds Semantics: Philosophical Foundations,” in Saul 
Kripke, ed. Alan Berger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 100-115. 
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By such an intuitive reasoning, Kripke overcomes an anti-
essentialist dogma in philosophy which was established by Immanuel 
Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason and which heavily influenced Quine 
and other ‘early analytic philosophers’ like Bertrand Russell or Ludwig 
Wittgenstein. However, Kripke’s idea of essentialism remains utterly 
vague, since he – in his characteristic way of presenting philosophic 
ideas – only presents a few examples of essential properties and does not 
give any sufficient principles or general statements on his account. 
Because of this vagueness, one is well-justified in calling Kripke’s 
intuitive essentialism a ‘metaphysical jungle’ – of course, without the 
negative connotations Quine had in mind by using this metaphor. On 
the contrary, a trip to Kripke’s jungle is very promising for contemporary 
philosophy – not only in terms of logic and philosophy of language, but 
also as a milestone on the way to a refreshed Aristotelian metaphysics. 
Therefore, I will, in the next part of this paper, sketch some general 
remarks on Kripke’s intuitive examples which might be seen as the 
entering step into this adventurous jungle.  
3. Entering the Jungle: General remarks on Kripke’s essentialism
So far, I have pointed out that Kripke’s intuitions lead him to a 
metaphysical position which is, in general, called essentialism or 
sometimes even Aristotelian essentialism. But what is exactly meant by 
these terms? Here is Quine’s definition: 
Aristotelian essentialism. This is the doctrine that some of the attributes of a 
thing (quite independently of the language in which the thing is referred to, if at 
all) may be essential to the thing, and others accidental. E.g., a man, or talking 
animal, or featherless biped (for they are in fact all the same things), is 
essentially rational and accidentally two-legged and talkative, not merely qua 
man but qua itself.11  
This definition is quite adequate to describe Kripke’s approach. Hughes 
characterizes this essentialism therefore as ‘moderate’, which means 
that it stands between hypo-essentialism and hyper-essentialism (cf. 
Hughes 2004:108-110). On the one hand, hypo-essentialism refers to a 
11 Quine, Willard Van Orman, “Three Grades of Modal Involvement,” in The Ways of 
Paradox and other Essays (New York: Random House, 1966), 173-174. 
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theory that claims that only trivial properties are necessary, as for 
example ‘being self-identical’, ‘being red or not red’, ‘being warm if 
being hot’ etc. – i.e. properties all individuals have. On the other hand, 
hyper-essentialism claims that each individual has all of its properties 
necessarily – a view one might well ascribe to Gottfried Wilhelm 
Leibniz. However, neither hypo-essentialism nor hyper-essentialism is 
what Kripke has in mind – his essentialism is moderate and therefore in 
accordance with the given definition by Quine. It seems that Kripke 
takes ‘essential’ and ‘necessary’ as synonyms – even though the 
Aristotelian tradition defines essential properties as properties which are 
non-trivial and still necessary. I will not distinguish between them 
either, even though I focus only on non-trivial necessary properties (as 
Kripke obviously does as well).  
Kripke mentions a simple principle which gives a certain hint in 
order to find out which properties are necessary and which are not: the 
necessity of origin. He introduces it in a footnote of Naming and 
Necessity as follows:  
If a material object has its origin from a certain hunk of matter, it could not have 
had its origin in any other matter.12 
Kripke comes to this principle by help of two intuitive examples: his 
wooden table and Queen Elizabeth II: 
We could conceivably discover that, contrary to what we now think, this table is 
indeed made of ice from the river. But let us suppose that it is not. Then, though 
we can imagine making a table out of another block of wood or even from ice, 
identical in appearance with this one, and though we could have put it in this 
very position in the room, it seems to me that this is not to imagine this table as 
made of wood or ice, but rather it is to imagine another table, resembling this 
one in all external details, made of another block of wood, or even of ice.13 
[C]ould the Queen – could this woman herself – have been born of different 
parents from the parents from whom she actually came? […] [C]an we imagine a 
situation in which it would have happened that this very woman came out of 
Mr. and Mrs. Truman? They might have had a child resembling her in many 
properties. Perhaps in some possible world Mr. and Mrs. Truman even had a 
child who actually became the Queen of England and was even passed off as the 
child of other parents. This still would not be a situation in which this very 
woman whom we call ‘Elizabeth II’ was the child of Mr. and Mrs. Truman, or so 
12 Kripke, Naming and Necessity, 114, fn. 56. 
13 Ibid., 113-114. 
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it seems to me. It would be a situation in which there was some other woman 
who had many of the properties that are in fact true of Elizabeth. Now, one 
question is, in this possible world, was Elizabeth herself ever born? Let’s 
suppose she wasn’t ever born. It would than [sic!] be a situation in which, 
though Truman and his wife have a child with many of the properties of 
Elizabeth, Elizabeth herself didn’t exist at all.14 
By analyzing these examples, it becomes obvious that Kripke does not 
establish a so-called ‘principium individuationis’, as is suggested in 
some literature – especially in some German literature – on Kripke.15 
According to this principle, a certain property, if necessary, can only be 
held by a certain individual. It raises the question whether an individual 
can be identified (or even transworld-identified) by its essential 
properties – or more precisely: by its necessary origin. It can be stated 
without any doubt that Kripke denies a principium individuationis in his 
analysis of the wooden table example above since he writes in a footnote 
of Naming and Necessity:  
[I]f the very block of wood from which the table was made had instead been 
made into a vase, the table never would have existed.16  
Even though the table has the essential property of being made from the 
very block of wood, the very block of wood might have been used to 
produce something different. Being made of the very block of wood does 
therefore not identify Kripke’s table.  
Also, the example of Queen Elizabeth II cannot be seen as an 
example of a principium individuationis. Even though Kripke claims 
that there is no possible world in which Elizabeth II comes from other 
parents, her very parents do not make her special among other 
individuals: Her younger sister Margaret was born of the same parents. 
Even if we take the more precise wording of “from a totally different 
sperm and egg” instead of “from different parents”17, Hägler’s 
14 Ibid., 112-113. 
15 Cf. Rudolf-Peter Hägler, Kritik des neuen Essentialismus: Logisch-philosophische 
Untersuchungen über Identität, Modalität und Referenz (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1994), 
and Christof Rapp, Identität, Persistenz und Substantialität: Untersuchung zum 
Verhältnis von sortalen Termen und aristotelischer Substanz (Freiburg and München: 
Alber, 1995). 
16 Kripke, Naming and Necessity, 115, fn. 57. 
17 Cf. ibid., 112-113. 
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assumption that Kripke established a principium individuationis is 
simply not true: We might stipulate a possible world in which Elizabeth 
II has a monozygotic twin sister. Hence it is only a contingent and not a 
necessary fact that the fusion of the very ovum with the very sperm leads 
to Elizabeth II. It is solely necessary that Elizabeth II comes from the 
fusion of the very ovum with the very sperm – or in other words: ‘being a 
result of this very fusion’ is a necessary property of Elizabeth II. This is 
the way we have to understand Kripke’s principle of the necessary 
origin.  
However, it fits best to Kripke’s intuition-based way of 
argumentation that he elaborates this principle in a footnote only – and 
criticizes it himself in the preface, which was added a few years later, as 
requiring further discussion.18 As I already adumbrated, it is Kripke’s 
philosophical goal to draw ‘better pictures’ and not to elaborate fully 
consistent theories. 
The contemporary ‘new essentialism’ which focuses on the classical 
Aristotelian substance ontology declines Kripke’s necessity of origin. It 
is claimed that substances (an Aristotelian term which Kripke avoids on 
purpose19) have to be ontologically independent. But how can Kripke’s 
table or Elizabeth II be ontologically independent if individuals come to 
existence by their necessary origin? This is how we are to understand the 
following objection by E. J. Lowe: 
I must reject the Kripkean thesis of the ‘necessity of origin’ – according to 
which, for example, it is part of the essence of a living organism, such as an elm 
tree, that it grew from a certain seed. For the seed is presumably not to be 
identified with the mature tree. However, I do consider this thesis to be 
mistaken. I am happy to concede, perhaps, that the tree could not have grown 
from a different seed, but I am not prepared to concede that it did have to grow 
from this seed, because it seems to me perfectly intelligible to suppose that this 
very tree could have existed from eternity, or could have come into existence ex 
nihilo.20 
But even if we were to accept the necessity of origin as an intuitive 
principle of essentialism, it does only apply to individuals, but not to 
natural kinds. However, Kripke also pursues a natural kind essentialism 
18 Cf. ibid., 1.  
19 Cf. ibid., 114-115, fn. 57. 
20 Jonathan Lowe, “Substance and Identity,” in Substanz, ed. Käthe Trettin (Frankfurt: 
Klostermann, 2005), 42. 
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as I already mentioned when I referred to Kripke’s famous ‘Water is 
H2O’ example. Kripke derives the natural kind essentialism from his 
reference theory (if we may call it a theory at all and not a picture!). For 
Kripke, both proper names and natural kind terms are rigid designators: 
They refer to the same individual, respectively natural kind, in all 
possible worlds, given that the very objects exist. Taking this approach to 
reference theory for granted, individuals do not only have essential 
properties of their own, but also as part of the natural kind they belong 
to. For example, a certain drop of water out of the River Thames belongs 
to the natural kind ‘water’ – therefore it shares the essential property of 
being H2O.  
Hereby, it is important to understand that the reference of a natural 
kind term “depends upon the actual nature of the particular things that 
serve as paradigms”21 – as stated by Hilary Putnam who shares similar 
views as Kripke on reference theory and essentialism. To illustrate the 
view of both authors by the water example, we can say that the reference 
of the natural kind term ‘water’ was fixed by pointing to a certain glass of 
water (or a certain river, lake, see or whatsoever). Afterwards we find out 
that either the very water, which fixed the reference, or another 
paradigm of this natural kind has the property of being H2O. Since this 
property is – according to Kripke – essential, we cannot imagine a 
possible world in which water does not consist of H2O molecules. 
Kripke illustrates this by his example of fool’s water: 
If there were a substance, even actually, which had a completely different atomic 
structure from that of water, but resembled water in these respects, would we 
say that some water wasn’t H2O? I think not. We would say instead that just as 
there is a fool's gold there could be a fool's water; a substance which, though 
having the properties by which we originally identified water, would not in fact 
be water.22 
But as I see it, the intuitive essentialism of natural kinds is somehow ill-
founded: Kripke’s essentialism of individuals has at least a more or less 
plausible principle to find out the essential properties of a certain object 
– the necessity of origin. But H2O can hardly be said to be the origin of
water – neither is ‘being an animal’ (to take another of Kripke’s 
21 Hilary Putnam, “Meaning and Reference,” in The Journal of Philosophy 70, no. 19 
(1973), 711. 
22 Kripke, Naming and Necessity, 128. 
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examples) the origin of a tiger, even though it is the essential property of 
every tiger, so to speak something that all tigers have in common. The 
problem I am targeted on is that Kripke does not give us a single hint 
how we should find out which of the various properties of a natural kind 
are essential and which are only contingent. He gives only examples 
which he believes to be intuitively evident like ‘A tiger is necessarily an 
animal’ or ‘Water is necessarily H2O’. But especially the latter example, 
is in my opinion, problematic: It is not very probable that the man on 
the Clapham omnibus would regard the statement ‘Water is necessarily 
H2O’ as intuitively evident, not even ‘Water is H2O’ without claiming its 
necessity. For most people, it is probably more intuitive to say that 
‘Water is liquid’ is a necessary truth, particularly because water, as one 
finds it in nature, is rarely pure H2O.  
However, I am not sure whether it is useful to criticize any 
particular examples and therefore do not want to continue with that. The 
main problem of Kripke’s essentialism, which I wanted to point out, is 
that Kripke refuses to name any proper principles to distinguish 
essential from contingent properties (both for individuals and natural 
kinds).  
Nevertheless, the vagueness of Kripke’s intuitive examples was 
enough to overcome the anti-essentialist paradigm in philosophy – and 
thus helped to revive Aristotelian essentialism in contemporary 
discussions. I will come back to this observation in my final outlook. 
4. A postcard to Quine: Summary and outlook
In my paper, I tried to develop my point that Kripke revived the 
Aristotelian idea that individuals and natural kinds have some of their 
properties necessarily and others contingently. I showed how Kripke 
rejected the counter-intuitive anti-essentialism which is first and 
foremost associated with Quine, but has a long tradition going back to 
Kant23. Kripke showed that the anti-essentialists contradict some 
fundamental intuitions about language use, and he also builds a vague 
essentialist theory on these intuitions. In the last part of my paper, I 
23 Cf. Richard Rorty “Kripke vs. Kant,” in London Review of Books 17, no. 2 (1980), 4-5, 
and Hägler, Kritik des neuen Essentialismus.  
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tried to sketch some general remarks on Kripke’s essentialism. It 
hopefully became clear why its vagueness makes philosophers even 
today feel as if they were in a metaphysical jungle.  
However, even though the ‘new essentialism’ movement does not 
totally agree with the views Kripke elaborated in Naming and Necessity 
and his later works, we can well say that Kripke’s analysis was a 
milestone on the way to bring contemporary substance ontology into 
vogue again. Richard Rorty writes in his review of Naming and 
Necessity:  
Just when it seemed that the [anti-essentialist] dialectic which Kant began had 
culminated in universal acceptance of the relaxed pragmatism of Wittgenstein 
and Quine, Kripke exploded his bomb.24 
In my paper, I tried to analyze the essentialist bomb Kripke exploded by 
simply following his fundamental intuitions. I am convinced that an 
impartial and open-minded reception of Aristotle and other important 
essentialists in history would not be possible today without Kripke – or 
at least, it would be more difficult to speak about an individual’s 
essential properties. Without Kripke, philosophy today would still be 
banned to the pragma-empiric jungle of Quine and other early analytics. 
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Natural Kind Terms and  
the Necessary A Posteriori 
Adriana Pavić  
(University of Göttingen) 
In this essay, I am concerned with propositions which we can come 
to know only via empirical investigation, yet are claimed by Kripke to 
hold metaphysically necessary, namely propositions expressed by 
statements referred to by Kripke as “theoretical identities” involving 
natural kind terms. I tentatively reject anti-realist attacks on the status 
of these claims as ‘necessary a posteriori’ on the grounds that the 
anti-realist fails to do justice to our actual practice of using natural 
kind terms. In illustrating these points, I appeal to Stroud’s 
reflections on the notion of necessity and Brown’s account of the 
reference of natural kind terms, subsequently amending them by my 
thesis that the tacit linguistic rules governing the use of natural kind 
terms involve a priori premises deeply anchored in our conceiving the 
world which seem to be responsible for the intuitive appeal of the 
essentialist view put forward by Kripke. Yet these observations do not 
constitute a positive argument in favor of the purported metaphysical 
necessity of the relevant propositions. So in the last part of the essay, 
I rather put up for discussion the question whether upon 
philosophical reflection on the presuppositions underlying our use of 
natural kind terms we can soften Kripke’s contention concerning the 
status of propositions like the one expressed by “Water is H2O” as 
metaphysically necessary without thereby adopting the anti-realist 
stance according to which the necessity of such claims is based on a 
linguistic stipulation. The idea put forward by Putnam (1990) seems 
to be to regard the relevant proposition’s truth as only nomologically 
necessary on the basis of our inability to assess them for truth in 
possible worlds in which the most fundamental laws of nature do not 
obtain.  
1. Kripke’s contention: empirical access to metaphysical necessity
Through Kripke’s Naming and Necessity (N&N), metaphysics “invaded” 
the philosophy of language, thereby regaining attention among 
philosophers generally and more specifically entering the realm of 
analytic philosophy, from which many had wished to exclude it once and 
for all. Essentialism – the metaphysical doctrine which claims that 
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objects have essential properties as opposed to accidental ones – came to 
the fore and with it the notion of metaphysical necessity as opposed to 
epistemic possibility (conceivability) and semantic necessity (truth by 
definition, meaning postulate). 
According to the picture Kripke advocates, metaphysical claims 
concerning the status of some statements as necessarily true can be 
deduced from certain semantic properties of the expressions involved in 
these statements, such as their rigidity. 
The statements he envisages are primarily identity-statements such 
as “Hesperus is Phosphorus” or “Water is H2O”, though he is also 
concerned with statements like “cats are animals”, whose logical form 
can be analyzed as a universally quantified conditional.1  
Now, the discovery that Hesperus and Phosphorus are one and the 
same heavenly body, just like the discovery that water is composed of 
H2O molecules, is the result of empirical investigation. But scientific 
discoveries like these, according to Kripke, have a modal dimension: If 
true, they could not have been false, i.e. their truth is metaphysically 
necessary, so they contradict the traditional assumption that we can gain 
insight into necessary truths only a priori and they constitute examples 
of “the necessary a posteriori”. 
In this essay, I will be concerned with natural kinds and natural 
kind terms, respectively, not with particular objects such as the Venus, 
the Queen or a certain table and the corresponding linguistic devices of 
reference (without assuming that in all the latter cases Kripke’s theses 
hold unproblematically). 
Are we indeed committed to the strong metaphysical claims Kripke 
advocates to account for the evidence he emphasizes? Anti-realists like 
Canfield come up with an alternative proposal, backed up by a variety of 
interesting arguments. 
In the first section of this essay, I want to point out why, in my 
opinion, neither of the two rival proposals can yield conclusive 
arguments against the other one, drawing on Stroud’s views on 
1 Kripke subsumes the relevant statement under the potentially misleading header 
“theoretical identities”. 
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metaphysical necessity presented in his Engagement and Metaphysical 
Dissatisfaction (2011). 
Then, in the second section, I take a look at the semantics of natural 
kind terms, disclosing a realist picture deeply entrenched in our use of 
these terms, which partly explains the appeal of Kripke’s metaphysics in 
N&N and casts some doubt on the most radical anti-realistic theses. In 
this regard the work of Jessica Brown proved helpful. Finally, I propose 
to weaken Kripke’s strong metaphysical claims in favor of a weaker form 
of realism endorsed by Putnam in his later work. 
2. Full-blooded essentialism vs. Wittgensteinian anti-realism?
It seems natural to assume that the substances and kinds we encounter 
in our natural environment have some properties which are essential to 
them, so that without having these properties they would not be 
instances of the respective substance or kind. How else, if not through 
investigation of these properties, could we be able to distinguish gold 
from fool’s gold, for example? 
Natural kind terms, according to Kripke, refer rigidly, i.e. they refer 
to the same kind in every possible world, and it is up to the scientists to 
tell us how to determine if a given sample is a sample of a given kind. If 
scientists succeed in identifying the relevant property, their discovery 
amounts to an insight in truths which hold in all possible worlds. Kripke 
writes: 
[S]tatements representing scientific discoveries about what this stuff is are not 
contingent truths but necessary truths in the strictest possible sense. It’s not just 
that it’s a scientific law, but of course we can imagine a world in which it would 
fail. Any world in which we imagine a substance which does not have these 
properties is a world in which we imagine a substance which is not gold, 
provided  these properties form the basis of what the substance is. (Kripke 
1980:125) 
It is conceivable that the scientists got it wrong, that it turns out that 
gold is not Au79. But provided that it is not wrong, it could not have 
been otherwise. In the same vein Putnam concludes as to water’s not 
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being H2O: “it is conceivable, but it isn’t logically possible!” (Putnam 
1975a: 233).2  
Anti-realists object that Kripke should have said much more about 
how, according to his view, scientists can discern candidates for an 
essential property from accidental properties of substances, kinds, and 
phenomena. Only a certain class of properties seems to come into 
question, not every property is a candidate for an essential one. Canfield 
points out that 
Since not all discovered features are essential, a theory of essence is 
presupposed in passing from the proposition that water is H2O to the 
proposition that it is of the essence of water to be H2O. But what theory? 
(Canfield 1983:107) 
Moreover, for the anti-realist it is not at all so evident that we can 
discover essential properties in the metaphysically charged sense 
envisaged by Kripke. They propose to cease using the notion of essence 
or to deflate it completely.  According to the latter option, endorsed by 
Canfield, scientists just decide what is essential, partly due to pragmatic 
considerations. 
The anti-realist has made an interesting proposal, but on what 
grounds could he persuade us to endorse his view? I shall attend to this 
question after having clarified the problem he points to. 
Essential properties as such cannot be discovered by science. 
Science arguably can discover structural, fundamental, underlying or 
maybe even the most fundamental properties of substances. 
The putative a posteriori necessity of the relevant statements is a 
result of combining these findings with certain a priori postulates. In the 
realist picture, the principle that the composition of a substance is 
essential to it and thus a change in composition is necessarily a change 
in identity, is a case in point. Once we split the relevant statements into 
their two components it becomes visible that the a priori component 
imports the necessity, whereas the a posteriori component is an ordinary 
empirical statement. Kripke seems to acknowledge this in emphasizing 
the conditional nature of our putative epistemic access to the relevant 
2 Putnam does not use the term “metaphysical possibility”, but seems to have in mind the 
same that Kripke has. More on this below. 
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metaphysical necessities: if water is H2O, then it is necessarily H2O. But 
he does not give any substantial argumentative support for the relevant a 
priori postulates, in this important respect, he relies solely on intuitions. 
Now, the implicit a priori component amounts to two completely 
different things in the realistic and in the anti-realist picture; though, as 
I will try to show, both can be conceived as stipulative in a sense. But 
“stipulation” amounts to completely different things depending on 
whether we prefer a metaphysically charged realism or a 
Wittgensteinian anti-realism. 
The claim that the properties in question are essential, and hence 
are attached to the substance with necessity, is an empirically warranted 
metaphysical hypothesis in the one case, and a semantic stipulation on 
the basis of scientific evaluation of empirical evidence in the other case.  
Understood in the first (the realistic) sense, the “stipulation” is not 
easily recognizable as such. To see that we unconsciously do stipulate, 
we have to reflect on the a priori metaphysical premises we bring to bear 
on the discovered patterns in nature and reveal these premises as 
unprovable. 
The second (the anti-realistic) sense of “stipulation” is an explicitly 
definitional one: we elevate a certain property, confer it the status of 
being the essential one. According to the anti-realist picture, this affects 
the linguistic meaning of natural kind terms, even though the features 
stipulated as essential are not “analytic”, in the sense of being arrived at 
by conceptual analysis alone. 
Accordingly, there are two ways to conceive of the notion of 
essentiality: the metaphysical one, invoked by Kripke, and the criterial 
one, proposed by Wittgensteinian anti-realists like Canfield. Two 
different varieties of necessity come with each picture, metaphysical 
necessity and semantic necessity, respectively. 
But the anti-realist claim that we regard the relevant statements as 
necessarily true because they are “rules of grammar” in a 
Wittgensteinian sense, is in tension with our use of the concept of 
necessity, as Stroud brings out in the following passages: 
[T]o accept such an explanation of necessity we would have to acknowledge that 
if it had not been for that explanatory factor the necessary truth in question 
would not have been necessary or perhaps even true. That means we would have 
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to grant at least the possibility of circumstances in which something that we 
regard as necessarily true […] would not have been necessarily true. But no one 
could consistently grant such a thing. (Stroud 2011:77) 
We do not conceive of necessity as man-made, so to speak; something is 
necessary if it could not have been otherwise. But rules of language are 
evidently contingent, as Canfield himself emphasizes when he 
characterizes his theory as “a form of linguistic relativism” (Canfield 
1983:106). 
The irreducibility of our notion of necessity, which Stroud 
emphasizes does not go well together with considering the statements 
Kripke is concerned with as “rules of grammar”. 
The a priori condition needed for the “theoretical identities”, which 
Kripke considers as examples of the “necessary a posteriori” to hold 
necessarily discloses assumptions deeply entrenched in our thinking 
about the world. It shows that our judgements aim at nature as it is 
independent of us, but at the same time raises the skeptical problem that 
we eventually cannot be sure if we can succeed in representing the 
substances and kinds in nature as they really are.  
According to Stroud, as I conceive of his view, this is a case in which 
neither a positive nor a negative metaphysical verdict is epistemically 
accessible. There is no proof available, not even in principle, neither for 
our assumption that substances have an essence, nor for the contrary. 
But the essentialist preconceptions governing our thinking of and 
speaking about natural kinds nevertheless seem to be indispensable. 
The anti-realist sees himself in a better position, though, for he 
purports not to rely on any metaphysical speculation. He does not even 
have to deny explicitly that there is something like essential properties in 
the metaphysical sense; he can be content with insisting that his 
opponents’ talk of essence simply does not make sense and should be 
replaced by the criterial sense proposed by Canfield-style anti-realists. 
But this causes conceptual entanglements due to the irreducibility of the 
notion of necessity emphasized by Stroud. 
However, in the next section I propose to illustrate why only the first 
picture fits in with how we use natural kind terms. Although the talk of 
relevant discoveries as discoveries of essence can also be considered as a 
kind of stipulation by us humans, within the realist framework we do 
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not intend to just stipulate and define, we intend to fit in with facts 
independent of us. 
3. The characters of natural kind terms
Kripke does not say much about the linguistic meaning of natural kind 
terms. He does oes say something about how the reference of these 
terms is fixed, namely via a sort of baptism in which we ostensively 
define to what kind of entity the relevant term is to be applied. But how 
is the linguistic meaning of natural kind terms related to the set of all 
“members” of the natural kind? Let us look at what Putnam has to say 
about that and contrast his view with the anti-realist view. 
According to Putnam, we have to know at least something about 
tigers to be recognized as one who knows the meaning of the word 
“tiger”. It does not suffice, as he puts it, to know just that tigers are 
physical objects and nothing more.3 We have to know some stereotypical 
feature of tigers, like being cat-like animals with striped fur etc. So far, 
this is not especially controversial.  
None of these stereotypical properties encompassed in the linguistic 
meaning of the relevant terms constitutes a necessary condition for 
membership in their extension, none of these features is “analytic”, i.e. 
true of every member of the extension by definition. 
But, evidently, there is a link between the linguistic meaning of a 
natural kind term and its extension, otherwise the respective extension 
could not be its extension. How does Putnam account for this fact? 
In the same way as in Kripke’s picture, the reference of a natural 
kind term is fixed ostensively, in the case of water in roughly the 
following way: “the term ‘water’ shall refer to all and only instances 
which stand in the sameL(=liquid)-relation to this liquid here”.4 (Whether 
the sameL-relation obtains, is to be determined by scientists ultimately. 
It is remarkable that in explaining this mechanism of reference, Putnam 
makes use of a “weaker” terminology than Kripke. In particular, he talks 
3 Cf. Putnam 1975a:247. 
4 Cf. Putnam 1975a: 225, 231. 
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about “important physical properties” or “the micro-structure” of a 
substance instead of its essence.5 
3.1 Experts shaping meanings? 
Striving to find out what a substance “really is”, we are obviously not 
practicing conceptual analysis; we are not engaged in an armchair a 
priori deliberation as, for example, in the case of the word “know” (at 
least according to most philosophers). In their investigation of 
substances and kinds, scientists also do not see themselves as enquiring 
the linguistic meaning of the corresponding terms. 
Scientific discoveries can change concepts, but they don’t have to. 
The structural properties, on the basis of which membership in the 
extension is determined, often do not enter in our common sense 
concept of the respective kind. Knowledge of these properties is not 
necessary to understand the linguistic meaning of the relevant natural 
kind terms. 
Putnam insists that non-expert competent speakers have normal 
knowledge, which is completely satisfying and enables one to take part 
in the linguistic exchange perfectly well. This is underscored by the 
“Principle of Reasonable Ignorance” he introduces in Language and 
Reality: 
I can know the meaning of the word ‘gold’ without knowing, explicitly or 
implicitly, the criteria for being gold (contrary to John Locke), and without 
having any very clear idea at all just how the word is tied to whatever it is tied to. 
(Putnam 1975b:278) 
In contrast, according to the anti-realist view, the discovery that water is 
H2O and its stipulation as a criterion for being water generated a change 
of the meaning of “water”. The meaning of a natural kind term changes 
with a (new) scientific determination of the criterion for membership in 
the extension of that natural kind term, hence in the anti-realist 
framework the initial ostensive definition is not the basis for reference-
fixing. But this view is implausible, for in case the scientists get it 
5 Cf. Putnam 1975a: 232. 
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completely wrong and later correct themselves, they constantly refer to 
the same substance and no modification of the meaning seems to have 
occurred. Other reasons for the implausibility of the anti-realist proposal 
will emerge once we take a look at Brown’s theory. 
3.2 Brown’s account of the reference of natural kind terms 
Jessica Brown provides an expansion, and, in my opinion, an 
improvement of the Kripke/Putnam view, without giving up the central 
idea of ostensive reference-fixing. The improvement consists in her 
clarifying the conditions under which a successful ostensive definition is 
possible. 
The ostensive reference-fixing is based on our general capacity to 
identify different natural kinds in our natural environment and 
distinguish them in a fairly reliable way by means of their manifest 
properties. Presupposing the recognitional capacity envisaged by Brown 
inherently involves a “naïve” realistic element. 
According to Brown, there are two requirements to be fulfilled for a 
person to have a recognitional capacity for a natural kind: (1) She has to 
have a discriminatory ability with respect to the kind in question, i.e. she 
has to be able to discern that kind from any other kind in her local 
environment. (2) Beyond that she has to appreciate the metaphysical 
nature of natural kinds. We need to import metaphysical assumptions 
concerning non-manifest properties of natural kinds in order to be able 
to distinguish cases in which there is only a recognitional capacity for 
anything with the appearance of a certain kind present from cases where 
a recognitional capacity for that kind itself is present. 
This appreciation of the metaphysical nature of natural kinds is to 
be understood dispositionally, it need not involve a full 
conceptualization of this nature. The presence of the metaphysical 
assumption is revealed by our disposition to adjust our judgments in 
accordance with scientific findings. Brown puts it as follows: 
In order to have a recognitional capacity for silver, a subject needs to have not 
only a certain discriminatory ability, but also an appreciation of the metaphysical 
nature of natural kinds. In particular, she needs to appreciate that whether an 
item is of some particular natural kind is determined by its fundamental 
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properties. She needs to appreciate that similarity in the appearance of two 
items is only defeasible evidence for the claim that there is a natural kind 
instantiated by both, defeasible in the light of evidence about their fundamental 
properties. (Brown 1998: 286f.) 
The metaphysical assumption Brown points to is also fundamental for 
our understanding of the linguistic meaning of natural kind terms and 
is at the bottom of our use of these terms. I want to argue that Brown’s 
condition (2) for having a recognitional capacity for a natural kind forms 
part of  the character (in the sense of Kaplan) of every natural kind term 
and qua linguistic rule constitutes a constraint on the understanding of 
the linguistic meaning of natural kind terms, too. Let me illustrate this 
further. 
In correcting ourselves by taking back a claim to the effect that a 
given sample is a sample of water, gold or whatever, in the light of 
scientific evidence to the contrary, we demonstrate our competence in 
using natural kind terms. Using these expressions, we intend to refer 
only to items which meet Putnam’s “samekind”-criterion. 
The normative impact of the character-rules governing natural kind 
terms would expose a speaker maintaining “well, all samples of water 
tested so far consisted of H2O, but maybe there are others with another 
underlying structure” as linguistically incompetent. It is not just that he 
or she knows very little about water, it is rather that such a person 
violates the implicit commitment laid down in our linguistic 
conventions. 
This general commitment is already in force because the scientists 
are still in the dark with respect to the underlying features of a given 
substance. Let us assume that we have identified a particular sort of 
metal, i.e. we are able to discern samples of this metal as samples of the 
same substance via some appropriate “operational definition”. We have 
ostensively introduced the term m for this substance, because science 
has not yet investigated the underlying structure of the substance. At 
this particular time already (when we are yet in search of a candidate for 
an essential property) we consider the following sentence as false under 
every possible substitution for F, on the assumption that F is an 
essential property: 
(S) Most, but not all samples of m are F. 
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If F is an essential property, then any sample which lacks that property 
cannot be a sample of m. 
Realizing this is gaining insight in the semantics of natural kind 
terms. As competent speakers we need not know what the fundamental 
property of a given kind is. Nor do we even have to be aware of the 
metaphysical commitments underlying our use of natural kind terms, 
just as little as we have to be aware of the rules forming part of the 
character of other linguistic expressions we use every day, for example 
the rule that “I” refers to the speaker. This is in accordance with what 
Putnam claims in his “Principle of Reasonable Ignorance” quoted above. 
Let me summarize what I have said about the relation between the 
meaning and the extension of natural kind terms. We can draw a 
distinction between an external and an internal component in the 
meaning of natural kind terms, the external one being primarily 
responsible for reference-fixing, in that it demands an ostensive 
reference to paradigmatic samples, which in turn makes an exact 
determination of the extension in the future possible.6 
Superficial properties also play a role in fixing the reference, for they 
are the basis for the pre-scientific individuation of kinds by means of our 
recognitional capacities. The relevant manifest properties enter in the 
conventional meaning of the term – they are precisely the features which 
constitute the stereotype in Putnam’s sense. So Brown’s first condition 
for having a recognitional capacity for a natural kind and Putnam’s 
stereotype can also be correlated. 
The internal component involving the a priori assumptions also 
plays a role in reference-fixing, albeit an implicit one: The character-
rules secure the usefulness of the ostensive definition (demanded by the 
external component) by way of ascertaining that the extension be 
determined by reference to underlying, structural properties of the 
paradigmatic samples, so, in a sense, it can be regarded as the “linguistic 
trigger” for searching the essential property of a kind. 
6 This does not mean that we cannot introduce a natural kind term descriptively, but a 
descriptive reference-fixing like “the substance which caused x” would be regarded as 
preliminary, for in such cases we are in anticipation of becoming acquainted with this 
substance via perception, being able to examine it scientifically etc. in the future. 
171 
Consequently, semantic externalism should be retained; the 
reference of natural kind terms depends “on the world”, not on mental 
entities of any kind. It depends on the world in a way which is 
determined by the ostensive definition of the term and the prescriptions 
provided by the character of natural terms in general.  
Our thinking of, and dealing with, natural kinds, substances, and 
phenomena stands on a metaphysical footing which leads us to consider 
scientific discoveries of underlying properties as discoveries of essence. 
As a result, we are willing to accept the modal consequences of such 
discoveries emphasized by Kripke. 
So in my view the scientific use of natural kind terms is not 
disconnected with our everyday use (contra Putnam 1990, but in 
accordance with Putnam 1975a, where he emphasizes the role of 
“experts” in the linguistic community). This allows us to bridge 
scientific curiosity and the pragmatic requirements of daily life in a 
unifying picture of our conception of natural kinds. 
4. Putnam’s revision: Does nomological necessity (in a realistic
framework) suffice? 
After this sketch, let us take a look at an example which threatens to 
disarrange our previous conclusions. 
According to our scientific knowledge of the world, no substance 
can change when left on its own. 
There has to be an impact from outside, so to speak – an extraneous 
cause bringing about the change in the substance, for example its 
passing from the solid state of aggregation into the liquid one through 
heating.7 Another example is chemical reactions between substances: 
Substances merge and their chemical composition changes, whereby 
new substances emerge. At any rate, every change concerning a 
substance has to have a cause, has to be caused by something. 
7 Of course, we can, and do, say that the capacity or disposition to undergo certain changes 
pertains to the substance itself; it is not just that the cause (for example heat) changes the 
substance, we can just as well say that the substance changes due to certain 
circumstances/influences/causes. The point remains that no substance changes “out of 
the blue”. 
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But nomological impossibility does not imply metaphysical 
impossibility. There could have been other fundamental physical laws. 
So the following scenario should be classified as metaphysically possible. 
The Strange Mutation 
Imagine a big lake in Finland filled with crystal clear blue water – a 
paradigmatic instance of the kind. If you feel like it, you can even 
assume that the liquid in this lake was one of the samples by reference 
to which water was ostensively defined a long time ago. But now 
something very strange occurs: the liquid in the lake begins to alter 
chemically. The content of this very lake undergoes a change in chemical 
composition resulting in the molecular structure XYZ, although no 
observable feature of the environment has changed.8 During this 
transformation, which you can imagine as occurring very slowly or 
instantly, all the perceptually observable qualities of the substance 
remain the same. 
What should we say in this case? It is difficult. We are not prepared 
to deal with such cases in our language use, because such cases are 
nomologically impossible, they contradict the most basic laws of nature. 
The strange occurrence seems to be conceivable, otherwise you could 
not understand the example. And I see no argument against its being 
metaphysically possible either. There could have been other laws of 
nature allowing changes to occur without a cause, a world without such 
things as “fixed substances”, i.e. substances with an underlying structure 
constant over time. That we humans would have a hard time getting 
along in such a world (to put it mildly) does not make it metaphysically 
impossible. So, if it is metaphysically possible, should we say that in this 
scenario water changes its composition or rather that water transforms 
into something else which is no longer water? 
This example is based on the metaphysical assumption that for 
every natural kind there is a distinctive feature which constitutes its 
8 It is important to keep in mind that in this example we stipulate that there is no cause for 
this change of molecular structure, it is not just that we have not detected it yet (for 
example, an extraterrestrial gas which has entered our atmosphere unnoticed or something 
like this). 
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essence to its limits. Is the statement “water is H2O” truth-evaluable in a 
world in which the fundamental laws of nature are not in force? 
We would have no use for this sentence with respect to such a 
world, for its meaning rests upon the possibility of classification of 
substances. Whether we regard them as metaphysically necessary or not, 
our criteria for distinguishing substances are applicable only to worlds 
in which the present laws of nature are in force; we do not possess 
distinguishing criteria for substances independently of this condition. 
The relevant statements express necessary truths against the background 
of a world in which substances have a constant underlying structure 
whose integrity can be affected by causal means only. But other worlds 
are conceivable (at least in a sense) and nothing speaks against their 
being metaphysically possible in principle.9 
Let wn be the set of all nomologically possible worlds. Should we say 
that it is metaphysically necessary that water is H2O relative to wn? Can 
something be metaphysically necessary only relative to worlds in which 
our laws of nature obtain? This cannot work, for it is just the gist of the 
idea of metaphysical necessity that it holds independently of all 
contingent factors, even the most fundamental ones like the laws of 
nature. So we are not allowed to restrict the domain of worlds to those 
which are nomologically possible. 
Are the criteria for membership in the extension of a natural kind 
term merely nomologically necessary then? Would water’s not being 
H2O be incompatible with the fundamental laws of physics? This 
question seems to be on the wrong track, for to answer it, we already 
need to have available a criterion for determining whether a given 
sample is a sample of water. And precisely this criterion is “being 
composed of H2O molecules”; we would not call anything water unless 
it were composed of H2O,10 so the question whether this would be 
compatible with our laws of nature does not arise: 
9 Of course, one could argue that the laws of nature themselves are not contingent, i.e. that 
there could not have been other ones, but this seems to muddle up the concept of 
metaphysical modality. I cannot pursue this issue here, but Sidelle (2002) convincingly 
argues against this proposal. 
10 I ignore problems of vagueness resulting from the fact that normally we do not 
encounter chemically pure water in our natural environment, for they do not have a 
bearing on the point presently under discussion. 
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Once we have discovered that water (in the actual world) is H2O, nothing counts 
as a possible world in which water isn’t H2O. (Putnam1975a: 233) 
This seems to be preserved in spite of the mentioned difficulties, for 
even a world in which completely other laws of nature are in force is 
prima facie no world in which water is not H2O, though it might be a 
world in relation to which talking about water does not make sense 
because we do not have criteria for the individuation of substances 
applicable in such a world, or simply a world in which there is no water. 
So the following possible reactions are available in cases like The 
Strange Mutation example: 
(1) The question whether there is water in such a world does not arise. 
(2) There is no water in such a world.  
(3) There is water in such a world when and only when H2O molecules are 
instantiated (regardless of what happens before or afterwards). 
(3) seems to be the Kripkean response, but it gives the impression of an 
obstinate application of natural kind terms, whereas (1) and (2) resist 
applying them in nomologically impossible worlds, thereby suggesting 
that their application presupposes that some background conditions 
obtain, namely the continuity of substances in the absence of causal 
impact etc. This would explain our difficulty in yielding clear-cut 
intuitive responses to such scenarios. 
Thus, maybe on reflection, we can weaken the assumption 
underlying our understanding and use of natural kind terms to the 
effect that what we, in fact, have to assume is that there are fundamental 
properties of every substance conceived as properties which apply in 
every possible world in which the same or very similar laws of physics 
obtain, i.e. every nomologically possible world.  
This is, in effect, Putnam’s later stance in his paper Is Water 
Necessarily H2O? (1990). There he qualifies some of his views in The 
Meaning of ‘Meaning’ (1975). As a result of thinking through some of 
the consequences of Kripke’s claims, he departs from Kripke at some 
points where this was not apparent in his previous work. This new way 
promises to be more tangible and still compatible with our use of 
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natural kind terms and our intuitive judgements of various 
counterfactual scenarios. So Putnam concludes: 
I now think that the question, “What is the necessary and sufficient condition 
for being water in all possible worlds?” makes no sense at all. And this means 
that I now reject “metaphysical necessity”. (Putnam 1990:70) 
This presents itself as a reasonable conclusion in the light of my Strange 
Mutation example and other examples provided in Putnam 1990. Such 
examples suggest that everything over and above nomological possibility 
(accessible only a posteriori) and logical possibility (accessible only a 
priori) creates confusion, and we can do without metaphysical necessity. 
But Kripke could counter along the following lines: “In any world in 
which there is no H2O, there is no water either, and even in a world in 
which substances appear and disappear out of the blue, while H2O 
molecules are present, water is present, no matter what happens in 
advance. So we have a criterion valid even in nomologically impossible 
worlds!” 
Can we stay in accordance with the rules implicit in the linguistic 
meaning of natural kind terms and still succeed in departing from 
Kripke’s essentialism with its strong metaphysical commitments? 
At this point, I want to leave it open for further reflection whether 
“necessity in the strictest possible sense” in the case of the pertinent 
statements concerning natural kind  is  just a nomological necessity 
under the condition that we have identified the most fundamental 
properties of the relevant substance. Then we would have: For any 
property F and natural kind m: if F is a fundamental property of m, it is 
nomologically necessary that m is F. But for the reasons mentioned 
above, I must confess that I am not quite sure about that.  
5. Conclusion
Canfield is right in emphasizing that in the interpretation of the unusual 
scenarios discussed by Kripke and Putnam, we go beyond our everyday 
use of natural kind terms. Nonetheless, we have to explain why, even 
among the different available choices which Canfield points to in his 
examples, the majority of speakers would intuitively choose the ones in 
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accordance with the picture on which Kripke and Putnam rely. I pointed 
to a possible explanation appealing to the characters of natural kind 
terms, which has to be spelled out in more detail elsewhere.11 
To get to the theoretical identities’ obtaining, which is 
metaphysically necessary, an a priori premise or condition is needed. 
Kripke presupposes it, without making it explicit or motivating it, apart 
from his repeated appeals to the intuitiveness of the resulting 
judgements. These intuitions come with our understanding of how 
natural kind terms function; they indicate the implicit knowledge of the 
semantic rules which competent speakers possess. Therefore Canfield’s 
criticism that “he attempts to turn plain facts about kind terms into a 
philosophical theory of them” (Canfield 1983: 109) is quite 
comprehensible, in spite of Kripke’s insisting that he merely wants to 
provide a picture, not a theory. 
Nonetheless, the common perception of Kripke’s work, to the effect 
that his philosophy of language – particularly his thesis that proper 
names and natural kind terms are ‘rigid designators’ – has wide-ranging 
epistemological and metaphysical implications, is accurate in an 
important sense. 
The background, indispensable in our conceptualizing the world, is 
reflected in our language. Linguistic conventions comprise many tacit 
rules, some of which, as I tried to show, express metaphysical 
assumptions which we maintain qua human beings.12 
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Consistency as a tool for 
interpreting the Philosophical Investigations 
Leon Weber  
(University of Bamberg) 
Interpreting Wittgenstein’s work is not an easy task. This becomes 
apparent when considering the debate on how the Tractatus logico-
philosophicus is to be understood. In addition to the Tractatus, the 
Philosophical Investigations also do not suggest an indisputable 
interpretation. Therefore, in this paper, I will present an argument for 
Diamond’s reading of the Investigations. I will argue that a certain set 
of readings implies a self-contradiction, while Diamond’s approach 
succeeds in avoiding this: Kripke’s understanding of the 
Investigations will serve as an example for those self-contradictory 
readings.  
1. Kripke’s reading
Let me first depict Kripke’s exegesis of the Investigations. For this, I will 
follow Stegmüller’s account. Kripke uses the rule-following paradox as a 
key to the Investigations. This paradox can be paraphrased by three 
questions: 
(I) What constitutes the fact that I am following this rule rather than another 
one? […] (II) What constitutes the fact that I am referring to something specific 
by using some word like ‘green’ or ‘pain’? (III) What constitutes the fact that I 
have understood some term like ‘green’ or ‘pain’?1 
According to Kripke, Wittgenstein asks which fact constitutes rule-
following. This can be understood as a demand for a set of necessary 
and sufficient conditions. If and only if those conditions are satisfied, 
could one be justified in calling something ‘rule-following’. Kripke’s 
position is that there is no such finite set of conditions.2 
1 Wolfgang Stegmüller, Kripkes Deutung der Spätphilosophie Wittgensteins: 
Kommentarversuch über einen versuchten Kommentar (Stuttgart: A. Kröner, 1986), 10. 
My translation. 
2 Cf. ibid. 
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In his view, Wittgenstein denies the existence of such a set, because 
the way in which we learn rule-following does not allow us to conceive of 
all of its necessary and sufficient conditions. He gives the rule of 
addition as an example: 
Let me suppose, for example, that ‘68 + 57’ is a computation that I have never 
performed before. Since I have performed – even silently to myself, let alone in 
my publicly observable behavior – only finitely many computations in the past, 
such an example surely exists. In fact, the same finitude guarantees that there is 
an example exceeding, in both its arguments, all previous computations. I shall 
assume in what follows that ‘68 + 57’ serves for this purpose as well. […] Now 
suppose I encounter a bizarre sceptic. […] After all, he says, if I am now so 
confident that, as I used the symbol ‘+’, my intention was that ‘68 + 57’ should 
turn out to denote 125, this cannot be because I explicitly gave myself 
instructions that 125 is the result of performing the addition in this particular 
instance. By hypothesis, I did no such thing. But of course the idea is that, in 
this new instance, I should apply the very same function or rule that I applied so 
many times in the past. But who is to say what function this was? In the past I 
gave myself only a finite number of examples instantiating this function. All, we 
have supposed, involved numbers smaller than 57.3 
In everyday life, we learn the rule of addition by considering single 
instances of its application. The set comprised of all those instances can 
never contain every possible addition. There are always instances of rule-
following which have not been actualised yet. Considering addition, this 
means that there is always a pair of numbers which has never been 
added by anyone and thus, no one could have learned how to add those 
specific figures. It is obvious that this paradox is not restricted to the 
domain of mathematics, but extends to every context in which the notion 
of rule-following is important. 
This paradox has serious consequences for our understanding of 
language. One of our most fundamental assumptions concerning verbal 
communication seems to be that a given word stands for the same entity 
in all – or at least, in most – situations. If a speaker A uses a word x at 
one point in time t0, then the assumption would be that the meaning of 
x stays the same in later points of time ty. But since he learned how to 
use x in a finite set of situations and the context can be dramatically 
altered at ty, the use of x is an instance of the rule-following paradox. 
There is no way to determine if A follows a certain rule by using x and 
3 Saul Kripke, Wittgenstein on rules and private language: an elementary exposition 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1982), 8. 
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thus, communication appears to be impossible. This seems to imply that 
there is no other option but to accept a radical nihilism when it comes to 
concepts and meanings.4 
However, Kripke’s Wittgenstein shows us an alleged way out of this 
nihilism: 
The entire ‘game’ […] – that the community attributes a concept to an individual 
so long as he exhibits sufficient conformity, under test circumstances, to the 
behavior of the community – would lose its point outside a community that 
generally agrees in its practices. If one person when asked to compute ‘68 + 57’ 
answered ‘125’, another ‘5’, and another ‘13’, if there was no general agreement 
in the community responses, the game of attributing concepts to individuals – 
as we have described it – could not exist.5 
In Kripke’s opinion, the private language argument gives us reason to 
think that language cannot function at all if there is not a community of 
speakers that defines the practices in which the use of language makes 
sense.6 Since we obviously have access to language, there must be a 
community that gives us the ability to engage in linguistic practices and 
consequently, to follow rules. The truth conditions are replaced by 
conditions of warranted assertion, grounded in the circumstances under 
which people do, in fact, attribute sensations to themselves and to 
others.7 So, the private language argument helps to conclude that the 
presence of a community allows speakers to use language despite the 
rule-following paradox. 
3. Self-contradiction
However, this reading leads to a self-contradiction in the Investigations. 
Wittgenstein states: 
Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces 
anything.--Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain. For 
what is hidden, for example, is of no interest to us. One might also give the 
4 Stegmüller, Kripkes Deutung der Spätphilosophie Wittgensteins, 80. 
5 Kripke, Wittgenstein on rules and private language, 96. 
6 Cf. Derek McDougall, “The Role Of Philosophical Investigations § 258: What Is ‘The 
Private Language Argument’?,” in Analytic Philosophy, no. 1 (2013), 71. 
7 Cf. ibid., 66. 
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name ‘philosophy’ to what is possible before all new discoveries and 
inventions.8 
Here, Wittgenstein explicitly states that philosophy does not explain or 
conclude anything. Obviously, for him, philosophy is a purely descriptive 
enterprise. Consequently, philosophizing does not serve a critical 
function. If this statement is considered in conjunction with Kripke’s 
reading of the rule-paradox and its sceptical solution via the private 
language argument, then it becomes apparent that, for Kripke, the 
different language games in the community of speakers cannot be 
hierarchical. There cannot be a set of language games that is more 
justified than another one, because otherwise the notion of ‘more 
justified’ language games would serve a critical function – inasmuch as 
they would serve to criticize the ‘less justified’ ones – and this is 
explicitly excluded by the passage from the Investigations quoted above. 
Hence, following Kripke’s reading there can be no privileged set of 
language games. Hösle identifies this assumption as a self-
contradiction: 
How can someone be justified in stating that every language game works well 
without any philosophical regulation while fiercely criticizing traditional 
philosophy? And how can one state that ‘philosophy leaves everything as it is’ 
without self-contradiction, while this statement is obviously directed against 
those language games that aim to alter things in philosophy?9 
The statement that there is no set of privileged language games can itself 
be understood as a criticism of all those language games which privilege 
some language games. Thus, all of the purely descriptive ‘conservative’ 
language games which do not privilege other language games can be 
considered to be privileged. Since the existence of a set of privileged 
language games was denied in the initial statement, it is self-
contradictory. And because this initial statement follows from Kripke’s 
reading of the Investigations, the interpretation leads to a self-
contradiction. 
8 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, translated by G. E. M. Anscombe 
(New York: Macmillan, 1963), §126. 
9 Vittorio Hösle, Die Krise der Gegenwart und die Verantwortung der Philosophie 
(München: C.H. Beck, 1997), 84. My translation. 
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3. Diamond’s Reading
Still, there are readings of the Investigations that do not lead to 
aforementioned self-contradiction. One of those is Diamond’s exegesis, 
as I will argue. According to Hunziker, Diamond opposes Kripke’s 
reading: 
The ramified debate concerning Wittgenstein’s concept of rule-following 
illustrates the tendency of the metaphysical spirit to misread such statements 
made by Wittgenstein. They are conceived as being transcendental philosophy 
and thus claiming that the capacity for language […] is a necessary condition for 
things like hope. Kripke’s conception of the ‘rule-following paradox’ […] is a 
particularly prominent example for this phenomenon: If one could describe the 
meaning of ‘meaning’ by referring to assertibility conditions, then it would be 
possible to give a theory of meaning that would be rather independent of the 
‘whirl of life’. It would be independent of the form of life in which the word or 
sentence is uttered.10 
She rejects the understanding of the Investigations as a work of 
transcendental philosophy in which the conditions of the possibility of 
language are laid down. Rather, she reads it as a comprehensive 
criticism of metaphysics. For her, a central feature of metaphysics is the 
notion ‘must’.11 She thinks of metaphysics as the form of inquiry which 
examines entities by laying down necessary conditions for the possibility 
of the thing. In her opinion, the Investigations oppose such a way of 
philosophizing and the text seems to support that hypothesis: 
For we can avoid ineptness or emptiness in our assertions only by presenting 
the model as what it is, as an object of comparison—as, so to speak, a 
measuring-rod; not as a preconceived idea to which reality must correspond. 
(The dogmatism into which we fall so easily in doing philosophy.)12 
Here, Wittgenstein explicitly states that a certain emptiness of assertions 
can be avoided when one does not include necessary conditions in it. For 
Diamond’s Wittgenstein, the alternative to this metaphysical way of 
doing philosophy is attentiveness towards the role which the subject of 
10 Andreas Hunziker, Das Wagnis des Gewöhnlichen: Ein Versuch über den Glauben im 
Gespräch mit Ludwig Wittgenstein und Stanley Cavell (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 
30-31. My translation. 
11 Cf. ibid., 12-13. 
12 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §131. 
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inquiry plays in our forms of life. She elucidates this by giving the 
example of hope: 
[W]hen he [Wittgenstein; L.W.] says that only those who have mastered the use 
of a language can hope […], he does not mean that hoping is a logical 
achievement of some sort, dependent upon mastery of language, but rather that, 
as he puts it, the phenomena of hope are modes of this complicated form of life’ 
(that is, of life with language)13. 
The mentioned passage by Wittgenstein can be read in at least two ways. 
Either one assumes that hoping is only possible for those beings which 
have mastered the use of language or he simply wants to draw attention 
to the fact that hope plays a role in our forms of life as talking beings. 
Kripke’s interpretation would probably suggest the former 
understanding, because he inquires into language (or rule-following) by 
exhibiting necessary conditions for its existence. Diamond opts for the 
alternative and reads the remark as a nudge to consider the role that 
hope plays in our forms of life. She suggests that this way the desire for 
further analysis of the subject of inquiry will fade.14 Reconsidering the 
example of hope, this would mean that if we realize which role hope 
plays in our forms of life, then we would be contented with the insights 
gained, and the motivational basis of further inquiries using 
transcendental philosophy would have vanished. 
4. No self-contradiction
This should be sufficient to explain how Diamond’s reading of the 
Investigations avoids the inconsistency identified by Hösle. For her, the 
Investigations simply are not about non-privileged language games. 
They are concerned with the understanding of certain concepts by 
looking at the forms of life in which those concepts play a role. This 
attentiveness towards forms of life makes further inquiries obsolete. 
This explains how the Investigations can have an obviously critical 
function and still claim that philosophy leaves everything as it was:15 
Wittgenstein observed that a certain approach towards philosophical 
13 Diamond, “Wittgenstein and Metaphysics,” 21. 
14 Cf. Hunziger, Das Wagnis des Gewöhnlichen, 11.  
15 Cf. Hösle, Die Krise der Gegenwart und die Verantwortung der Philosophie. 
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topics (the analysis of forms of life) makes our desire for further 
philosophical investigation go away. In this way, it is critical of other 
types of philosophy by leaving everything as it was. On this reading, the 
self-contradiction has vanished. 
Measured against consistency, Diamond’s reading of the 
Investigation is superior to Kripke’s. She avoids the inconsistency which 
Kripke’s exegesis necessarily implies. Maybe there are other 
considerations that would favor Kripke’s approach. This paper is not 
supposed to settle the question of which is the right interpretation of the 
Investigations. It is supposed to give an argument for Diamond’s 
reading. As already mentioned in the footnote above, I am not sure if the 
contrast between Diamond’s and Kripke’s reading is as sharp as 
Diamond thinks. Some passages in Kripke’s Wittgenstein on rules seem 
to suggest that his interpretation can be understood as a therapeutic 
approach as well. Still, I think that Hösles argument poses a challenge 
for every reading of the Investigations that is metaphysical in the sense 
mentioned above. 
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Metaphysics for limited beings: how scientific practice leads 
to methodological concerns in metaphysics 
Mads Goddiksen 
(Aarhus University) 
In this essay, I discuss a particular approach to philosophy that is 
sometimes labeled metaphysics. The aim of this approach is to unite 
all human knowledge into one grand logical system which is 
constructed through a search for the most general metaphysical 
truths and their relation to all other truths. I will argue that this 
approach has severe weaknesses. The result that we could hope to 
gain from this approach is a better understanding of the internal 
relations in scientific knowledge and the relation between scientific 
knowledge and other types of knowledge. However, I will argue that 
the methodology that this approach employs prevents any deep 
understanding of scientific knowledge. Fitting scientific theories and 
laws into logically consistent systems of propositions can only be 
done at the cost of severe distortion and loss of understanding. The 
final part of the essay therefore suggests a different approach to 
metaphysics that is more suitable for limited beings   
1. Introduction
Every field has its favorite examples. They appear repeatedly in papers 
and textbooks and are passed on from teacher to student as illustrations 
and partial definitions of concepts and problems. Philosophy is no 
different. In the philosophy of mind, the examples tend to be bloody and 
action packed. If I try to punch my enemy in the nose, but miss, will it 
then be an intentional act? If I do not miss, will my enemy’s feeling of 
pain be equivalent to, supervenient on, or quite different from a brain 
state?  
In other fields within philosophy, the examples are a bit duller. 
Those who work with truth theory seem to have an obsession with cats 
(or is it mats?), and in metaphysics there seems to be a particular 
preference for the following sentence: 
Water is H2O. 
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There is much that can be, and has been, discussed about this sentence. 
Is it a necessary truth? And, if so, what kind of necessary truth?1,2 Is it a 
metaphysical truth? Or is it based on an even more fundamental truth 
about “the very nature” of water? Or even the very nature of being?3   
I will not venture into the details of these discussions. Instead, I will 
challenge the basic assumptions of these discussions by pointing to 
some fairly obvious lessons about general statements like “Water is 
H2O”, which can be drawn from everyday experience. These will be 
supplemented with lessons from the philosophy of science about 
scientific theories and human understanding. In Section 4, I will discuss 
the implications these lessons have for current discussions about what 
the aims and methods of metaphysics should be. 
2. Stating the obvious
The questions raised by metaphysicians about the sentence “Water is 
H2O” mainly concern what kind of truth it states. These discussions 
seem to miss a very important fact: 
The sentence “Water is H2O” does not state a truth at all!4 
The sentence can be read in at least two different ways. Firstly, we can 
read it as a statement of identity: “Water is (the same as) H2O.” This is 
the way it is used in most contexts and certainly the way Putnam reads it 
when he discusses whether or not water could be something other than 
H2O on Twin Earth.5 We can also read it as stating a property of water. 
This would make the sentence analogous to the sentence “snow is 
white”. While this reading might make the sentence true, it will also fail 
1Hilary Putnam, "Meaning and Reference," The Journal of Philosophy 70, no. 19, 
Seventieth Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Association Eastern Division 
(Nov. 8, 1973), 699-711. 
2Saul A. Kripke, Naming and Necessity, reprinted ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988). 
3Kit Fine, "What is Metaphysics?," in Contemporary Aristotelian Metaphysics, ed. Tuomas 
E. Tahko (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 8-25. 
4Hasok Chang, Is Water H2O?: Evidence, Realism and Pluralism (New York: Springer, 
2012) reaches a similar conclusion based on an illuminating historical and philosophical 
discussion. 
5Putnam, Meaning and Reference, 699-711. 
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to represent the use of the relation between “water” and “H2O”. In 
science classes, for instance, the teacher might say “water”, but (s)he 
writes “H2O” on the blackboard.     
Reading “water is H2O” in the usual way, i.e. as a statement of 
identity, makes the sentence false in a world governed by a two-valued 
logic - i.e. a world where a statement that is not absolutely true is false. 
This should be obvious to any student in metaphysics who ventures 
down into the messy world of the senses even for a brief moment. 
As an illustration we can consider the following piece of fiction: 
Not so long ago there was a very famous professor in metaphysics who 
traveled the world and gave lectures on the nature of all being. As an 
experienced lecturer, he knew that it was important to have concrete 
things and examples to point to while presenting his clear cut, precise 
and very abstract arguments. Therefore, he always carried an empty 
bottle with him on his travels (airport security is so tight these days!). 
Just before giving his lecture, he would find a tap and fill the bottle with 
water. When he got to the point in his lecture where an example was 
needed he could point to his bottle and say, “In this bottle I have some 
water, and, as we all know, water is H2O.” No one would usually object 
to this.  
Of course, if the famous professor had opened the bottle and tasted the 
liquid inside it, he could easily have convinced himself that water is not 
just H2O. In some places, he would be able to taste that the liquid 
contained not only hydrogen and oxygen, but also chlorine. He might 
even be able to taste that the amount of calcium in the water differs from 
one region to another (and if not, to see it, he need only compare the 
showerheads in a couple of the different hotel rooms he stayed in). The 
downside to this empirical adventure is, of course, that it might be 
dangerous; in some places the tap water is safe to drink, while in other 
places it can give you a very painful reminder of the material aspects of 
the human body.  
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3. What is Water ?
This false tale reminds us that if we take samples of water from different 
places and submit them to thorough chemical analysis, the results will 
not be identical. Certainly, most of the samples will contain mainly 
oxygen and hydrogen, and most will contain twice as much hydrogen as 
oxygen. The majority of these atoms will also most likely be bound 
together in H2O molecules, but that does not change the fact that the 
sample will almost certainly contain other things than H2O. Thus, the 
statement that “water is H2O” is not an unconditional truth at all, but a 
convenient approximation that is useful in most contexts.6 An important 
thing to learn when learning to use such approximations is when not to 
use them, i.e. know when the approximation fails. H2O has some very 
beneficial properties: it can quench your thirst, clean your equipment, 
even the more delicate parts of it, and it is highly useful as a solvent, for 
instance in a chemistry lab. Liquids that can be referred to as water both 
in daily and scientific discourse usually have the same properties. 
However, if you are lost at sea, you should take care to note that the 
water that surrounds you will only make you thirstier. Furthermore, 
anyone who has spent time in a chemistry lab knows that using the 
wrong kind of water may ruin the experiment or even damage the 
expensive equipment. It is, thus, not very difficult to find contexts where 
it would be wrong, even dangerous, to treat water as identical to H2O.  
3.1. Objections 
The famous professor in metaphysics, and others, might object to all 
this nonsense. Surely water is H2O, and what the professor had in his 
bottle was just water with something in it.  
This objection rests on an unfaithful reconstruction of what 
happened when the professor filled his bottle. When he turned on the 
tap and filled up his bottle, he filled it up with water, not water with 
6Wimsatt would call it a heuristic. William C. Wimsatt, Re-Engineering Philosophy for 
Limited Beings: Piecewise Approximations to Reality (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2007). Cartwright would say that the law is true only ceteris paribus. Nancy 
Cartwright, How the Laws of Physics Lie, repr. ed. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984). 
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added substances. That is what anyone, even a chemist, would say in the 
given context. To say that he filled it with water with added substances 
would be to distort the ordinary use of the word ‘water’ and would force 
us to draw absurd conclusions. For instance, it would then be wrong to 
say that humans drink water, since water (i.e. H2O without added 
substances) is not found anywhere on the planet, except perhaps in 
laboratories.   
So what the professor filled into his bottle was water. However, I 
will grant that if the bottle with the same content were put in a different 
context, for instance in the hands of a chemist in her lab, it would 
contain water with added substances. This is because the adequate 
description of the content of the bottle is not solely determined by the 
content of the bottle; it also depends on the context in which the bottle 
and its contents are used.7,8 As mentioned before, the heuristic that 
“Water is H2O” is safe to use in most contexts, but in the context of a 
chemistry lab it is not safe. Here a slightly different heuristic may apply: 
demineralized water is H2O. But, of course, even this heuristic can fail, 
and the chemist needs to learn when and how to act if it does. 
So it turns out that what metaphysicians and others have treated as a 
simple, even necessary, truth is not a general truth after all. The problem 
here is not the choice of example! Given the analyses of Wimsatt9 and/or 
Cartwright10, all general statements that scientists use are best 
characterized as heuristics, or ceteris paribus laws. For instance, 
Cartwright11 shows that “‘fundamental” laws, like Newton’s Law of 
Gravitation or Coulomb’s Law, are false unless they are read as ceteris 
paribus laws. These “laws” work in many (even most) contexts, but in 
some contexts they are insufficient (and, strictly speaking, wrong) and 
other, perhaps less general, heuristics must be put to use. 
7Bas C. Van Fraassen, Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010). 
8The fact that the content of the bottle plays a very important role in determining the 
adequate description of the content of the bottle means that it is very hard to imagine a 
context in which the content of the bottle is adequately described as marmalade or plastic. 
9Wimsatt, Re-Engineering Philosophy for Limited Beings : Piecewise Approximations to 
Reality. 
10Cartwright, How the Laws of Physics Lie. 
11Nancy Cartwright, The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science 
(Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
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Following this discussion, the metaphysician might grant me that 
“water is H2O” and other similar statements are not exact truths. In 
return, I have to recognize that it is a very good approximation to a 
general truth. So perhaps the mistake the metaphysician is making is 
not all that important?  
I have no problem granting the strength of the approximation, but 
as I will argue in the next section, it makes quite a big difference for the 
possibilities of a certain type of metaphysics whether we treat statements 
like “water is H2O” as truths or as very useful approximations. This is 
especially so if we simultaneously accept that we humans have limited 
cognitive capabilities.     
4. Metaphysics as the search for fundamental truths
In the following sections, I will discuss the general view that a certain 
type of philosophy, usually referred to as metaphysics, should aim to 
provide us with a fundamental framework that can be used to 
understand all knowledge possessed by humans, and that this 
framework should be developed through the study of the most general 
features of reality.   
There are many disagreements about whether it is possible, and, if 
so, how to define the methods and subject matter of metaphysics.12 My 
aim here is not to give a general definition of metaphysics nor to dismiss 
the field as a whole. My aim is to challenge a certain vision for a type of 
philosophy that happens to be called metaphysics by those in favor of it.  
The question I raise in this essay is what consequences the view of 
scientific knowledge that I have sketched above, has for this specific kind 
of metaphysics. 
An important first thing to note about this philosophical practice is 
that the aim of the practice is widely accepted to be unattainable. For 
instance, Gracia argues that “[m]etaphysics is an ongoing and never-
ending enterprise, with no claim to finality”.13 Thus, when considering 
the value of such a practice, we must consider the costs and benefits in 
12Jorge J. E. Gracia, Metaphysics and its Task: The Search for the Categorical Foundation 
of Knowledge. (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999). 
13Ibid., p. 158. 
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relation to the pursuit of an unattainable goal. This means that what we 
need to consider is not what we would gain if we attained the goal, but 
rather the benefits of pursuing this goal.  
Of course, we cannot consider this unless we further specify what 
this process consists in. I will therefore briefly consider two 
contemporary accounts of how such an all-encompassing system of 
knowledge propositions should be constructed, namely the accounts by 
Kit Fine14  and Jorge Gracia15 . Common to these accounts is that they 
start from a study of the most general and proceed down through the 
layers of generality using logic as an essential tool.  
4.1. Contemporary Examples 
Fine’s discussion of the aim and method of metaphysics rests on the 
concept of eidictic statements. Eidictic statements concern the nature of 
reality. Fine’s paradigmatic example is (of course) “water is H2O”16. A 
statement is eidictic as to content if it explicitly refers to the nature of 
reality, e.g. “water is by its nature H2O”.  Fine now gives the following 
description of the aim of metaphysics: 
Metaphysics should attempt to provide a foundation for all truths eidictic as to 
content; and what […] provides the foundation are the metaphysical truths 
eidictic as to content along with […] other possible truths that are not eidictic as 
to content. Thus given the non-edictic truths, the edictic truths of metaphysics 
will provide a foundation for all other edictic truths 17 
Gracia sees this project as too limited, and argues that metaphysics has 
been, and should continue to be an even broader study of the most 
general categories, and on the relation between less general categories 
and these most general categories. In this way, according to Gracia, 
metaphysics will attempt to build a foundation of all human 
knowledge18. Common to the two projects is that they focus on the 
14Fine, What is Metaphysics? 
15Gracia, Metaphysics and its Task: The Search for the Categorical Foundation of 
Knowledge. 
16Fine, What is Metaphysics?, p. 10. 
17Ibid., p. 11 
18Gracia, Metaphysics and its Task: The Search for the Categorical Foundation of 
Knowledge, p. 220. 
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establishment of logical relations among propositions assumed to be 
true. This is obviously so in the project described by Fine, but also 
implicitly so in Gracia’s description, to the extent that he describes 
metaphysics as investigating the logical relations between definitions of 
categories. If such relations are to establish a foundation of our 
knowledge, it seems crucial that the definitions of both the most general 
categories and at least some of the less general categories are true 
propositions.  
4.2. Lessons from the Philosophy of Science 
Two lessons from the philosophy of science indicate that these projects 
are far too ambitious. First of all, many philosophers now hold the so 
called semantic view of scientific theories.19,20 This view denies that 
scientific theories are sets of propositions connected through logic. 
Rather, scientific theories should be viewed as sets of abstract models. 
This means that if all of our current scientific theories are to be fitted 
into a vast network of propositions, the metaphysician is faced with a 
tremendous translational task. Even if such translation is possible, the 
ambitious metaphysician is still faced with a second challenge. As 
argued in the first three sections of this essay, it is too simplified to view 
such general claims about nature as simple truths, they must be 
considered as context-dependent, ceteris paribus truths. Thus, a 
metaphysical system consisting of presumed true propositions will only 
give us a very inexact picture of our scientific knowledge and everyday 
knowledge.  
A metaphysical system that relies so heavily on approximations will 
never be able to serve as a foundation of our current knowledge. Thus, if 
metaphysics is the search for a foundation of all knowledge, as both Fine 
and Gracia define it to be, we should consider finding a new 
methodology, since the one outlined so far cannot provide the 
foundation sought after. However, there may be another important 
19Bas C. Van Fraassen, The Scientific Image (Oxford: Clarendon, 1980). 
20Ronald N. Giere, Explaining Science: A Cognitive Approach (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago 
Press, 1988). 
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reason why we may still want to pursue the construction of this kind of 
metaphysical system. 
Approximations are not problematic in themselves. Approximations 
can be extremely useful if they help us to understand the world we live 
in. Thus, if we have reason to believe that we might gain some additional 
understanding from the construction of a grand metaphysical system, 
we could consider whether the necessary approximations would be 
justified. Fine does not seem optimistic about this matter. The idea of a 
metaphysical explanation is, for him, “somewhat obscure”21. He 
suspects that simply a logical relation, as opposed to an explanatory 
relation, between the various eidictic truths will be sufficient for the aim 
of metaphysics. Similarly Gracia does not state that anything more than 
a logical connection between categories is required in order for us to 
have achieved a successful metaphysical system.22  
In the philosophy of science literature, we find arguments that 
indicate that there is a limit to the extent to which complex logical 
systems can improve our understanding of the world. These arguments 
support Fine’s doubt whether a metaphysical system will explain 
anything.    
In relation to discussions on the philosophical interpretations of 
quantum physics, James Cushing 23 argued that humans are only 
capable of understanding certain types of explanations. Thus,  in some 
cases there might be a qualitative difference between the best 
description (in the sense that it has the highest degree of empirical 
21Fine, What is Metaphysics?, p. 11. 
22These thoughts seem to be compatible with a unificationist view of explanation. See for 
instance: Michael Friedman, "Explanation and Scientific Understanding," The Journal of 
Philosophy 71, no. 1 (1974), 5-19.; or Philip Kitcher and Wesley C. Salmon, Scientific 
Explanation (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989). According to this view, 
we explain something by subsuming it under a general framework that encompasses many 
other things that were in need of explanation. So maybe the idea of constructing such a 
system in order to explain and understand the world we live in is not so “obscure” after 
all.The unificationist view of explanation has received severe criticisms over the past years 
(e.g. James Woodward, Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2003)., Ch 8), but I do not think this criticism shows that it 
would be impossible to gain genuine understanding from the metaphysics outlines by 
Fine and Gracia. What the explanation literature certainly has taught us is that a unified 
view of nature is not necessary for our understanding of it. 
23James T. Cushing, "Quantum Theory and Explanatory Discourse: Endgame for 
Understanding?" Philosophy of Science 58, no. 3 (1991), 337-358. 
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adequacy) of a class of phenomena – for instance radioactive decay or the 
formation of matter – and the best explanation of these phenomena (in 
the sense that it provides the most understanding of these 
phenomena).24 Quantum physics probably provides the best examples of 
this. The Standard Model, for instance, allows physicists to predict the 
properties of all known elementary particles with incredible precision. If 
there has ever been a scientific theory that is empirically adequate, it is 
the Standard Model. Yet, for all its predictive precision many feel that 
the theory provides little understanding, partly because it has very 
counter-intuitive elements. Hence, physics lecturers often quote Richard 
Friedman25 to the students who want to understand quantum 
mechanics: “Shut up and calculate!” 
My point here is not that we should not try to understand quantum 
mechanics. My point is that if one is developing a metaphysical system 
for the purpose of gaining understanding – remember we gave up 
finding a logical foundation for our scientific knowledge when 
approximating ceteris paribus laws with true propositions - it may not be 
enough to require that we can make logical connections between the 
most general and the most particular, since this will not ensure that 
understanding is provided.   
The reason for this is to be found in the human mind26. As a 
species, we are well adapted to survive in a world filled with objects 
behaving according to classical physics.27 Would it be surprising if this 
ability came at a small cost, for instance, that we are unable to truly 
24This argument put limitations on claims made by proponents of the epistemic theory 
referred to as ‘inference to the best explanation’ (see for instance Peter Lipton, Inference to 
the Best Explanation, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge/Taylor and Francis Group, 2004)). 
Though the heuristic that the loveliest explanations (i.e. those that provide the most 
understanding) is also the likeliest (as in likeliest to be true) might be very efficient in 
general, it is important to know that this does not apply to explanations of the very small or 
the very big.  
25 Or is it David Mermin? N. D. Mermin, "Could Feynman have said this?" Physics Today 
57, no. 5 (2004). 
26For further perspectives on the link between explanation and human cognition see Frank 
C. Keil and Robert A. Wilson, eds., Explanation and Cognition (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
The MIT Press, 2000). 
27Alison Gopnik, "Explanation as Orgasm and the Drive for Causal Knowledge: The 
Function, Evolution, and Phenomenology of the Theory Formation System," in 
Explanation and Cognition, eds. Frank C. Keil and Robert A. Wilson (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2000), p. 299-325. 
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grasp the behavior of elementary particles and black holes, unless we 
were able to talk about them in ways that are sufficiently similar to the 
ones we normally use?  
4.3. Not suitable for fallible beings 
What I have argued so far does not show that the projects outlined by 
Fine and Gracia could not possibly increase our understanding of the 
world we live in. However, my argument does show that if the projects 
are to increase our understanding, we may well have to require more 
than simply a logical relation among presumed truths to achieve it. 
As we saw, the problem is that humans are limited beings, which 
means that the theories and explanations that can benefit us are not only 
constrained by the world around us, but also by our own cognitive 
capabilities. 
Humans are limited beings in another respect as well: we are fallible 
in our reasoning.  This basic condition of human existence provides us 
with an additional reason why we should consider choosing a different 
approach to metaphysics than the ones outlined by Fine and Gracia.  
Consider a fallible metaphysician who wishes to argue for p on the 
basis of either one of the supposedly true premises  q and r. Arguing 
from q to p involves n steps, while arguing from r to p involves n+m 
steps (m>0). Since the metaphysician is fallible, there is a non-zero 
chance of him making a mistake for each step he makes. Now, in the 
simplest model, where the probability of making a mistake during each 
step is constant, it is obviously preferable for the logician to argue from 
q and not r. In general,28 the result is the same: “fallible thinkers should 
avoid long serial chains of reasoning”.29 
The metaphysician may grant me this and accept that metaphysics 
is very difficult. He could then object that the argument does not show 
that the top-down approach that I have discussed so far is more difficult 
than a more bottom-up approach that starts from less general knowledge 
and tries to abstract more general knowledge from it. Arguing for this, 
28Wimsatt, Re-Engineering Philosophy for Limited Beings : Piecewise Approximations to 
Reality, Ch. 4. 
29Ibid. p. 49 
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he could say that there is no a priori reason to think that it will take 
fewer steps to go from the most general to the more particular than the 
other way. This would be true, except that in the top-down approach one 
would have to argue for what the most general is, which, by the way, is 
what many of the metaphysicians of the past two and a half millennia 
have argued over.  
Furthermore, fallible beings should reconsider constructing a 
system of knowledge from the top down because the strength of such a 
system will be highly dependent on the strength of a few general claims 
and the claimed connections between these claims and less general 
claims. This makes the system extremely fragile. Should one of these 
general claims turn out to be wrong, the consequences for the rest of the 
system would be devastating.  A system of propositions that is built from 
the bottom up will be much less vulnerable when errors occur (see 
Figure 1).       
Figure 1: Two systems of propositions, constructed through different approaches. The 
advantage of the bottom-up approach is that it makes the system much more robust. 
Thus, a fallible being who wants to construct a strong system of 
knowledge should (ceteris paribus) start from the less general and work 
his way up towards the most general instead of starting from the most 
general and work his way down. Such a bottom-up approach would not 
198 
only rely less on the truth of single propositions for its strength, it would 
also have other advantages, to which I will now turn.       
5. Metaphysics for limited beings
No science is free of what we might call metaphysical 
assumptions— i.e. assumptions that are presupposed in the empirical 
exploration of nature. Scientists and other members of 
society recognize that there is a need to explicate these assumptions and 
to discuss their advantages and limitations. There is no 
question that philosophy can and should be an important voice in such 
discussions. However, the recognition that there is a need 
for philosophy does not mean that all kinds of philosophy are 
equally valuable. So far, I have characterized a particular kind 
of metaphysics – and thus a kind of philosophy – that seeks to 
create a unified system of presumed true propositions that encompasses 
all human knowledge by starting from the most 
general and working its way down to the most particular. We have seen 
that this approach to philosophy has severe limitations. Choosing a more 
practice-oriented and in a sense more bottom-up approach to philosophy 
would increase the robustness of the system that is constructed, but it 
would also allow the philosopher to construct a view of current science 
that distorts the products of science to a lesser extent and thus provides a 
better understanding of these products. 
Take causation as an example. This is certainly a general category or 
concept that is used in many sciences, and sometimes in 
counterproductive ways. A philosophical analysis of causation 
will definitely be valuable in its own right and as an input to various 
discussions in science and society. My point here is that 
such an analysis is more fruitful if it starts from the actual practices of 
speaking about and working with causation. Understanding (or 
improving) these complex practices will require the 
use of abstractions and approximations. But our understanding need 
not, and should not, start from one general definition of what causation 
is and how it ought to be used. We will be much better suited for 
choosing the fruitful and appropriate approximations if we start by 
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considering the actual diverse practices and their aims. Through this 
approach we might be able, with time and effort, to understand how 
causation is used in, for instance, biology or Patagonian literature. We 
may also come to understand why it used in these ways in the given 
practices and attempt to evaluate this usage given an analysis of the aims 
of these practices. We might even try to understand the relation between 
causation in biology and Patagonian literature. I take it to be an 
empirical question whether or not such a comparison would show 
significant similarities. It might turn out that they have so little in 
common that it makes little sense to say that causation means 
the same thing in the two practices. However, this does 
not mean that the analysis of causation in biology or 
Patagonian literature is worthless, or that we cannot achieve a unified 
account of causation in, say, biology and chemistry. What it does mean 
is that a definition of causation that captures every use of the concept is 
unachievable.           
More generally: What a philosopher aiming to understand the 
relations between different domains of knowledge can do is to try and 
connect the clusters of heuristics used in various practices into 
new and perhaps bigger clusters. In some cases, the connection formed 
in these new clusters may be strictly logical, but disclosing other, or 
perhaps additional, relations, such as various explanatory relations, may 
provide important new understanding as well. In 
any case, it is important to remember the limitations of the heuristics 
when seeking connections between them in order to avoid 
overly general conclusions. This means that in order to succeed, the 
philosopher must have knowledge about the scope and limitations 
of the heuristics she is trying to unify, or at least be involved in a 
continuous discussion with people who have.       
Such a practice-oriented approach can be pursued to 
gain a deeper understanding of the practice with minimal 
distortion in the description of the tools and products of the practice. 
This approach will preserve a nuanced picture of our knowledge 
and keep us aware of the limitations to our general conclusions. 
Furthermore, it will help us to stay within our cognitive limits. 
Each step will be potentially interesting and useful for scientists who are 
usually more interested in the specific historical, social and 
200 
logical connections between their own field and other specific fields 
rather than a very general picture of how all knowledge can 
be connected; this is especially true if the more general picture 
comes at the cost of significant distortion of the practice of each field. 
Thus, this approach will be better suited to the task of answering 
the questions from scientists that Sullivan & Pannier30 state as one of 
the reasons why metaphysics is still important.   
In short, a practice oriented, more bottom-up approach to 
metaphysics has the same potential, as a top-down approach, but 
is far less vulnerable and has more immediate relevance 
for discussions outside philosophy and is thus more suited for limited 
beings like human philosophers.   
6. Conclusions
Before his analysis of the detailed characteristics of metaphysics, Fine 
remarks that: 
Metaphysics […] might be a somewhat anemic discipline – there might be very 
little for it to do. But it is also thought that metaphysics might play an important 
foundational role. It is not merely one form of enquiry among others, but one 
that is capable of providing some kind of basis or underpinning for other forms 
of enquiry.31 
In his conclusion, Fine further reflects on the possibility of metaphysics, 
and concludes that it is not unreasonable to hope that we may one day 
find the truths that underpin all others, and thus that the task of 
metaphysics is worth pursuing. 
My aim in this essay has been to argue that even though Fine may 
be right in his conclusion that metaphysics, as he describes it, is not 
impossible, it will not serve the foundational role that he and others 
want it to serve. This leads us to ask what other aims the methodology of 
metaphysics might serve and whether it is the most suited methodology 
for pursuing these aims. One important alternative aim is to increase 
30Thomas D. Sullivan and Russell Pannier, "The Bounds of Metaphysics," in: What are we 
to Understand Gracia to Mean?: Realist Challenges to Metaphysical Neutralism, ed. Robert 
A. Delfino (Kenilworth : Rodopi, 2006), p. 1-12. 
31Fine, What is Metaphysics?, p. 11 
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our understanding of the structure of our knowledge and of nature in 
general. In this essay, I have presented a number of reasons why I think 
a more bottom-up and practice-oriented approach to the study of 
scientific and everyday knowledge will be better suited for the 
philosopher pursuing this aim than the top-down approach that is often 
associated with the practice of metaphysics.32      
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Understanding the Dispute between 
Science and Metaphysics 
Shao-Pu Kang 
(National Taiwan University) 
Modern history is marked by the rapid development of science and 
technology. In such a scientific era, metaphysics is often seen as an 
anti-modern discipline of the past. The logical positivists even once 
claimed that metaphysics should be eliminated from philosophy in 
order to save the genuineness of philosophy. However, does science 
really undermine the credentials of metaphysics and render it 
redundant? This paper dismisses the dispute between science and 
metaphysics as a pseudo debate. It characterizes the dispute as one 
between one totality of statements, labeled science, and another 
totality of statements, label metaphysics. By showing that 
metaphysics has a non-empirical feature, which science lacks, it 
argues that metaphysical statements and scientific statements do not 
belong to the same kind, and ipso facto there is no common base for 
comparison. Hence, the legitimacy of metaphysics is unaffected, 
however successful science might be. In the penultimate section, it 
sketches two positive contributions metaphysics might have for 
science: first, metaphysics can explicate the concepts used in science; 
second, metaphysics can delimit the boundary of science. This paper 
does not aim to propose that metaphysics should govern scientific 
research, but rather to show that both science and metaphysics are 
legitimate fields of rational enquiry worthy of equal respect.   
1. Introduction
Kant cast doubt on the possibility of pursuing a metaphysics whose aim 
is, as traditionally conceived, to tell us the fundamental structure of 
reality as a whole.1 For him, the limit of human understanding prevents 
us from gaining knowledge of things-in-themselves. Kant argued that 
metaphysics should confine itself to the fundamental structure of our 
thought about reality, not to the structure of reality itself. The anti-
metaphysical trend of thought culminated in the works of the logical 
positivists, the most vigorous opponents of metaphysics in the twentieth 
1 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Kemp Smith (1787; repr. London: 
Macmillan, 1929), 56-57. 
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century. Ayer set up the criterion of verifiability, in terms of which a 
sentence is said to be factually significant if and only if it is verifiable in 
principle. Since no observations are relevant to determine the truth or 
falsehood of metaphysical statements, these, according to this criterion, 
are nonsensical and should thus be eliminated from philosophy in order 
to save its genuineness.2 
Although the attack of logical positivism  proved unsuccessful, 
metaphysics was far from being a legitimate field of rational enquiry 
respected by all. The twentieth century was an era characterized by the 
rapid development of science and technology, which dramatically 
changed the ways of life and the general form of culture among human 
beings. Comparatively, metaphysics hardly produced anything capable of 
increasing convenience and efficiency. This difference between science 
and metaphysics made the latter bear an image of uselessness and 
obsolescence. However, is metaphysics really a field of enquiry 
belonging only to the past? Should philosophy distance itself from 
metaphysics in order to be a genuine branch of knowledge? Or should 
metaphysics be eliminated due to the success of science? 
While the status of metaphysics might be challenged from different 
points of view, this paper focuses only on those challenges which arise 
owing to science’s great success, which metaphysics allegedly lacks. 
They might argue that in such an era marked by the advance of science, 
metaphysics becomes a field of enquiry which is not worth undertaking 
anymore. The more radical ones in the scientific camp might even 
contend that science can answer any question, and whatever science 
cannot answer is not a genuine question at all. Indeed, human 
intellectual history reveals a bitter past for philosophy, in the course of 
which various disciplines separated themselves from philosophy and 
became independent. It embarrassed philosophers even more when 
those fields of enquiry, which were no longer under the reign of 
philosophy, experienced a great breakthrough in the past four hundred 
years. However, does science really undermine the credentials of 
metaphysics and render it redundant? Can science replace metaphysics 
and take over the job to deal with such a question as what the nature of 
2 Alfred J. Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic (New York: Dover Publications, 1952), 13-29. 
206 
reality is? Before answering any similar question, we must first 
understand the nature of the dispute between science and metaphysics. 
2. The Nature of the Dispute
It is vague to say that science undermines the credentials of 
metaphysics, or that there is a dispute between them. To understand the 
dispute in question, we need to have a clearer idea about exactly (1) what 
disputes with what, (2) why there is such a dispute, and (3) in what sense 
one undermines the other. What I have in mind concerning the first 
question is that the dispute is between two sets of statements: scientific 
statements and metaphysical statements. Specifically, it is a dispute 
between one totality of statements, labeled science, and the other totality 
of statements, labeled metaphysics, not one between terms or individual 
statements taken in isolation.3 Statements labeled science include 
mathematical formulae and models, the laws of physics, and assertions 
in the special sciences;4 statements labeled metaphysics include 
statements dealing with universal, causation, and other topics often 
regarded as metaphysical ones. One should note that I am neither 
defining what a scientific (metaphysical) statement is, nor am I saying 
that all statements labeled science (metaphysics) share certain features 
necessary for being a scientific (metaphysical) statement. In my 
characterization, statements are scientific ones simply because they 
occur in disciplines generally recognized as science such as physics, 
biology, or psychology, or because they are asserted by those who are 
deemed scientists. By the same token, statements are metaphysical ones 
because they discuss issues often included in metaphysical textbooks, 
such as necessity, existence, or identity, or because they are asserted by 
those who claim to be metaphysicians. It is in this sense that I call it a 
dispute between one totality of statements labeled science and the other 
totality of statements labeled metaphysics. 
3 Hereafter I use “scientific (metaphysical) statements” and “the totality of statements 
labeled science (metaphysics)” interchangeably. 
4 One might argue that mathematical formulae and models account for the bulk of science, 
although they are not statements at all. Here I use the word “statement” in a rather broad 
sense only for the sake of argument. 
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Why is there such a dispute between science and metaphysics? 
Presumably, the dispute results from the alleged fact that both science 
and metaphysics assert something about the nature of reality in one way 
or another. For instance, physics tells us what the basic particles 
constituting reality are, biology tells us about the compositions and 
functions of various organisms, and psychology explains the relationship 
between human minds and the corresponding neural processes. On the 
other hand, metaphysics makes assertions such as: there are universals, 
physical things and physical events exhaust the whole reality, or free will 
is compatible with determinism. What follows naturally from this 
alleged fact is that people would compare science and metaphysics 
according to different criteria. 
There are various ways of comparing two systems of statements, e.g. 
we can compare them in terms of the degree of inner consistency, of the 
scope of explanation, or of simplicity. Arguably, the difference between 
science and metaphysics is marked predominantly by the fact that 
science has practical value while metaphysics lacks this. Science has 
practical value, that is, the collective work of the statements labeled 
science can produce concrete things existing in time and space, and the 
systematic employment of those things can make human life more 
efficient and convenient; metaphysics, on the contrary, enjoys no such 
practical value.5 It is in this sense that science undermines the 
credentials of metaphysics. Now we understand the dispute between 
science and metaphysics as one between one totality of statements 
labeled science and the other totality of statements labeled metaphysics; 
science challenges the legitimacy of metaphysics, and whereas both 
manage to probe into the nature of reality in one way or another, only 
science possesses practical value.  
5 I am not defining what it takes to have practical value; such words as “systematic,” 
“efficient,” or “convenient” are too vague to be constituent terms of a definition at all. That 
I characterize practical value in this way is only for the sake of discussion. In what follows I 
use “practical,” “useful” and “pragmatic” interchangeably. 
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3. Dismissing the Dispute
Science can undermine the credentials of metaphysics only if the 
dispute in question is a genuine debate. And a dispute between two 
systems of statements would not be a genuine one unless they both 
consisted of the same kind of statements. For instance, we do not 
usually compare moral judgments with scientific statements, since each 
asserts things which are quite unlike that which the other asserts. While 
science is concerned with what is, ethics copes with what ought to be, 
and that there is a gap between “is” and “ought” is widely acknowledged, 
if not accepted. The point is that if two sets of statements are not of the 
same kind, we cannot compare them, since there is no common basis 
for comparison at all. If that is the case, then for there to be a genuine 
dispute between science and metaphysics, one must presuppose that 
scientific statements and metaphysical statements belong to the same 
kind. I doubt the plausibility of this presupposition. Before entering my 
criticisms of this presupposition, let me briefly explain the strategy 
underlying my argument. Neither do I believe that there is a general and 
unambiguous criterion which enables us to draw a sharp dividing line 
between science and metaphysics, nor do I intend to define what it takes 
for a statement to be a scientific or metaphysical statement, and which 
would then allow a classification. What I do believe is, if scientific 
statements and metaphysical statements belong to the same kind, they 
must share the same features to at least a sufficiently high degree. If, 
however, we find some apparent features that scientific statements have, 
which metaphysical statements lack, or vice versa, then we have good 
reason to believe that scientific statements and metaphysical statements 
are not of the same kind. We are justified in doing so even without 
defining beforehand exactly what a scientific or metaphysical statement 
is, or what we mean with the word “kind”.  Hence, in what follows I am 
going to show some key features that science and metaphysics do not 
share. 
A particular science is supposed to deal with the nature of being of a 
particular kind, e.g. biology concerns the nature of biological organisms, 
chemistry the chemical elements, and physics the basic particles. That 
is, these particular sciences all purport to explore one certain part of 
reality. Metaphysics, however, concerns the nature of being as a whole. 
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Metaphysics is recognized as the science of “being qua being”, in the 
sense that it is the systematic study of the most fundamental structure of 
reality as a whole.6 The fact that two sets of statements assert something 
different might not be sufficient to separate scientific statements and 
metaphysical statements into two kinds. It is the “non-empirical” 
character of metaphysics – metaphysics does not typically appeal to 
experimental or observational evidence in support of its claims – that 
makes it distinct from science. For instance, in claiming that there are 
universals, it would be fruitless to try to confirm it by collecting 
empirical data, nor can it be refuted simply because all things observed 
are particular objects. Such a claim must be justified or rejected only by 
sound metaphysical arguments. This echoes what Fine believes to be 
one of the five features, which, when combined, serve to distinguish 
metaphysics from other forms of enquiry, that is, the “aprioricity” of its 
method.7 As Fine states: “The claims of science rest on observation; the 
claims of metaphysics do not, except perhaps incidentally. Its findings 
issue from the study rather than from the laboratory.”8 
The fact that metaphysical statements are non-empirical, while 
scientific statements are empirical, makes their truth-makers and the 
ways of their truth-making different. The truth-makers of scientific 
statements are facts. It is the nature of mind-independent reality that 
renders scientific statements true or false. And scientific statements are 
true by correctly representing the actual states of affairs. For instance, 
the statement “metal expands when heated” is true in virtue of its 
correctly representing the fact that metal expands when heated. The 
truth-makers of metaphysical statements, on the contrary, are 
arguments. Metaphysical truths are not, except incidentally, determined 
by empirical enquiry of whatever kind, but by arguments 
metaphysicians give. And metaphysical statements are true if they 
6 E. Jonathan. Lowe, The Possibility of Metaphysics: Substance, Identity, and Time (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 1-27. See also Lowe, A Survey of Metaphysics (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 1-20. 
7 Kit Fine, “What Is Metaphysics,” in Contemporary Aristotelian Metaphysics, ed. Tuomas 
E. Tahko (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 8-25. The five features are the 
aprioricity of the methods of metaphysics, the generality of its subject-matter, the 
transparency or “non-opacity” of its concepts, its eidicity or concern with the nature of 
things, and its role as a foundation for what there is. 
8 Ibid., 9. 
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logically follow from some finite and logically consistent class of 
metaphysical arguments. For instance, the proposition “the only things 
that exist are physical objects and physical events” is true since 
physicalism, let us say, logically follows from some logically consistent 
class of metaphysical arguments, while mind-body dualism or idealism 
does not. 
Now we get a clearer picture on how metaphysics differs from 
science: metaphysial statements have a non-empirical feature which 
scientific statements lack, and ipso facto both their truth-makers and the 
ways of their truth-making are different. As I have said, two sets of 
statements are comparable only if they belong to the same kind. Though 
both concern the nature of reality, scientific statements and 
metaphysical statements are not comparable, since the targeted fields of 
science are certain parts of reality, while metaphysics aims to illustrate 
the nature of reality taken as a whole. Science makes claims about the 
empirical world, while metaphysics does not aim to represent the 
empirical world which is, in principle, if not in practice, observable 
through sense-perception. Scientific statements and metaphysical 
statements have their own truth-makers and their specific ways of truth-
making, and the truth-makers of scientific statements cannot render 
metaphysical statements true or false, and vice versa. The conclusion we 
arrive at here is, scientific statements and metaphysical statements are 
not of the same kind, and thus the dispute between them is not a 
genuine one. By this very fact, the credentials of metaphysics is 
unaffected by the great success that science has achieved. 
4. Possible Objections
Objection 1: The usefulness of science is one of the significant marks 
which represent a higher likelihood of its being true; by contrast, the 
truth of metaphysical statements is far less probable due to their lack of 
practical value. Owing to this huge difference in the likelihood of being 
true, science still undermines the status of metaphysics, irrespective of 
whether they belong to the same kind. This approach, however, has two 
problems. First, usefulness does not entail truth. This has been shown 
clearly in the history of science. For instance, Newtonian mechanics is 
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still widely applied in mechanical engineering, though it is false, strictly 
speaking, whereas quantum mechanics is difficult to apply in ordinary 
cases, though it is the best theory for the time being. The problem is that 
being useful is not constitutive for a sentence to be true; there is no 
necessary logical connection linking usefulness and truth together. 
People might tend to accept sets of statements that are more useful and 
have less confidence in sets that are not, but that is only a practical 
consideration which by no means entails that the sets accepted are true. 
Second, science manifests its practical value only by the collective work 
of the statements labeled science. In other words, a statement taken in 
isolation would generate nothing; only when combined together to form 
a corporate body can the totality of scientific statements produce 
anything useful. Specifically, in a scientific theory there are often some 
highly formalized parts, e.g. mathematical formulae and models; those 
formalized parts would not have any empirical bearing unless they 
receive some empirical interpretations, that is, some bridge principles 
tell us which variables in the formulae stand for which objects 
observable in sense-perception. This empirical interpretation would 
render the formalized parts relevant to the phenomena of our 
experience, and it is in this sense only that the collective work of the 
formalized parts and the empirical parts can generate concrete things 
that advance the well-being of human beings. The point I want to 
emphasize is, that while individual statements might be bearers of truth, 
only through the cooperation of various statements working as a 
corporate body can science have practical value. This shows that 
usefulness is irrelevant to truth: the usefulness of a totality of statements 
depends on what the constituent statements are and the way they are 
combined together; truth, however, is determined by whether what is 
asserted in a given statement obtains. 
Objection 2: Practical considerations would dominate the process of 
theory choice when it is underdetermined by all given evidence. At any 
given time there might be two or more empirically adequate theories 
that are compatible with the same observable phenomena, while 
conflicting with each other in their fundamental structures. Under those 
circumstances, evidence favors none of the empirically equivalent 
theories, that is, theory choice is underdetermined by purely epistemic 
considerations; we cannot but, among many theories, choose one 
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according to some pragmatic considerations.9 Based on this 
understanding, one might thereby argue that practical value alone would 
eventually prompt people to accept science rather than metaphysics. In 
this sense science still undermines the legitimacy of metaphysics. 
However, even when what is at issue is narrowed down to practical 
value, science still fails to challenge the status of metaphysics. For there 
to be a situation underdetermined by evidential considerations, it is 
necessary that all rival theories are scientific theories. Scientific theories 
are incommensurable only with scientific theories, if any. A scientific 
theory does not compete with a metaphysical theory, since scientific 
statements and metaphysical statements are not of the same kind. This 
means we would not encounter such a situation in which theory choice 
between science and metaphysics is underdetermined by evidence and is 
governed rather by pragmatic considerations. Thus, it is futile to argue 
that science undermines the credentials of metaphysics by appealing to 
the underdetermination thesis. 
5. What Can Metaphysics Contribute to Science ?
What has been argued in the previous part is merely a negative account; 
it only says that the credentials of metaphysics cannot be undermined by 
science, however successful it is. This is far from satisfactory for those 
determined disbelievers of metaphysics; they might think that even if 
science cannot reject metaphysics as such, metaphysics is completely 
irrelevant to scientific research and is thus totally insignificant.  Before 
ending this paper, I would like to briefly sketch two positive 
contributions that metaphysics might have for science: (1) metaphysics 
can explicate the concepts used in science; and (2) metaphysics can 
delimit the boundary of science. 
Let us take the issue of consciousness as an example to explain this. 
Cognitive neuroscientists study the micro-structure of the brain and its 
neural mechanisms correlating with various cognitive activities, and aim 
thus at a final account for consciousness in purely neural-biological 
9 Bas van Fraassen, The Scientific Image (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 87-96. This 
possible objection is formulated based on van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism. 
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terms.10 Now consider one thesis that is widely acknowledged: the 
phenomenal character of consciousness11 supervenes on the neuro-
biological functioning of organisms. What neuroscientists have in mind 
is that there is a correlation between, let us say, pain feeling and C-fiber 
stimulation. Metaphysicians might explicate the notion of supervenience 
in this way: 
Pain-C-fiber Supervenience. Pain feeling supervenes on C-fiber stimulation in 
that if x feels any pain, there is a stimulation of C-fiber such that x’s C-fiber is 
stimulated, and necessarily any object whose C-fiber is stimulated feels pain.12 
Supervenience as such is a covariance relation between the supervenient 
and the supervened. It does not follow, however, that there is a causal 
relation. The existence of the supervened makes a causal difference, but 
that does not suffice to confer causal efficacy on the supervenient. Thus, 
the pain-C-fiber supervenience thesis only says that one necessarily feels 
pain whenever his C-fiber is stimulated, without claiming that it is C-
fiber stimulating that causes pain. By explicating the concepts used in 
science in a similar manner, we can understand what scientists have and 
have not achieved in a much clearer way. 
The first contribution metaphysics might have for science is actually 
related to the second one. If such a pain-C-fiber supervenience thesis 
does exist, metaphysicians might still ask the following questions: it 
happens to be the case that C-fiber stimulating correlates with pain, but 
why is this so? Why does C-fiber stimulating not correlate with itch but 
pain? This can be put more generally: why do conscious states correlate 
with those neural states with which they correlate? All questions of this 
and of similar kinds are actually asking why there are such 
supervenience relations between conscious states and neural states. The 
answers depend on how we interpret the word “necessary” in the 
supervenience thesis. If pain necessarily supervenes on C-fiber 
10 Michael S. Gazzaniga, Richard B. Ivry, and George R. Mangun, Cognitive Neuroscience: 
The Biology of the Mind, 3rd ed. (New York: Norton, c2009). My knowledge of cognitive 
neuroscience is based mainly on this book. 
11 Thomas Nagel, “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” Philosophical Review 83 (1974): 435-50. 
The phenomenal character of consciousness refers to the what-it-is-like aspect of conscious 
experience coined by Nagel in his 1974 paper. 
12 Jaegwon Kim, Philosophy of Mind, 3rd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, c2011), 8-10. I 
revise Kim’s formulation of supervenience developed in his 2011 book. 
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stimulating in the nomological sense, neuroscientists might well claim 
that it is the way the world is that renders the supervenience thesis true. 
However, it is quite reasonable to imagine that the way the world 
actually is, is not the only way the world could be. For example, I am 
actually writing this paper now, but I could have done otherwise; I might 
have felt tired of writing paper and started to play video games. 
Similarly, it might actually be the case that C-fiber stimulating correlates 
with pain, but it does not necessarily correlate with pain in the 
metaphysical sense. The fact that the human brain is constituted in a 
certain way is a contingent fact, so is the supervenience relation between 
C-fiber stimulating and pain, if any. Here we can understand what is 
meant by saying that metaphysics can delimit the boundary of science: 
scientists can only investigate the way the world actually is without 
explaining why it must be so or what may be, but happens not to be, the 
case; on the other hand, metaphysicians chart various metaphysical 
possibilities of reality, and tell us that the world we happen to live in is 
only one among many possible ones. 
6. Conclusion
This paper characterized the dispute between science and metaphysics 
as a dispute between one totality of statements, labeled science, and the 
other totality of statements, labeled metaphysics. I argued that it is 
because scientific statements have practical value while metaphysical 
statements lack this, that science allegedly undermines the legitimacy of 
metaphysics. However, for there to be a genuine dispute between two 
systems of statements, they must belong to the same kind. In Section 3, 
I argued that the non-empirical feature of metaphysics makes it distinct 
from science. By showing that there is such a distinctive feature which 
one set of statements has, which the other set does not have, we are 
justified in believing that metaphysical statements and scientific 
statements do not belong to the same kind. This means, however, that 
there is no common basis for comparing science and metaphysics, and 
accordingly the dispute between them is not a genuine debate. Hence, 
the credentials of metaphysics are unaffected, however successful 
science has been. In Section 5, I sketched two positive contributions 
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metaphysics might have for science. On the one hand, metaphysics can 
explicate the concepts used in science; on the other hand, metaphysics 
can delimit the boundary of science. Above all, science and metaphysics 
are not mutually exclusive; both are legitimate fields of rational enquiry 
that deserve equal respect. 
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Thirsting for a world: the permeating presence of 
metaphysics in Epistemology 
Jesus Moreno 
(Simon Fraser University) 
Recent literature in epistemology seems to argue that epistemology is 
better carried out under the guise of an eliminative metaphysics, if 
not with the goal of eliminating the role of metaphysics in the field 
altogether. Normative disagreement, for example, has been presented 
as what can be better understood under the heading of conflict 
between choices. In this paper I will argue that, due to some basic but 
tremendously important phenomenological features of engaging in 
discourse with other people, any attempt to account for normative 
disagreement by representing it as conflict is condemned to an 
explanatory failure. Moreover, this phenomenology is indicative of a 
much deeper concern: one connected to an attitude that is 
metaphysical in nature. This attitude, namely our conception of a 
strong and substantial relation between ourselves as the kind of 
epistemic agents we are and the world as a knower-friendly place, 
plays a constitutive role in practices such as epistemology—
something that is better evidenced once we analyze the nature of 
global skeptical arguments.   
Introduction 
To some, presupposing a substantial metaphysics in our epistemology is 
somewhat passé. Epistemology, so they seem to claim, is to be seen as a 
formal enterprise—one filled with barren models and entities the 
presence of which is adjudicated on the strictest notions of explanatory 
necessity. Debates such as that on the role and nature of normativity, 
and in particular of epistemic normativity, are to be carried out under 
the guise of an eliminative metaphysics. Normative disagreement, for 
example, has been presented as a mere instance of conflict between 
choices. In this paper I will argue that, due to some basic but 
tremendously important phenomenological features of engaging in 
discourse with other people, any attempt to account for normative 
disagreement by representing it as conflict is condemned to an 
explanatory failure. Whereas conflict needs not be factual, the 
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phenomenology of disagreement dictates for the intentions of the 
speakers to refer to the world—and thus, it is concerned with factual 
issues. Moreover, this phenomenology is indicative of a much deeper 
concern: one connected to an attitude that is metaphysical in nature. 
This attitude, namely our conception of a strong and substantial relation 
between ourselves as the kind of epistemic agents we are and the world 
as a knower-friendly place, plays a constitutive role in practices such as 
epistemology—something that is better evidenced once we analyze the 
nature of global skeptical arguments. 
I. 
Let us first introduce a basic framework within which we may discuss 
normative disagreement. By “Normativity” I shall refer to normativity in 
some realist sense—that is, a strong, robust, factual notion of 
normativity where normative demands stand independently of our 
attitude towards them. By “normativity*” I shall be referring to the 
weaker, deflationary-style notion of normativity discussed by non-realists 
accounts—a normativity the weight of which is derived from one form 
or another of relativization to goals. This entails that we cannot talk 
about norms irrespectively of the kind of theory discussed. Let us 
differentiate then between what we shall call “Norms” and what we shall 
call “norms*”. Thus, a Norm would be a fact (e.g. you ought to do x), and 
it will play a crucial role in simpliciter ought-statement found in 
Normative accounts and to which an agent appeals when holding beliefs 
of the kind “given [facts, including the relevant normative fact], I ought 
to do x”. In contrast, norms* are closer to policies (e.g. if you want to 
achieve y, then do x; or always believe v if you believe w), and beliefs 
containing norms* can be presented as holding something along the 
lines of the formulaic “given [facts], and policy ψ, I ought* do x”.1   
1 Here I am appealing to something rather close to Hartry Field’s notion of norms as 
policies in accordance to his presentation of it in his “Epistemology Without Metaphysics” 
(Field 2009). Field’s assessor-relativist account embodies, and develops, several key notions 
from the non-realist side—notions that can be found in the works of authors such as 
MacFarlane and Gibbard, see: (MacFarlane, Making sense of relative truth 2005), 
(MacFarlane 2009), (Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings 1990), (Gibbard 2003), (Gibbard 
2008 ). For an analysis of reductivist and eliminativist accounts of normativity (such as 
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Given the difference between Norms and norms*, it is possible to 
see that not all normative claims are created equal. Normative claims 
that appeal to Norms appear to derive whatever normative weight they 
have from the factual nature of the Norm themselves—that is, it is that 
fact in the world that a Norm is that which what imposes a demand on 
you. Claims that employ norms*, however, seem to derive their 
normative weight from a conditional based as much on our desires as on 
the way the world is. Claims that appeal to Norms seem to believe in a 
strong, substantial normativity. This Normativity—whether existent or 
not—is qualitatively different from that which grounds claims that 
employ norms*. For the latter, “normativity” stands closer to the kind of 
guidance power offered by goal-oriented rules of thumb, by minimax 
strategies aiming to provide an algorithm with which to calculate the 
payoff from different paths of action. Unlike Normativity, this 
normativity* poses but a contingent demand upon us: “if the world is a 
certain way, and you desire a certain outcome, then this is the way to 
go”. This would not be a problem for non-realists were their account to 
show that an appeal to normativity* was indeed simpler, stronger, and 
better fit for an understanding of normative disagreement than its 
aforementioned alternative. But despite their apparent parsimony, such 
accounts can hardly be seen as simpler and stronger without first 
effecting a massive misinterpretation of basic dialectical facts.   
II. 
Since norms* are policies, and policies are contingent in their relevance 
to at least one desired goal, a conflict between norms* is a conflict 
between desired outcomes. If I want to have Chinese food and my friend 
wants to have French food, then we are in a scenario where our desires 
are incompatible in such a way that only one of them, but not both, can 
be satisfied (assuming, of course, that we also want to have dinner 
together). Our desires, that is our preference as for where we are to dine, 
are in conflict. Were we to express our desires by saying “we should have 
(Gibbard 2003)) that shares several of the worries raised in this essay see chapter 4 in Barry 
Stroud’s Engagement and Metaphysical Dissatisfaction (Stroud, Engagement and 
Metaphysical Dissatisfaction 2011). 
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__ for dinner” we would then be employing the “should” of preference 
(i.e. “given [facts, including my desire to x] and [policy to satisfy one’s 
desire], we should* do y).  
The sort of phenomenon that we wish to represent under the notion 
of conflict can be better individuated via the following analogy: Think of 
a typewriter. The mechanism executing a key’s command in a typewriter 
can be such that, when several keys are pressed simultaneously, the type 
bars end up entangled. That is to say, not all commands can be executed 
at once. The machine can successfully execute but one command at any 
given time. If more than one command is given at the same time (such 
as when we press several keys simultaneously), not all commands 
succeed. Were we to think of the pressing of a key as a preference, we 
would conceive of the situation as one of conflict among preferences: 
ceteris paribus, only one option can be carried out at any given time 
successfully—that is, only one preference can be satisfied at any given 
time.  
This kind of incompatibility can also rise between agents’ choices. If 
Smith and Jones come to a fork while hiking down a path, and each one 
favours the road rejected by the other, either one agent’s choice will be 
ignored or they will have to travel separately. In some cases, the latter 
disjunct may not be a feasible option (imagine them driving down a 
highway instead). Their choices are incompatible. Whereas some would 
say that our travelers disagree on what path to take, a seldom few would 
wish to extend this claim to the typewriter scenario. After all, in what 
sense, if any, do the typebars disagree? It could be claimed that, unlike 
the typebars, our travellers can argue in favour of their choice—for 
example, by appealing to instrumental normativity. In a basic form, this 
scenario would go along the following lines: 
S: We should go left 
J: We should go right 
Let us desensitize S and J the following way: 
S*: Given the facts x, y, and z, and policy α, we should go left. 
J*: Given the facts x, y, and z, and policy β, we should go right. 
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Assuming Smith accepts J* as true, and Jones accept S* as true (in other 
words, that each accepts the other’s desensitized claim to be true), it 
appears to follow that we are in the presence of a conflict between 
Smith’s choices and Jones’ choices. There is no disagreement between 
S* and J*, and yet there was disagreement between S and J. How is this 
situation to be solved? Smith and Jones cannot debate, insofar as they 
each accept the truth of the other’s desensitized sentence and, therefore, 
no argument can be made against the truth of either’s assertion. 
However, they can negotiate. In negotiation, agents aim at maximizing 
the degree to which their individual choices will be satisfied. In a debate, 
agents are concerned with the truth-value of a claim—a common 
understanding of which is a must if the agents do not wish to talk across 
each other. When two people debate whether a sentence is true, no 
negotiation needs take place: the sentence in question may have no 
weight in the fulfillment of each party’s preferred choices. In contrast, 
when two parties negotiate, no debate has to take place: both parties can 
agree on all the relevant facts, yet find themselves in a situation where 
their choices are incompatible (indeed, zero-sum perfect information 
games can be seen as scenarios of this kind). 
III. 
If we cannot talk about normativity in only one sense, then we cannot 
talk about normative disagreement without qualifications. Thus, given 
the difference between Norms and norms*, between Normativity on the 
one hand and normativity* on the other, two basic kinds of normative 
disagreement seem to appear in the horizon. For example, imagine a 
discussion between two people, each of which defends one of the 
following: 
C: the blockade against Cuba should be ended. 
D: the blockade against Cuba should not be ended. 
Prima facie, it appears as if C and D could not both be true. Moreover, it 
appears as if it would be inconsistent for someone to believe in both. 
Yet, in a world without normative facts, relativism renders both these 
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options possible. For example, imagine the following understanding of 
these sentences: 
C*: Given facts [x,y,z…], and policy δ, the blockade against Cuba should* 
be ended 
D*: Given facts [x,y,z…], and policy ε, the blockade against Cuba should* 
not be ended 
Once a relativized sentence is presented explicitly it becomes a factual 
sentence to which a truth-value can be assigned. Since norms* are 
policies, C* will be true iff given the set of facts, policy δ dictates for the 
blockade to be lifted (ditto for D* after the relevant changes). Thus, I 
could agree with D*, in fact I could assert D*, even if I also believe and 
assert C*. A belief in either of them would then be a pure belief. Unlike 
cases of contextual disagreement, in which sentences are considered to 
be in disagreement iff they cannot both be true after being desensitized, 
C and D are in disagreement even in the case aforementioned. 
  Let us call a scenario such as the above an instance of normative 
disagreement*. Now let us follow this scenario from the first-person 
point of view. Your interlocutor has asserted D, and you have asserted C 
in reply. She asks you to explain yourself, to which you reply by asserting 
C*. She did not know you meant C*. All along she believed that you 
meant the opposite of what she had in mind when asserting D (that is, 
she thought you meant to deny D* by asserting that e.g. given facts 
[x,y,z…], and policy ε, the blockade against Cuba should* be ended)—
and she tells you so. What kind of insight have you gained about the 
dynamic of this discussion after her announcement? It seems that you 
have learned that the two of you were not talking about the same thing—
the two of you were talking past each other. Indeed, had it been a heated 
discussion, one of both of you would probably apologize for having 
pressed on with the debate. You may perhaps laugh a little at the end, 
thinking about how silly the whole scenario would have seemed to an 
observer who knew from the beginning what you have learned via her 
announcement. Looking back, it appears that there was nothing about 
which the two of you were disagreeing—even if your policies were in 
conflict. This is clearly an instance of equivocation. 
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In simple terms, speakers equivocate when, while presumably 
talking about the same thing, they are unknowingly talking about 
different things. Equivocation does not entail either agreement or 
disagreement, but it does convey the illusion of being in one of them. If 
two people were to get into a heated discussion over whether Harry's last 
presentation was on a given topic, just to finally realized that they were 
talking about two different people named “Harry”, they would 
acknowledge they were not disagreeing—indeed, they were hardly 
communicating in a meaningful way (ditto were they to have been 
asserting their agreement with Harry's conclusions).  
What is missing in the above case of conflict is something that we 
can find in instances of what we shall call “Normative Disagreement”: 
agents R and S are in Normative Disagreement iff R holds a Norm α to 
be a fact, S holds Norm β to be a fact, and only one of [α,β] can be a fact. 
Of course, people can talk past each other in apparent instances of 
Normative Disagreement—which is to say that, for one reason or 
another, people can equivocate even when they think they are in this 
scenario. However, unlike normative disagreement*, at least some cases 
of what appears to be Normative Disagreement are such that, once each 
interlocutor has asserted her claim explicitly, both parties would agree 
they are debating over a disagreement. If you claim that C, and your 
claim is based on what you believe to be a Norm, and your interlocutor 
recognizes that what you think she says is indeed what she is saying, 
then it is not possible for you to accept your interlocutor’s claim to the 
opposite if you both are in Normative Disagreement. For in Normative 
Disagreement your interlocutor would have to be asserting either that 
not-C or a claim that entails the falsity of C.  
On the other hand, were your interlocutor’s claim to be based on a 
norm* while your claim appeals to a Norm, then, upon having realized 
this piece of information, you would also realize that the two of you are 
not debating over a disagreement. In fact, given 
that your claim is a Normative claim while hers is a normative* claim, 
there needs not even be a conflict of preferences in this scenario—your 
assertion, and your Normative beliefs, needs not even be in 
line with your desires. Ultimately, the two of you are simply talking past 
each other. For what sort of debate can happen when only one 
person is asserting a sentence and what kind of conflict can there be 
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when there is only one choice being pressed forward? As the saying 
goes, it takes two to tango. 
Your interlocutor could now argue against your appeal to Norms, 
and in doing so a debate would ensue on whether there is such a Norm, 
or any Norm for that matter. This would not be a normative 
disagreement of any kind, but a regular factual disagreement: your belief 
that there are Norms, and her belief that there are no 
Norms. Yet, this is also a substantial factual disagreement. Whether 
there are Norms or not is a significant fact—one that would dictate 
whether any Normative beliefs are true and, with it, whether there are 
any instances of Normative Disagreement in which one of the sentences 
in question is true. 
But your interlocutor needs not be so philosophically oriented. 
Perhaps she refuses to engage in a discussion on normative 
realism while at the same time asserting that the two of you were in 
some sort of normative disagreement. Yet, in what way, if any, could she 
be right? The answer is none. Ex hypothesi, she is not claiming the two 
of you were in Normative Disagreement. If she is claiming that the two 
of you were in normative disagreement*, then she has not been 
engaging what you said—for your sentences appealed to Norms. And if 
she says that she interpreted your sentence as a normative* claim, then 
she would be corroborating your suspicions: she was not arguing against 
your claim. Of course she was free to interpret your claim as a 
normative* one—she was just mistaken in doing so. While she was 
talking about what her desires demand, you were asserting what you 
believe the world commands. 
IV. 
The world-oriented phenomenology described above can be seen as 
indicative of an impulse that permeates throughout the entire practice of 
epistemology. Our desire to understand how we know rests 
on a particular notion of what there is to be known. Non-realist 
conceptions of normativity were attacked above for their 
inefficient account of this very same underlying notion. Yet, nowhere is 
this tacit demand (namely, the demand for a 
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metaphysically significant picture of the world to be the 
bases of our epistemology) better seen than in the debate 
on global skepticism. In this section I will argue that the true object of 
global skepticism is the metaphysical presumption of an 
intelligible world. 
It is commonly argued that global skeptical arguments are 
self-defeating. For the purpose of this essay it is sufficient 
to define the notion of a defeater in the following terms: An argument 
(or proposition) y is a defeater of another argument (or 
proposition) x if and only if were y to obtain then x could not obtain. The 
term “obtain” is here being used to indicate either soundness (in the 
case of an argument) or a truth-value of true (in the case of a 
proposition). 
Global skepticism is the thesis that, for reasons involving the need 
to meet justificatory desiderata, we are not justified to claim knowledge. 
This thesis was most famously propounded by the Pyrrhonian skeptics 
of the Hellenistic period. Global skepticism 
has been accused of being self-defeating. Indeed, it appears that the 
Pyrrhonians themselves gladly welcomed the apparent inconsistency of 
their position. In his Outlines of Skepticism (Empiricus 2000), Sextus 
Empiricus presents us with a global skeptical argument 
to rule them all: the proof against proofs. This argument tries to show 
that, if the argument is sound, then there are no proofs. Since, 
presumably, the argument itself is a proof in case of being 
sound, it seems to follow that we have a proof that there are no proofs 
(Empiricus 2000, pp. 2. 144-184). However, it is not necessary to dwell 
on the casuistry of particular skeptical arguments in order to discuss 
their underlying features—it is sufficient for our discussion to recognize 
the general structure of such arguments and its 
apparently self-defeating features. Global skeptical arguments 
such as the proof against proofs seem to have the following form: 
Schema of the Proof against Proofs (SPP): 
1) Every argument has at least one defeater argument.
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2) In order for us to be justified to believe in the soundness of 
any argument over that of its defeaters we must meet some 
justificatory desiderata  
3) We cannot meet the justificatory desiderata.
4) Therefore: we are not justified to hold any argument to be
sound.
Given our criterion of defeat, for an argument y to count as a defeater of 
SPP it must be the case that, if y obtains, then SPP cannot obtain—that 
is, if y is sound then SSP cannot be sound. This renders it evident that 
SPP is not a defeater of SSP. Neither does SPP’s conclusion deny any of 
its premises, nor is such a negation implied by it. Moreover, SPP’s 
conclusion does not negate itself, nor does it imply such a negation 
(ditto for SPP’s premises).  
However, there is an intuitive uneasiness in thinking of arguments 
like SPP as informative or, more disturbingly, as tenable. That global 
skeptical arguments such as SPP are not self-defeating in the strictest 
sense of the term (as least as defined above) does not mean that they can 
be held—the very nature of SPP prevents any epistemic agent from 
assenting to it. Let us assume the soundness of SSP. If it is the case that 
justification is necessary for a true belief to count as knowledge, then 
since we cannot be justified in believing any argument to be sound (or 
any thesis to be true) we cannot claim to know of any argument that it is 
sound (or of any thesis that it is true). Thus, neither can we claim to 
know any argument to be sound nor can we claim to know any thesis to 
be true. Yet, this means that we cannot claim to know that SSP is sound. 
This effectively means that, if SSP is sound, then we cannot know that 
SSP is sound—in other words, if SSP is sound, then its soundness is 
unknowable.  
Those who accuse global skeptical arguments such as SSP of being 
self-defeating may be better understood as portraying such defeat within 
the framework of epistemic goals and pragmatic grounds. If the goal of 
inquiry is the acquisition of knowledge, then arguments such as SSP 
cannot be a tool for the fulfillment of our epistemic ends for it is not 
possible to hold an argument such as SSP in a consistent fashion. If we 
wish to hold only justified beliefs and, having assessed all the relevant 
evidence, we come to the conclusion that we are justified to believe in 
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the soundness of SSP, then we have effectively overrun our own 
grounds for believing in the soundness of SSP. We cannot continue to 
uphold SSP to be sound, for we now acknowledge that we cannot be 
justified to believe SSP to obtain in the place of any of its defeaters. 
Thus, if we are justified to believe SSP to be sound, then we are justified 
not to believe SSP to be sound. Attempting to uphold global skepticism 
via the assertion of arguments such as SSP would be the epistemic 
equivalent of attempting to utter “I am not uttering a sentence right 
now”.2  
Notice that the above is in no way inconsistent with SSP. Both 
arguments show that, if justification is necessary for knowledge and 
either one of these arguments is sound, then we could not come to know 
that SSP is sound were it to be sound. However, this agreement can 
hardly be seen as indicative of an agreement on the lessons to be derived 
from the scenario. Deriving a contradiction from a set of premises has 
long been seen as an efficient sorting strategy when it comes to 
accepting or rejecting beliefs. The impossibility of holding arguments 
such as SSP in a consistent fashion seems to dictate for the rejection of 
something—yet this something cannot be the possible soundness of 
SSP. In rejecting the claim that we can hold SSP consistently we are 
responding to the apparent unintelligibility of a world where SSP is 
sound.  
By assuming the soundness of SSP we are forced to contemplate the 
possibility of an unknowable world. This scenario becomes even more 
frightening once we realize that the self-referential features of global 
skepticism deprive us of reasons to justify this epistemically nightmare-
esche scenario itself. Yet, and in a truly Damoclean fashion, we can 
acknowledge that the possibility of an argument such as SSP being 
sound is a constant , if passively latent, threat to our dearest epistemic 
goals. If, in presenting an argument such as SSP, it is the desire of an 
epistemic agent to allow her interlocutor to experience what it is like to 
reflect on such an incomprehensible scenario, we cannot expect to hold 
the former’s success as an objection to his argument. 
2For more on pragmatic self-refutation see (O’Connor 1951). Sextus Empiricus’ pyrrhonian 
skepticism tends to be seen as prey of pragmatic self-refutation. McPherran provides a list 
of sources on the topic as well as an illuminating analysis of the issue; see (McPherran 
1987). 
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If reductiones ad absurdum are useful because they allow us to sort 
the wheat from the chaff, then rejecting SSP on the grounds that the 
assertion of its soundness produces an insurmountable inconsistency 
could be seen by some as a legitimate move. However, as it was just 
shown, this strategy is not equivalent to refuting the soundness of 
arguments such as SSP. An attempt to deny that SSP is sound cannot be 
based on that, were it to be sound, its soundness would entail our 
incapacity to be the kind of epistemic agents we think we are. If a 
historical analogy is adequate we could then portray global skeptical 
arguments as standing closer to Zeno of Elea’s elaboration of 
Parmenides’ arguments than to the apparently self-defeating global 
relativism of thinkers like Protagoras. That such a comparison is 
relevant can be seen once we inquire upon the alleged self-refuting 
characteristic of global relativism: An assertion to the truth of all theses 
entails the acceptance of that very same thesis’ negation as true.3 Thus, 
global relativism is self-defeating in accordance to our definition of the 
term. In contrast, Parmenides’ and Zeno’s arguments seek to convey the 
picture of a less-than-immediately-intelligible world. The 
counterintuitive nature of their results stands in direct opposition to the 
rawest, and most immediate, notion of the world shared by us all 
without therefore falling in self-defeat. In doing so, they do not show 
that we do not conceive of the world in a certain way. Instead, they 
appeal to our picture of the world in order to disprove its feasibility. A 
mere reassertion of our experiences cannot be seen as a feasible strategy 
when trying to disprove the soundness of, for example, Zeno’s argument 
against motion. 4 
In this sense, those puzzling features of global skepticism which 
prevent us from being capable of holding the position consistently 
separate it from other apparently untenable positions like, for example, 
the normative non-realist described earlier in this essay. Whereas the 
failure of the normative non-realist positions emerges from its inability 
to explicate, and account for, epistemic phenomena (e.g. disagreement), 
3 For the best-known version of this argument see Plato’s Theaethetus, 171a-c (Plato 1997). 
For a more contemporary as well as inquisitive discussion on Protagoras’ relativism see 
Mi-Kyoung Lee’s Epistemology After Protagoras: Responses to Relativism in Plato, 
Aristotle, and Democritus (Lee 2005). 
4 For more on Parmenides’ view see (Curd and McKirahan 2011). 
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the global skeptic purposely aims at placing us in an apparently 
unintelligible position. Indeed, the relevance of such a move can be 
understood only in contrast to the most general, and basic, objections 
that can be raised in the dialectic on global skepticism. An objector could 
argue that, on the one hand, the mere logical possibility that SSP may 
obtain provides little to no grounds for judging it worthy of inquiry and 
discussion. On the other hand, given the repercussions of SSP’s 
soundness, there seems to be no reason to discuss something which 
appears to dictate for quietism.  
However, these latter arguments represent a radical shift in the 
scope and nature of the discussion. The issue is no longer whether 
global skeptical arguments are self-defeating; what is now requested is a 
stance on whether the consequences of global skeptical arguments are 
desirable, let alone endurable. 5 A judgment on this topic is a judgment 
on how much weight, if any, we are to place upon the possibility of there 
being truths which are necessarily unknowable; it is a judgment on the 
degree to which we wish to allow such possibility to influence our notion 
of inquiry6—it is a judgement over our most basic conception of the 
world. By presenting us with a scenario where our unrestrained thirst 
for knowledge may prove the world to be a dry riverbed, global skeptical 
arguments pin our desire for truth against the ropes—and even those 
who allegedly claim to love deserted landscapes retreat from such arid a 
world. The unknowable truth that would follow from these arguments is 
one which demands for a reassessment of our own self-image as 
inquirers who conceive the object of their epistemic desires to be within 
reach. In judging upon the relevance of this topic we are passing 
judgment upon our very own notion of inquiry—we are passing 
judgement over our most elemental conception of the world. 
If anything can be seen as a default epistemic stance is, pace 
Protagoras, a rejection of complete infallibility. Not only do we accept the 
possibility of some, if not all, of our beliefs being false, but such 
possibility is also conceived as nothing more than a mere bump in the 
road to knowledge. Yet, the gap between the possibility of being wrong 
5 This statement is not to be confused with the anti-skeptical objection concerning the 
impossibility of living a skeptical life (for a classic discussion on the topic see section XIII 
of Hume’s An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (Hume and Millican 2007). 
6 For an example of this kind of approach see (Rescher 2007, 39-50). 
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and the impossibility of being right is one which can hardly be bridged 
by appeals to fallibilism and pragmatic considerations. If our notion of 
error depends on our notion of “getting things right” in a realist-like 
sense of the term7, if our notion of objectivity is indeed based on a 
presupposition of realism as the beginning of our discussions8, then the 
impossibility of having justified belief would render the world 
unintelligible in any meaningful sense. An assertion to the opposite, a 
reiteration of our conviction in the intelligible nature of the world and 
experience, can hardly be expected to eliminate the fear caused by a 
possible state of necessary ignorance.9 It may provide a reason to search 
for alternative frameworks within which to discuss the topic, but it will 
not do away with it. Assuming the intelligibility of the world when it 
comes to choosing a path away from global skeptical arguments provides 
little guidance other than a proviso for this path to be paved by 
intelligibility—even if as nothing more than an implicit desideratum. 
This requirement, however, is insufficient, for it can be fulfilled with 
ease by incompatible goals, methods, and even answers within the same 
conceptual framework.10  
It is upon a canvas of a strong conception of truth that the notions of 
error and objectivity, as described all throughout this essay, colour the 
landscape of an unintelligible world. This is why alternatives to a strong 
7 (Rescher 2007, 27-34; 80-84). 
8 See Barry Stroud’s discussion of the topic in chapter II of his book The Significance of 
Philosophical Scepticism (Stroud 1984).  
9 That a conviction is not sufficient to dispel doubt is precisely what is at issue in certain 
takes on Moore’s argument against skepticism about the external world. See, for example, 
Unger’s argument against the latter in his book Ignorance (Unger 1975, 20-36). Unger’s 
argument relies on our intuitive response to counterfactual scenarios in which we are 
shown to be mistaken in having claimed certainty. We may conceive of Unger’s argument 
as appealing to the phenomenology of the situation: in Unger’s discussion, that we may 
come to experience embarrassment upon discovering we were wrong is a consequence of 
recognizing our conviction that we are entitled to claim certainty to be misguided. 
Embarrassment is not eliminated by our conviction, it is caused by it. Similarly, the 
conviction that the world is intelligible does not dispel the puzzlement that characterizes 
our apprehension of the possibility that SSP may be sound. For a defense of Moore’s 
argument which emphasizes its appeal to our notion of plausibility and certainty see 
(Lycan 2001). 
10 For historical examples on the employment by both sides of a debate of global-like 
skeptical arguments, as well as on the apparent undesirable consequences of holding 
skeptical arguments, see (Popkin 1964, 1-16; 197-217). 
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notion of truth can be seen as responses to global skeptical arguments11. 
In attempting to preserve some resemblance of intelligibility in the 
world, these options provide us with an alternative within which we may 
conceive of inquiry as conducive to knowledge rather than paradox. 
However, this move is not required in order to defend the intelligibility 
of a knower-friendly world from global skeptical arguments. Inquiry can 
be portrayed as indeed conducive to an unintelligible world—reason for 
which inquiry itself may be seen as an inadequate tool for the 
apprehension of truth.12 
Conclusion 
It would be a gross misinterpretation of this essay to conceive of it as a 
study on ordinary language. The terms “conflict” and “disagreement” 
could be replaced for each other throughout the essay salva veritate. 
What matters to the argument is not whether we should call the 
phenomenon to which we refer by the term “disagreement” or 
“conflict”. What matters is that these phenomena are different—to the 
point where a reduction of one to the other would be not only 
impractical, but also misguided. Those who wish to reduce normative 
disagreement to a conflict between policies need to explain why we 
should dismiss the phenomenological evidence we have that the non-
realist would be misinterpreting what we say. Moreover, the notions of 
instrumental and non-instrumental normativity need not be mutually 
exclusive. The kind of value expressed by each is consistent with that of 
the other. The problem is not with the notion of instrumental 
normativity, the problem is with the claim both that there is only 
instrumental normativity and that we can accommodate the 
phenomenology of discourse within a framework characterized solely by 
instrumental normativity. This is the claim to which I object. For the 
phenomenology of engaging in normative discourse from the Normative 
11  Rorty’s notion of truth as a commendatory term can be seen as another example of an 
alternative understanding of truth which aims at overcoming some of the problems 
described above (see (Rorty, Solidarity or Objectivity 1985)). For a better understanding of 
Rorty’s view on the applications of the notion of truth and its consequences see also (Rorty 
1988).  
12 This is precisely the kind of move perform by fideists. See (Popkin 1964, 34-38; 92-99).  
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stance can accommodate that of engaging in normative discourse from 
the normative* stance, but not vice versa. The non-realist needs to show 
unequivocally why we should not take seriously these serious cases of 
equivocation. This, from the first-person point of view, she has done not.  
Moreover, this phenomenology is indicative of a much deeper 
attitude towards the world—an attitude the constitutive role of which is 
demonstrated by global skepticism. The somewhat disturbing, almost 
incomprehensible nature of the global skeptical position emerges not 
from any sort of content-based inconsistency—that is, it is not due to 
explicit or implicit contradictions in its claims. Global skepticism elicits 
such reaction via the manner in which it attacks our presupposition of 
an intelligible world—presupposition which is indeed constitutive of the 
epistemic enterprise. Yet, this presupposition is metaphysical in nature, 
and it demands for a world that is constituted in such a way that we 
must be able to comprehend it. It is a metaphysical demand for an 
intelligible world; that the content of such demand can be questioned in 
a consistent fashion in epistemology ought to be seen as a meaningful 
sign of the connection between the latter and metaphysics. Those who 
dream of an epistemology without metaphysics dream of square 
epistemic circles. Whatever value we may attach to epistemology must 
be indicative of the value we must attach to metaphysics.13  
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On the Prospects for Naturalism 
Nicholas Tebben  
(Johns Hopkins University) 
Contemporary naturalism has two components. The first is 
ontological, and says, roughly, that all and only what the sciences say 
exists, really does exist.  The other is methodological, and it says that 
only scientific explanations are legitimate explanations. Together 
these commitments promise a coherent picture of the world that is 
nicely integrated with an attractive epistemology.  Despite the obvious 
appeal of naturalism, I would like to sound a note of caution. First, I 
would like to argue that naturalism's ontological commitment cannot 
be vindicated. Not, that is, that it is false; rather, I argue that any 
attempt to show that it is true presupposes that it is not. Second, I 
argue that methodological naturalism is false. But, again, the problem 
is not straightforward. I will not claim that there are gaps in the 
explanations offered by science, such that the scientific project would 
be incomplete without emendation. Instead I argue that the goodness 
of an explanation depends, in part, on how the event to be explained 
is described, and that, some events, under some descriptions, call for 
non-scientific explanations.  
1. Introduction
Contemporary metaphysics, in what is perhaps its most 
popular form, finds its home in a larger set of views that promises a 
unified picture of the world and our place in it. 
Collectively known as ‘naturalism’, this set of views proceeds 
from the conviction that empirical science is our only guide 
to the nature and content of the world.  Naturalism has 
two main components.  The first is ontological1:  
1 Despite its presentation here, the precise content of naturalism is controversial.  The 
thesis that I call ‘ontological naturalism’ is a thesis of intermediate strength, relative to the 
other “naturalistic” metaphysical theories in the field.  Physicalism, for example, is a 
stronger thesis. As far as I can see, however, none of the plausible ways in which it might 
be modified would bear on the argument to be developed below. 
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Ontological Naturalism: The kinds of things that exist are all and only 
those kinds that play a role in our best sciences, or will play a role in 
successor sciences that are very similar to those currently in the field.2  
The second component of naturalism is a thesis about what constitutes a 
good explanation: 
Methodological Naturalism: All legitimate explanations are scientific 
explanations. 
Together the two claims present a coherent whole.  We believe in things 
for explanatory purposes, and if all legitimate explanatory purposes are 
scientific ones, then all things for which one has legitimate grounds to 
believe are those necessary for science.  If these two commitments are 
correct, then philosophy and all other branches of inquiry are, to the 
extent that they are legitimate, branches of the empirical sciences. 
Naturalistic philosophy usually proceeds by finding some apparently 
problematic, but philosophically significant, subject matter, and 
providing an account of the nature or functioning of the subject matter 
in question that appeals only to members of ontological categories that 
find employment in the sciences.  Ultimately, if the philosophical project 
is successful, the explanations that this account will provide will be 
scientific explanations.  In completing such a project, the naturalistic 
philosopher helps develop a coherent picture of the world, integrated by 
scientific principles and commitments.   
2 It is worth noting that this is a distinctively metaphysical thesis, and not a scientific one.  
Here is Stroud, on this point: “A positive science of physical nature tells us what the world 
is like – what qualities objects in the world do, in fact, have.  But that physical science alone 
does not establish [that only physical objects exist].  Physical scientists professionally 
restrict their attention to the physical aspects of the world that can be captured in their 
theoretical network.  If there is more to the world than that, physical science says nothing 
about it.  The metaphysical theory of atomism or physicalism goes one step further.  It says 
that atoms or the physical qualities of things are all there is.”  (Barry Stroud, The Quest for 
Reality: Subjectivism & The Metaphysics of Color (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 
10.)  Moreover, it is not an accident that the sciences remain uncommitted about those 
things that fall outside of their theoretical network.  If there were any such things, there 
could be, by their very nature, no scientific evidence that would bear on the hypothesis that 
they exist. 
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Despite its obvious attraction, I am pessimistic about the prospects 
for naturalism.  There are two reasons for my  
pessimism.  First, I will argue that there are reasons to believe that a 
demonstration of the ontological thesis cannot, even in principle, be 
completed.  This is not to say that Ontological Naturalism is false;  
I do not argue that there is something that does not find a place in the 
scientific picture of the world.  Rather, I will argue, the  
problem for naturalism on the ontological side is that any demonstration 
that it is true requires that one presuppose that it  
is not.3 
The other challenge that naturalism faces comes from the 
methodological direction.  The problem, in short, is that  
explanatory contexts are referentially opaque.  So even if there is a 
scientific explanation of every fact and event, it does not follow that there 
is a scientific explanation of every fact and event under  
every description.  Indeed, I will suggest that there are some facts, under 
some descriptions, that call for explanation in terms of categories that 
cannot be shown to be identical to those familiar  
from the sciences.4  If that is so, then the appeal of  
naturalistic metaphysics will be much weakened, and the  
plausibility of the picture of inquiry as unified by scientific  
procedures and explanations much reduced. 
3 There is a clear affinity between this argument and some of Putnam’s arguments. He 
has, for example, long argued that scientific practice essentially involves appeal to 
epistemic values, such as coherence and simplicity.  He takes this fact as a premise in an 
argument that there is no sharp dichotomy between facts and values.  See Hilary Putnam, 
“Beyond the Fact/Value Dichotomy,” in Realism with a Human Face, ed. James Conant 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), especially pp. 138-141, and Hilary Putnam, 
The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy, and Other Essays, (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2002), especially chapter 2.  I think that the point about scientific practice 
generalizes: providing any argument presupposes that there are, what Putnam would call, 
“epistemic values”.  I am, however, less ambitious than Putnam.  My contention is only 
that this fact will allow us to show that Ontological Naturalism cannot be vindicated. 
4 Again, this is not to say that they are not identical to such categories.  They may well be.  
But they cannot be shown to be identical to naturalistic categories. 
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2. Naturalizing the Epistemic
Normative facts and properties are the most notable among those that 
resist integration into a naturalistic world-view.  If Ontological 
Naturalism is to be vindicated, then, either normative facts and 
properties must be shown, despite initial appearances, to be identical to 
natural facts and properties, or else it must be shown that they do not 
exist at all.   
Whatever its merits as a means of dealing with other normative 
kinds,5 eliminativism about epistemic normativity seems to be ill 
advised.6  The problem, in brief, is that any argument for epistemic 
eliminativism would need to provide good reasons to believe that its 
conclusion is true, but epistemic eliminativism just is, in part, the claim 
that there are no such things as good reasons to believe.7 
More promising than attempting to eliminate the epistemic, 
however, are attempts to reduce epistemic facts and properties to facts 
and properties that are employed by the sciences.  And, in fact, there 
have been many attempts to reduce one or another kind of epistemic fact 
or property.  In isolated cases, I do not doubt that this can be done.  
Vindicating Ontological Naturalism, however, requires not that some 
epistemic facts and properties be reduced to natural ones, but that all of 
them are so reduced.  It is this project, that of reducing all epistemic 
categories, that cannot be completed.  And this project cannot be 
completed not for contingent reasons regarding, for example, its 
difficulty, or our lack of imagination.  I will argue that, even in principle, 
a wholesale reduction of the epistemic to the natural is not possible. 
Though reducing A’s to B’s involves showing that A’s and B’s are 
identical, reductions are typically not reductions without loss.  Reducing 
one thing to another involves re-conceptualizing at least one of the 
involved facts, properties or objects.  In particular, reductions typically 
5 For a discussion of its merits in the moral case, see J.L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right 
and Wrong (New York: Penguin Books, 1977). 
6 And, indeed, epistemic eliminativism has no defenders. 
7 Notice that it would not do simply to note that the fact that there are no epistemic facts is 
entailed by some other fact F, and that F is true.  For if there are no epistemic facts, then 
the fact that both a conditional and its antecedent are true provides one with no reason to 
conclude that its consequent is true.  Without any epistemic facts, the inference is optional. 
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involve denying that the kind being reduced has features other than 
those that are characteristic of the kind to which it is being reduced.  For 
example, a physical reduction of the mind involves not simply saying 
that the mind and (some favored part of) the body are identical, but that 
minds are not immaterial.  If a reduction was simply a matter of finding 
that the two kinds are identical, the possibility would be open that a 
successful reduction of the mental to the physical would show that there 
are immaterial physical objects.  But of course nothing of the sort is on 
offer.  A reduction of the mental to the physical crucially requires saying 
that the mental does not have all of the properties that it was previously 
thought to have.   
A similar impoverishment is characteristic of attempts to provide a 
naturalistic reduction of epistemic normativity.  As we ordinarily 
conceive of them, epistemic categories carry deontological significance. 
One violates a duty when one believes without justification; in doing so 
one behaves irresponsibly.  In virtue of such facts, epistemic evaluations 
have an imperatival aspect.  To say that one would not be justified in 
believing that p is, in part, to forbid one from believing that p.  Likewise, 
holding a justified belief is a matter of acting in accord with one’s duty.  
And saying that one would be justified in believing that p is, in part, to 
permit one to believe that p.   
But because the natural world contains no deontic facts, naturalistic 
reductions of epistemic categories are reductions to something that is 
non-deontic.  And in completing a reduction of an epistemic category to 
a natural category, one thereby finds that the epistemic category in 
question does not, in fact, possess the deontic characteristics it is usually 
thought to possess.  The most popular, and promising, naturalistic 
reductions of epistemic categories are the various reliabilist epistemic 
theories.8  Though the details are many and varied, the heart of the view 
8 Kornblith, who offers a reliabilist account of knowledge, denies that his view is 
reductionistic: “Epistemic terminology, and, indeed, philosophical terminology in general, 
must be grounded in the world if it is to be naturalistically legitimate.  This does not 
require that such terminology appear in our physical theories, for naturalists need not 
accept any sort of reductionism. … Naturalism would only threaten to eliminate epistemic 
terminology as illegitimate if there were no prospect of discovering theoretically unified 
epistemic phenomena.”  (Hilary Kornblith Knowledge and Its Place in Nature (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), 25.)  The kind of “reductionism” that Kornblith has in 
mind is a particularly strong variety, one according to which all legitimate explanation is 
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is that epistemic properties – like being justified in believing – are 
identical to natural properties concerning the reliability (under some set 
of conditions or other) of one’s belief-forming processes.  Such views are 
naturalistic precisely because reliability, understood as a high ratio of 
true to false beliefs, is no more problematic than belief and truth, both 
of which naturalistic philosophers have made peace with.  These 
notions, which have a place in a broadly scientific understanding of the 
world, contrast with that of justification, understood as conformity to 
one’s duty, which does not.  So if it has been (or will be) found that, say, 
being justified in believing, is the same property as being the product of 
a reliable belief-forming process (under some set of conditions), it has 
been, or will be, found that epistemic normativity is radically different 
than was previously thought.   
The difference is even more apparent in the case of unjustified 
beliefs.  Assume that a belief is unjustified just in case it is not justified,9 
in that case, unjustified beliefs are those that are formed through belief-
forming processes that are either not reliable, or not used in the right 
conditions.  If to be unjustified is to be the product of an unreliable 
process (or a reliable process used in the wrong circumstances), then the 
imperatival aspect that we find in epistemic evaluations is misplaced. 
For from the fact that a belief is unlikely to be true, it does not follow 
that it one is prohibited from holding it, though from the fact that 
holding the belief requires that one violate one’s duty it does follow that 
holding that belief is prohibited.  Naturalistic epistemology is a 
revisionary project. 
This is important because vindicating Ontological Naturalism 
requires an argument, one which makes it rationally mandatory to hold 
that the only things that exist are those things that play a role in our best 
current sciences, or close successors to those sciences.  But the natural 
world contains no facts about what is mandatory.  And so it is precisely 
this aspect of epistemic facts – that they do, or can, concern what is 
rationally mandatory – that is not preserved in a naturalistic reduction. 
not merely scientific explanation, but explanation at the level of physics.  Kornblith is right 
that naturalists need not accept this extreme view.  But they must be reductionists in some 
sense, at least in that they must see (as, indeed, Kornblith does see) epistemic categories as 
identical to the categories, or at least constructions thereof, recognized by the sciences.   
9 That is, assume that there are no beliefs that are neither justified nor unjustified. 
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That it is not preserved is what allows us to say that a reduction of the 
epistemic to the natural really is a reduction of the epistemic to the 
natural: if the reduction is successful, those aspects of epistemic facts 
that do not fit nicely into a naturalistic understanding of the world will 
be discarded.   
But this fact is also the reason that Ontological Naturalism cannot 
be vindicated.  If an argument in favor of Ontological Naturalism were 
successful, it would effect a reduction of the epistemic to the natural. 
But if that reduction was to go through, it would show that epistemic 
facts cannot be facts about what is rationally mandatory, as natural facts 
have no imperatival aspect.  They must merely be facts about, for 
example, which beliefs were produced by reliable belief-forming 
processes.  But if the conclusion of the reductive argument is, in part, 
that epistemic facts are merely facts about, say, the reliability of belief-
forming processes, then the premises of the argument cannot make its 
conclusion rationally mandatory.  And so, by its own lights, we are free 
to accept the premises of the argument for Ontological Naturalism, 
without accepting its conclusion.   
It is worth emphasizing that the naturalist program requires more 
than showing that there is a sound argument with Ontological 
Naturalism as its conclusion.  The mere fact that an argument is sound 
does not, in general, make its conclusion rationally mandatory.  Indeed, 
a sound argument need not make its conclusion rationally mandatory, 
even if one knows that it is sound.  Consider: it is necessarily true that 
the set of real numbers is uncountable.  Since it is necessarily true, any 
argument for the proposition that the set of real numbers is uncountable 
is valid and, if its premises are true, sound.  But few such arguments 
make the conclusion rationally mandatory.  Indeed, imagine that I 
assure you that the set of real numbers is uncountable.  You then know 
that the argument “grass is green, so the set of real numbers is 
uncountable” is sound.  Nevertheless, it is not the argument that gives 
you conclusive reason to believe that the set of real numbers is 
uncountable; your reasons, rather, comes from my testimony.  
Demonstrating that Ontological Naturalism is true requires a sound 
argument, which reduces the epistemic to the natural, but which also 
makes believing the conclusion rationally non-optional, given that one 
believes the premises.  And this is what the naturalist cannot have, as 
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admitting that there are natural properties that can make holding some 
belief mandatory, or such that holding that belief is the only way to act in 
conformity with one’s duty, would make a mockery of the idea that the 
epistemic had been reduced to the natural. 
This fact is obscured in the writings of those working in naturalized 
epistemology, because the problem would arise only in the attempt to 
reduce all epistemic categories to natural categories.  Those who actually 
attempt a reduction do so one fact or property at a time, and so they are 
free to make use of unreduced epistemic facts or properties in their 
reductions.  Consider Kornblith’s reduction of knowledge to reliably 
produced true belief.  He begins by using pre-theoretic intuitions to 
roughly specify a property of interest, and then looks to see if empirical 
inquiry finds anything that can be recognized as relevantly related to the 
property that was identified pre-theoretically.  As empirical inquiry 
proceeds, its needs take priority over the dictates of pre-theoretic 
intuition.  Kornblith argues that empirical inquiry does, indeed, identify 
something recognizable as relevantly related to the property pre-
theoretically identified as knowledge.  In particular, cognitive ethology 
utilizes something recognizable as knowledge ascriptions in the 
explanation of animal behavior.  Moreover, the knowledge that cognitive 
ethologists attribute to the animals that they study can be recognized as 
a natural kind through the role that it plays in fixing traits through 
natural selection.  Since it is a natural kind, it can be investigated 
inductively.  Ordinary empirical inquiry then proceeds, and in the course 
of this inquiry one discovers that the property cognitive ethologists need 
for their evolutionary explanations of trait fixation is merely that of a 
reliably produced true belief.  Hence, Kornblith concludes, knowledge is 
reliably produced true belief.10   
Kornblith may well be right about this, and his argument itself may 
also be successful.  But the reason that he does not encounter the 
problem that I have identified is that he attempts to reduce only one 
epistemic category, and so he is free to make use of others.  The problem 
arises only with the attempt to reduce all epistemic categories, or the 
epistemic as such, to the natural.  Those working in naturalistic 
10 This is the central argument of Kornblith’s Knowledge and It’s Place in Nature.  His 
methodology is developed and described on pages 11-63. 
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epistemology, like Kornblith, achieve the success that they do precisely 
because they attempt only one reduction at a time.  But naturalism is 
compelling because it promises a unified picture of the world, and in so 
far as naturalistic epistemology is important, it is so because it 
contributes to this unified picture.   
What I have argued is that this picture cannot be completed.  It 
cannot be completed all at once, nor can it be completed by conjoining 
local naturalistic projects, like those pursued by Kornblith, or Alvin 
Goldman.  Again, a successful argument is not merely a sound one; it 
must be such that, if one accepts its premises, then one is required to 
accept its conclusion.  So if Kornblith’s argument is successful, it must 
be that if the premises are accepted, one is (epistemically) required to 
accept the conclusion.  Otherwise, his audience could, without blame, 
accept the premises and reject the conclusion.  But any reduction of the 
epistemic to the natural must relieve the epistemic of its, as it were, 
imperatival aspect.  So Kornblith’s reduction of knowledge to reliably 
produced true belief, presupposes that there is some unreduced 
epistemic property or other.  And any argument that attempted to reduce 
that property would, if it was successful, presuppose that there is some 
other unreduced epistemic property.  And so on.  The problem is not 
with trying to naturalize epistemic facts or properties, it is with trying to 
naturalize all of them, either all at once, or in succession. 
I should be clear about what this argument attempts to prove. 
Nothing that I have said indicates that there are any non-natural 
epistemic facts or properties.  I have also, in the interest of not begging 
any questions, not claimed that one cannot know that Ontological 
Naturalism is true.  If knowledge really is reliably produced true belief, 
and if one’s belief that Ontological Naturalism is true is both true and 
reliably produced, then one knows that it is true.11  I have argued, 
however, that there could not be a successful argument for Ontological 
Naturalism.  A reduction of the epistemic to the natural would be an 
argument that purports to show that, if its premises are accepted, one is 
rationally required to accept that the facts and properties described in 
epistemic terms are identical to natural facts and properties.  But if this 
is a reduction of the epistemic, to the natural, then it would show that 
11 I would like to thank Matthew McCauley for reminding me of this point. 
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epistemic facts and properties do not possess an, as it were, imperatival 
aspect.  But if they do not, then the premises of the reductive argument 
do not rationally mandate that one accept the conclusion of the 
argument. 
3. Explanation
Perhaps the argument to this point need not be a cause for much 
concern.  Reducing the epistemic to the natural requires supposing that 
there is an irreducible epistemic property, but if that property plays no 
role in explaining any facts or events, then the naturalist’s 
methodological commitment remains untouched.  And that philosophy 
ought to be a branch of the sciences is, perhaps, naturalism’s most 
fundamental commitment.  So in closing, I would like to briefly discuss 
why the inability to complete the ontological component of the 
naturalist’s project should undermine our confidence in its 
methodological component. 
The heart of the case against Methodological Naturalism is that 
explanatory contexts are referentially opaque.  Referentially opaque 
contexts are those in which substitution of co-referring expressions can 
change the truth value of the sentences in which the substitution occurs. 
The paradigmatic example of a referentially opaque context is the object 
position of a propositional attitude ascription, but explanatory contexts 
function in the same way. Putnam found a characteristically vivid way to 
illustrate this point: 
Suppose a professor is found stark-naked in a girl’s dormitory room at 
midnight.  His being naked in the room at midnight - ε, where ε is so small that 
he could neither get out of the room or put his cloths on between midnight - ε 
and midnight without traveling faster than the speed of light, would be a ‘total 
cause’ of his being naked in the girl’s room at midnight; but no one would refer 
to this as the ‘cause’ of his presence in the room in that state. … In its ordinary 
sense ‘cause’ can often be paraphrased by a locution involving explain … The 
forest fire is explained (given background knowledge) by the campfire’s not 
having been extinguished; but the professor’s state at midnight - ε is not what 
we consider an explanation of the state of affairs at midnight.12   
12 Hilary Putnam, “Why There Isn’t a Ready-Made World,” in Realism and Reason: 
Philosophical Papers Volume 3, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 213. 
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Now, there are many ways to describe the situation that Putnam 
imagines.  A description of it, given purely in the language of physics, 
may well call for an explanation in terms of what could or could not 
happen in an interval of length ε.  But a description of the situation 
given in terms of the professor and his clothes does not.  Under such a 
description, a good explanation of the situation must make reference to, 
say, the professor’s romantic involvement with a student.   
The point generalizes.  Describing a fact or event in one way rather 
than another makes some features of the fact or event contextually 
salient, and these contextually salient properties determine what kind of 
explanation is called for.  A purely physical explanation of the professor’s 
presence in the dorm room will, if the situation is described in those 
terms, be no good, because from a physical perspective, that the atoms 
under discussion comprise a professor and a dorm room is sheer 
accident.  An explanation in terms of the professor’s relationship with 
the student, however, is a good one, because it is essential to the 
explanation that the objects under discussion have their contextually 
salient properties. 
This is important, because it means that even if there is a scientific 
explanation for every fact and event, nevertheless, there is room for non-
scientific explanations of the very same facts and events, though under 
other descriptions. Above we saw that Ontological Naturalism cannot be 
validated, because arguing for it presupposes that there is some non-
natural property, something like being rationally mandatory.  I would 
now like to suggest that this property has a role to play in some 
explanations, of some phenomena, under some descriptions.   
Stroud has long argued that epistemic externalism (like Kornblith’s 
reliability theory) does not answer to our philosophical needs because it 
does not provide the kind of self-understanding that we seek.13  The 
opacity of explanatory contexts allows us to explain Stroud’s 
dissatisfaction.  Assume that perception is reliable, and that the fact that 
human knowledge, in general, is possible, is identical to the fact that a 
creature with a certain set of cognitive faculties manages to accurately 
13 See Barry Stroud, “Understanding Human Knowledge in General,” in Understanding 
Human Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 119-120, as well as Barry 
Stroud, “Scepticism, ‘Externalism’ and the Goal of Epistemology,” in Understanding 
Human Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 147-152. 
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represent its environment.  Then it may be that the fact that perception 
is reliable explains how a creature with a certain set of cognitive faculties 
manages to represent its environment, without the fact that perception 
is reliable explaining how human knowledge, in general, is possible.  I 
would like to suggest that Stroud is dissatisfied with externalist 
explanations, even if they are correct explanations of the phenomena in 
question, because they are not correct explanations of the phenomena 
under the description offered.   
Plausibly, the only correct explanation of the phenomena, under the 
description of interest to the epistemologist, is one given in terms of the 
irreducible property of being rationally mandatory.14  It would concern 
the evidence that one has available, and what one is required to believe, 
given this evidence.  Humans, unlike most or all other animals, can 
recognize that their ordinary beliefs are massively underdetermined by 
the evidence that they have for them, and can, like Descartes at the 
beginning of the second meditation, ask what they ought to do about 
that fact.  The under-determination problem is a problem for humans 
because we are responsive to epistemic reasons in a way that, say, 
spiders, are not.  Asking for an explanation of how human knowledge is 
possible, and asking for it in those terms, makes human responsiveness 
to reasons contextually salient. 
An explanation of how human knowledge is possible, which was 
given in terms of the reliability of human cognitive faculties, would not 
make essential appeal to the contextually salient property of being 
responsive to reasons, and would, for that reason, be unsatisfactory.  But 
an explanation of how human knowledge is possible, given in terms of 
what it is rationally mandatory to believe, does make essential appeal to 
the fact that humans are responsive to reasons.  It would tell us that 
there are, in fact, propositions that we are rationally required to believe, 
given the evidence that we have.  That an explanation given in terms of 
the reliability of our cognitive faculties would not make essential appeal 
to the relevant contextually salient properties is, I believe, the deep 
reason that Stroud finds externalist accounts of human knowledge 
unsatisfying.   
14 Although Stroud denies that there is any correct explanation.  See Stroud, 
“Understanding Human Knowledge,” 120-121. 
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And if the correct explanation of how human knowledge is possible, 
when described in those terms, makes essential use of the property of 
being rationally mandatory, then the difficulties that we encountered 
trying to vindicate the ontological half of the naturalist program will turn 
out to be significant indeed.  For we will have found that there is a 
property, which cannot be naturalized, but which does essential 
explanatory work.  And that finding would undermine the claims to 
coherence and comprehensiveness that make naturalism’s 
metaphysical/epistemic picture of the world so attractive. 
4. Summary
Popular belief, perhaps, to the contrary, ours is not an anti-metaphysical 
age.  But the most popular metaphysical view is a modest one; it is one 
that takes its lead from the results of scientific investigation.  In fact, this 
metaphysical view comprises one half of an influential line of thought 
which also includes a conception of the nature of inquiry in general, and 
the relation of philosophy to science in particular.  I have not argued that 
this metaphysical view is mistaken, but I have argued that it cannot be 
vindicated.  Any argument for it presupposes that it is false.  I went on to 
suggest that this may be a source of some concern for the broader 
naturalism of which it is a part.  The failure of the reductive program, 
together with the opacity of explanatory contexts, leaves open the 
possibility that there are legitimate non-scientific explanations.  And, 
plausibly, how human knowledge is possible, when described in those 
terms, calls for such an explanation.15 
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Quine, Putnam and the Naturalization of Metaphysics 
Sander Verhaegh 
(University of Groningen) 
Naturalists argue that metaphysics ought to be in some sense 
continuous with science. Putnam has claimed that if we push 
naturalism to its limits, we have to conclude with Quine that 
reference is indeterminate. Since Putnam believes Quine’s thesis 
to be extremely counter-intuitive, he regards naturalism to be an 
unsatisfactory approach to metaphysics. In this essay, I will show 
that Quine’s ideas about reference do not necessarily follow from 
his naturalism and that, as a result, Putnam’s reductio argument 
against naturalism breaks down. In addition, I will argue that 
Putnam’s pluralistic alternative to Quine’s views is perfectly 
compatible with a naturalistic perspective as well and that, in 
consequence, even for a naturalist the relation between science 
and metaphysics is less straightforward than it might initially 
seem to be.   
1. Introduction
There is a widespread tendency among present day metaphysicians to 
think of themselves as ‘naturalists’. According to these naturalists, 
metaphysics ought to be in some sense continuous with science; they 
endorse the Quinean dictum that the differences between science and 
metaphysics are “differences only in degree and not in kind”.1 Like 
W.V. Quine, they stress that we are bound to answer our 
metaphysical questions within our scientific system of beliefs. We 
should treat metaphysical questions as scientific questions, accepting 
“that it is within science itself, and not in some prior philosophy, that 
reality is to be identified and described”.2 
Prima facie, a thoroughly naturalized metaphysics inevitably 
seems to lead to an extremely austere physicalistic picture of reality. 
Indeed, Quine is well known for his taste for “desert landscapes of 
1 Quine, “On Carnap’s Views on Ontology,” 1951, reprinted in Ways of Paradox, rev. ed. 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), 211. 
2Quine, “Things and their Place in Theories,” in Theories and Things (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1981), 21. 
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largely featureless matter” moving to and fro according to the laws of 
physics.3 Quine rejects intentional notions as scientifically 
unacceptable and has developed a naturalistic theory of intentionality 
in its stead. One of the most radical consequences of this theory is his 
thesis about ontological relativity, which implies that there is no fact 
of the matter as to what our terms refer to. According to Quine, 
reference is simply indeterminate by microphysical standards. 
Reflecting on Quine’s philosophy, Hilary Putnam has playfully 
remarked that there are two kinds of philosophical genius. On the one 
hand, there is the genius who proposes “a highly believable […], 
coherent, and profound account of reality”.4 On the other hand, 
philosophical genius can also consist in presenting a system of ideas 
which is plainly absurd, yet which exhibits fundamental problems for 
received philosophical views. In the latter case, the importance of the 
genius in question rests in the deep philosophical puzzles he or she 
presents for the generations to come. Putnam lists Aristotle and Kant 
as examples of the first type of genius, while he regards Berkeley as 
one of the best known examples of the second type; after the work of 
the latter, philosophers “have been forced” to reconsider their views 
about both matter and perception. According to Putnam, Quine is a 
genius of the second type: “just as Berkeley in a sense showed the 
limits of classical empiricism by pushing it to its logical conclusions, 
so Quine has shown the limits of naturalism”.5 For Putnam, Quine’s 
ontological relativity is so counter-intuitive that it counts as a strong 
argument against the naturalism that underlies it: “any doctrine that 
leads to the conclusion that there is no fact of the matter as to what 
our terms refer to must be wrong”.6 
In this essay, I will argue that Putnam is mistaken when he 
rejects naturalism on the basis of this reductio ad absurdum. I will 
show that, although Quine’s theory of intentionality is naturalistic in 
spirit, it does not follow from his naturalism as such. In addition, I 
will show that Putnam’s alternative to Quine’s theory is compatible 
3B. Stroud, “Review Essay: Pursuit of Truth,” review of Pursuit of Truth by Quine, 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 52:4 (1992): 981. 
4Putnam, “Quine,” Common Knowledge, 8:2 (2002): 274. 
5 Ibid., 279. 
6Putnam, “Reply to Burton Dreben,” Philosophical Topics, 20:1 (1992): 396. 
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with a naturalistic approach as well. In doing this, I hope to draw a 
more realistic picture of what it means to naturalize metaphysics and 
show that, even for a naturalist, the relation between science and 
metaphysics is not as straightforward as is often suggested. 
2. The Problem of Intentionality
Intentionality is the property of being directed towards some object, 
whether concrete or abstract, whether existent or not. Our beliefs, our 
sentences, and our desires, for example, are intentional in that they 
are always about something. According to Franz Brentano, who 
reinvented the medieval notion at the end of the 19th century, 
intentionality is a characteristic property of mental phenomena: “[n]o 
physical phenomenon exhibits anything similar”.7 The problem of 
intentionality, which has had an enormous impact on 20th century 
philosophy, is therefore the question of how to reconcile the 
intentional character of the mental with the physicalistic worldview 
propagated by the natural sciences. 
Probably the most common response to the problem of 
intentionality is to try to reduce our intentional talk to something non-
intentional.8 Both Quine and Putnam dismiss this option. According 
to Quine, “there is no breaking out of the intentional vocabulary by 
explaining its members in other terms”.9 Similarly, Putnam argues 
that reducing intentionality is impossible because there is “no 
scientifically describable property that all cases of any particular 
intentional phenomenon have in common”.10 Yet, although Quine 
and Putnam agree on the irreducibility of intentional notions, the 
conclusions that they have drawn from this are diametrically opposed. 
Quine’s solution to the problem of intentionality is to dismiss 
7Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, 1874, translated under the 
editorship of T. Honderich (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973), 97. 
8Some influential examples are F. Dretske, Knowledge and the Flow of Information 
(Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press, 1981); R. Millikan, Language, Thought, and Other 
Biological Objects (Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press, 1984); and J. Fodor, Psychosemantics 
(Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press, 1987). 
9Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press, 1961), 220. 
10Putnam,  Representation and Reality (Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press, 1988), 2. 
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intentionality altogether, whereas Putnam’s solution is to take 
intentional talk at face value. In what follows, I will discuss their 
respective views in turn and argue that naturalism is not the ultimate 
source of their differences.  
3. A Naturalistic Theory of Intentionality
For Quine, the problem of intentionality is a semantic problem; it is 
the question of how our sentences can be meaningful, the question of 
how our utterances can be about something. As a naturalist, Quine 
proposes approaching such semantic matters “in the empirical spirit 
of natural science”.11 According to Quine, the natural sciences teach 
us that, in learning our languages, all we have to guide us are the 
triggerings of our sensory receptors, i.e. the light rays that strike our 
retinas and the molecules that bombard our eardrums and 
fingertips.12 In developing his naturalistic theory of intentionality, 
Quine seeks to examine the relation between these sensory 
stimulations and our linguistic utterances. 
The major problem with taking sensory stimulations as the basis 
of a theory of intentionality, however, is that they differ from person 
to person, whereas our linguistic utterances are intersubjectively 
understood. Quine solves this problem by proposing that children 
learn basic observation sentences by being conditioned to associate 
them with the correct set of sensory stimulations, i.e. by being 
conditioned to use them only on occasions in which this is 
appropriate according to the other speakers of the language. A child’s 
mastery of the term ‘red’, for example, can be equated with the 
“acquisition of the habit of assenting when the term is queried in the 
presence of red, and only in the presence of red”.13 
11Quine, “Philosophical Progress in Language and Language Theory," Metaphilosophy 
1 (1970): 2. 
12See Quine, “The Scope and Language of Science,” 1954, reprinted in Ways of 
Paradox, 228. 
13Quine, “The Nature of Natural Knowledge,” 1975, reprinted in Confessions of a 
Confirmed Extensionalist and Other Essays, ed. D. Føllesdal and D. Quine (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), 263. 
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Now, for our present purposes, it is important to note that if we 
equate grasping the meaning of a sentence with being able to use the 
sentence correctly, and Quine does so,14 it follows that “[t]here is 
nothing in linguistic meaning beyond what is to be gleaned from 
overt behavior in observable circumstances”.15 In other words, in 
Quine’s naturalistic theory of intentionality, there is nothing to 
meaning outside the behavioral facts. The consequence of this 
position is that Quine rejects the intentional character of meaning 
altogether:  
One may accept the Brentano thesis either as showing the indispensability of 
intentional idioms and the importance of an autonomous science of 
intention, or as showing the baselessness of intentional idioms and the 
emptiness of a science of intention. My attitude, unlike Brentano’s, is the 
second.16 
In Quine’s theory, the ‘aboutness’ of sentences and utterances is 
replaced by a picture in which the meaning of an observation 
sentence is nothing more than the correlation between certain 
behavioral facts and certain patterns of sensory stimulation. My 
utterance of the one-term observation sentence ‘Rabbit’, for example, 
is not really ‘about’ a certain type of object, it is merely an instance of 
my disposition to utter a certain string of sounds in situations that are 
similar with respect to the stimulation of my sensory receptors. 
4. Ontological Relativity
Quine’s naturalistic theory of intentionality has radical 
consequences for our everyday ideas about reference. One of the 
consequences that has received much attention in the philosophical 
literature is Quine’s idea that reference is indeterminate. To illustrate 
this idea, Quine makes use of a thought experiment about a group of 
linguists who, independently from each other, try to translate the 
language of some completely unknown tribe into English. According 
to Quine, it is possible that the linguists come up with partially 
14See Quine, “Use and Its Place in Meaning,” in Theories and Things. 
15 Quine, Pursuit of Truth (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), 38. 
16Quine, Word and Object, 221. 
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different conclusions. One could imagine, for example, that one of the 
linguists concludes that the word ‘gavagai’, a word that members of 
the tribe utter whenever a rabbit is present, refers to rabbits, whereas 
another linguist concludes that ‘gavagai’ refers to brief 
temporal segments of rabbit. Both conclusions would arguably be 
compatible with all publicly observable behavior of members of the 
tribe. Now, since Quine’s naturalistic theory of intentionality implies 
that publicly observable behavior is all there is to 
meaning, the conclusion has to be that there is no fact of the matter 
as to which translation is correct: 
It is meaningless to ask whether, in general, our terms ‘rabbit’, ‘rabbit part’, 
‘number’, etc. really refer respectively to rabbits, rabbit parts, numbers, etc., 
rather than to some ingeniously permuted denotations. It is meaningless to 
ask this absolutely; we can meaningfully ask it only relative to some 
background language. When we ask, “Does ‘rabbit’ really refer to rabbits?” 
someone can counter with the question: “Refer to rabbits in which sense of 
‘rabbits’?”, thus launching a regress; and we need the background language 
to regress into. The background language gives the query sense, if only 
relative sense.17 
It is important to realize that Quine’s thesis about ontological 
relativity is not epistemological but ontological in character.18 That is, 
the point of Quine’s thesis is not that it is impossible to 
determine whether members of the tribe ‘actually’ refer to rabbits 
instead of to brief temporal segments of rabbits. Rather, the point is 
that there is no fact of the matter here, there is nothing to discover 
17Quine, “Ontological Relativity,” in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969), 48-49. In his later work, Quine often 
illustrates ontological relativity using proxy functions. According to Quine, “[a]ny two 
ontologies are equally supported by all possible data if we can express a one-to-one 
correlation, what I call a proxy function, between them”. See Quine, “The Growth of 
Mind and Language,” in Confessions of a Confirmed Extensionalist, 189. An example 
of such a proxy function is the function which maps all objects of a theory onto their 
spatio-temporal complements and which reinterprets all predicates accordingly. 
Because both the objects and the predicates of the theory are reinterpreted, a sentence 
like “the rabbit is sitting on the grass” is guaranteed to have the same truth-value as 
“the complement-rabbit is complement-sitting on the complement-grass”. 
18See M. Friedman, “Physicalism and the Indeterminacy of Translation,” Nous 9:4; and 
R. Gibson, “Translation, Physics, and Facts of the Matter,” in: The Philosophy of W.V. 
Quine, ed. L. Hahn and P. Schilpp (La Salle: Open Court, 1986). 
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because there is nothing to reference beyond the behavioral facts.19 
What seems quite certain is that ‘gavagai’ probably does not refer to 
dogs, for it seems very difficult to come up with such a translation 
that does justice to the behavioral facts.20 What is clear, however, is 
that all publicly observable behavior, which is all there is to meaning, 
according to Quine, is not enough to the make reference completely 
determinate.  
5. Putnam’s Reductio 
Putnam believes that Quine is right in claiming that a 
naturalistic approach to intentionality leads to the conclusion that 
reference is indeterminate. In fact, Putnam has constructed a model-
theoretic argument that leads to more or less the same conclusion.21 
Still, Putnam and Quine draw diametrically opposed 
conclusions. Where Quine accepts ontological relativity 
as a consequence of his naturalistic theory of intentionality, Putnam 
holds that “any doctrine that leads to the conclusion that there 
is no fact of the matter as to what our terms refer to must be 
wrong”.22 And since Putnam believes that there is "not […] any 
hope” that one can coherently accept naturalism “without being 
driven to […] ontological relativity”,23 he regards naturalism to 
19See Quine, Word and Object, 73. 
20Igor Douven shows that there are indeed limits to ontological relativity. According to 
Douven, one cannot reinterpret a theory’s ontology as drastically as one pleases without 
violating the behavioral facts. Whereas the truth-conditions of a sentence are preserved 
in reinterpreting one’s ontology in terms of another, the action conditions of a sentence 
and the plausibility ordering among sentences might also influence the behavior of a 
subject, and therefore might constrain the choice of the ontology for a theory. See 
Douven, “Empiricist Semantics and Indeterminism of Reference,” in Quine: 
Naturalized Epistemology, Perceptual Knowledge and Ontology, ed. L. Decock and L. 
Horsten (Amsterdam: Atlanta, 2000). 
21See Putnam, Reason, Truth, and History (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University 
Press, 1981), Ch. 2; and Putnam, “Model Theory and the “Factuality” of Semantics,” 
1989, reprinted in Words and Life, ed. J. Conant (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1994). 
22Putnam, “Reply to Burton Dreben,”  396. 
23Putnam, “Quine,”  279. 
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be an absurd position: “another philosopher’s modus ponens is my 
modus tollens”.24 
In the later stages of his career, Putnam has come to defend an 
alternative to Quine’s views, which he himself has called (conceptual) 
pluralism. This pluralism can be characterized as  
the insistence that the various sorts of statements that are regarded as less 
than fully rational discourse, as somehow of merely ‘heuristic’ significance, 
by one or another of the ‘naturalists’ […] are bona fide statements, “as fully 
governed by norms of truth and validity as any other statements”.25 
Conceptual pluralism, in other words, is the claim that there is not 
one vocabulary (e.g. the vocabulary of physics) that has an 
ontologically or epistemologically exclusive status. According to 
Putnam, the problem with Quine’s views is that they are still guided 
by outdated notions of ‘objectivity’, ‘existence’, and ‘factuality’; 
notions that also cause Quine to give up on intentionality. 
6. Regimentation
Before I turn to Putnam’s pluralism, however, let me briefly discuss 
these so-called outdated notions of ‘objectivity’, ‘existence’, and 
‘factuality’. In Quine’s naturalized metaphysics, ontology is the study 
of which entities we are committed to on the basis of our best 
scientific theories. The naturalized metaphysician tries to determine 
the minimal set of entities we need to posit to do justice to our 
scientific beliefs. The problem with this project, however, as Putnam 
notes, is that “science does not wear its philosophical significance on 
its sleeve”.26  Whether or not science commits us to elementary 
particles, tables, numbers, and/or psychological states such as beliefs, 
for example, is not something that can be precisely determined by 
reading numerous scientific papers. The naturalized philosopher 
24Putnam, “Meaning Holism,”  in The Philosophy of W.V. Quine, 425. 
25Putnam, “The Content and Appeal of “Naturalism”,” in Naturalism in Question, ed. 
M. de Caro and D. Macarthur (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), 61. The sub-
sentence between quotation marks is a reference to Conant, “Wittgenstein’s Philosophy 
of Mathematics,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97:2 (1997): 202. 
26Putnam, “Quine,” 273. 
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therefore needs a criterion that determines which minimal set of 
entities is to be posited to reflect our scientific knowledge in the best 
possible way.  
For Quine, the solution to this problem is to reformulate our 
scientific theories into the language of classical first-order logic with 
identity, a process that he calls regimentation. The advantage of 
regimenting scientific theories in this way is that in first-order logic 
both ontological commitments and inferential relations are precisely 
defined. According to Quine, “entities of a given sort are assumed by 
a [regimented] theory if and only if some of them must be counted 
among the values of the variables in order that the statements 
affirmed in the theory be true”.27 This is Quine’s criterion of 
ontological commitment, and it is often summarized in the slogan “to 
be is to be a value of a bound variable”. 
Quine’s naturalized ontology, therefore, implies that only entities 
that are the values of the bound variables in a regimented version of 
our scientific theories are to be classified as real. And according to 
Quine, we only need to posit two types of entities in this way, viz. 
physical objects and mathematical sets.28 All other entities, whatever 
their usefulness “in the market place or in the laboratory”,29 are 
dispensable for theoretical purposes; Quine cannot accord them the 
same ontological status as the entities included in his regimented 
theory of the world. This is why Quine often speaks about these other 
entities as “half-entities in a second-grade system”30 or as “Grade B 
idiom”.31 Now, consider the following three statements: 
(1)  Adam refers to the rabbit in front of him whenever he uses the 
term ‘gavagai’.   
(2)  Adam refers to the temporal segments of rabbit in front of him 
whenever he uses the term ‘gavagai’. 
27Quine, “Logic and the Reification of Universals,” in From a Logical Point of View, 2nd 
ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), 103. 
28See Quine, “The Scope and Language of Science,” 244. 
29Quine, Word and Object, 228. 
30Quine, “Speaking of Objects,” in Ontological Relativity, 23-5. 
31Quine, “Reply to Davidson,”  in Words and Objections, ed. D. Davidson and J. 
Hintikka (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1969), 335. 
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(3)  Adam has the disposition to utter or assent to ‘gavagai’ whenever 
there are rabbits in his visual field. 
According to Quine, one can only say of statements like (3) that they 
are ‘true’, ‘factual’ and ‘objective’, because only statements like 
(3)once reformulated in the language of classical first-order 
logicwould be part of his regimented theory of the world. The 
difference between the statements (1) and (2) simply transcends the 
behavioral and hence the physical facts: 
I speak as a physicalist in saying there is no fact of the matter […] behavioral 
criteria that will ordinarily decide in favor of one translation rather than 
another. When they do, there is emphatically a fact of the matter by 
microphysical standards; for clearly any difference in overt behavior, vocal or 
otherwise, reflects extravagant differences in the distribution of elementary 
physical states.32 
The problem with (1) and (2), in other words, is that the difference 
between them does not seem to be reducible to differences in 
elementary physical states. And since his physicalism commits Quine 
to the thesis that “nothing happens in the world, not the flicker of a 
thought, without some redistribution of microphysical states”,33 he 
has to conclude that one cannot apply norms like truth, factuality or 
objectivity to statements like (1) and (2).   
7. Putnam’s Alternative: Pluralism
According to Putnam, on the other hand, none of the statements (1)-
(3) can be deprived of qualifications like ‘factual’, ‘objective’ or ‘true’, 
just because they are stated with one vocabulary or another. 
According to Putnam, “ontological approaches to ‘demarcation’ are 
bankrupt”; it is absurd to suppose that we should dismiss so many of 
32 Quine, “Facts of the matter,”  in Confessions of a Confirmed Extensionalist, 284, my 
italics. 
33Quine, “Goodman’s Ways of  Worldmaking,” Theories and Things, 98. 
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our beliefs about what sort of statements can be true on the basis of 
some misguided ontological criteria.34 
Still, Putnam agrees with Quine that there can be no change 
without physical change. According to Putnam, however, this does 
not imply that all facts are physical facts.35 Ironically, Putnam’s 
justification of this position depends on one of Quine’s theses, viz. 
the idea that there is no strict distinction between the factual and the 
conventional aspects of a statement.   
In his “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, Quine rejects the idea that 
we can test our scientific statements about the world individually. 
Rather, “our statements about the external world face the tribunal of 
sense experience […] only as a corporate body”.36 The implication of 
this view is that one cannot logically determine which statement in 
this corporate body is falsified whenever an observation conflicts with 
our predictions. Quine famously concluded from this that “[a]ny 
statement can be held true come what may, if we make drastic 
enough adjustments elsewhere in the system” and that “no statement 
is immune to revision”.37 The implication here is that statements that 
are thought to be completely factual might also be ‘held true come 
what may’ and that statements that are thought to be completely 
conventional might also be revised in the light of adverse experience. 
Putnam, who has always agreed with Quine on this point,38 has 
made important contributions towards providing historical evidence 
for Quine’s thesis by pointing at some historical cases in which 
conventionally introduced definitions were, in fact, revised in the light 
34See Putnam, “The Idea of Science,” in Words and Life, 489; and Putnam, The 
Threefold Cord: Mind, Body, and World (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 
7. 
35Putnam, “Meaning Holism,” 424-5. 
36Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” 1951, reprinted in From a Logical Point of 
View, 41. 
37Ibid., 43. 
38“[W]hile there is an aspect of conventionality and an aspect of fact in everything we 
say that is true, we fall into hopeless philosophical error if we commit a “fallacy of 
division” and conclude that there must be a part of the truth that is the “conventional 
part” and a part that is the “factual part”.” See Putnam, preface to Realism with a 
Human Face, ed. J. Conant (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), x.  
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of conflicting empirical evidence.39 Now, according to Putnam, 
granting that statement (3) might be true, objective and factual, while 
denying that statements like (1) and (2) can be classified in the same 
way is imposing a rigid distinction, whereas in fact such a distinction 
cannot be made. Every statement has a conventional component and 
every statement has a factual component, even if the factual 
component in a statement (3) might be larger. 
Putnam illustrates this graduality by arguing that most people 
would probably agree on the following ranking of properties from 
being more subjective to being more objective:40 
(a) Being very amusing. 
(b) Being a match that would have lit if it had been struck. 
(c)  Being an utterance that means ‘Do you speak French?’ in 
English. 
(d) Being soluble. 
(e) Being a region of space which contains at least one hydrogen 
atom (in classical physics). 
For Putnam the problem with Quine’s ontological views is that they 
impose a strict dichotomy between statements that can be true, 
objective, and factual and statements that cannot: 
Quine […] would put the cut between [(c) and (d)]counting both 
dispositional predicates (such as ‘soluble’) and non-dispositional predicates 
from fundamental physics as ‘objective’ and all the others as more or less 
subjective […] my own view […] is that the enterprise isn’t worth the candle. 
The game is played out. We can make a rough sort of rank ordering 
(although even here there are disagreements), but the idea of a ‘point at 
39See, for example, Putnam, “The Analytic and the Synthetic,” 1962, reprinted in 
Mind, Language, and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1975); and Putnam, “The Refutation of Conventionalism,” in Mind, 
Language, and Reality. An influential example is Putnam’s description of the history of 
the concept of “momentum” in physics. Putnam shows that although “momentum” 
was conventionally introduced into physics as “mass times velocity,” Einstein 
established that this equation had to be revised: the momentum of a particle only 
approaches mass times velocity at non-relativistic speeds. As a result “the statement 
that momentum is exactly equal to mass times velocity was revised […] the statement 
that was originally a ‘definition’”. See Putnam, Representation and Reality, 9-10.  
40Putnam, The Many Faces of Realism (La Salle: Open Court, 1987), 40. 
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which’ subjectivity ceases and Objectivity-with-a-capital-O begins has proved 
chimerical.41 
Putnam’s objection to Quine can thus be stated as the complaint that 
although Quine has shown that the fact-convention dichotomy cannot 
be maintained, he does not recognize that giving up this distinction 
also has implications for the way in which he can use notions like 
‘existence’, ‘objectivity’, and ‘factuality’. For Putnam “the idea that 
there is an Archimedean point, or a use of ‘exist’ inherent in the 
world itself […] is an illusion”.42 
8. Varieties of Naturalism
Given that Putnam’s main argument for pluralism is based on 
Quine’s rejection of the fact-convention distinction, one may wonder 
why Quine has not drawn the same conclusions as Putnam. It is my 
contention that Quine could have drawn the same conclusions, but 
that he did not because of pragmatic considerations. To show this, we 
will have to dig deeper into Quine’s views on the nature of 
regimentation.  
Earlier, I described regimentation as the process of reformulating 
or rephrasing our scientific theories into the language of classical 
first-order logic. What I did not discuss, however, is what Quine 
means by ‘reformulating’ and ‘rephrasing’. Because Quine rejects 
notions like ‘sameness of meaning’, he cannot identify these terms 
with creating a sentence-by-sentence translation synonymously with 
ordinary language. Rather, for Quine, regimentation is a creative 
enterprise: 
[R]egimentation is not a matter of eliciting some latent but determinate 
ontological content of ordinary language. It is a matter rather of freely 
creating an ontology-oriented language that can supplant ordinary language 
in serving some particular purposes that one has in mind.43 
41Ibid., 28. 
42Ibid., 20. 
43Quine, “Facts of the matter,” 285, my italics. 
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According to Quine, the naturalized metaphysician is free in choosing 
whether to regiment our scientific beliefs in one way or another. The 
explicandum and the explicans must roughly fulfill the same function 
in the overall theoretical structure, but “[b]eyond those conditions of 
partial agreement, dictated by our interests and purposes, any traits of 
the explicans come under the head of ‘don’t-cares’”.44 
Quine’s open-mindedness with regard to regimentation is 
illustrated in the way in which he justifies the choices he makes in the 
regimentation process. With respect to the question whether his 
regimented system should contain a two-valued or a many-valued 
truth-predicate, for example, he argues that although opting for 
bivalence comes “at no small price” due to phenomena like 
vagueness, he still chooses a two-valued logic “for the simplicity of 
theory that it affords”.45 Similarly, in pondering whether to adopt a 
different logic in order to account better for the reasoning involved in 
quantum mechanics, Quine claims that we should not 
“underestimate the price of a deviant logic. There is a serious loss of 
simplicity […] The price is not quite prohibitive, but the returns had 
better be good”.46 
Quine thus seems mostly guided by pragmatic values in 
regimenting our scientific knowledge: “the general principle is that 
we should choose our canonical notation in a way which maximizes 
the simplicity, clarity, and efficacy of our system of knowledge as a 
whole. For Quine this is all that mattersthere are no other 
constraints.”47 The problem with pragmatic values, however, is (1) 
that there is no generally agreed upon list of pragmatic values which 
regimented scientific theories should adhere to,48 and (2) that it is 
completely unclear how we should balance all these different virtues. 
This implies that different naturalists will not only make different 
choices in regimenting our scientific theories of the world, they will 
44Quine, Word and Object, 259. 
45Quine, “What Price Bivalence?” in Theories and Things, 32, my italics.  
46Quine, Philosophy of Logic (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970), 86. 
47Hylton, Quine (New York: Routledge, 2007), 259-60. 
48Quine himself gives different lists of pragmatic virtues in different publications. Cf. 
Quine, “Posits and Reality,” 1955, reprinted in Ways of Paradox, 247; Quine, From 
Stimulus to Science (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 49; and Quine 
and Ullian, The Web of Beliefs, 2nd ed. (New York, Random House, 1978), Ch. 6. 
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also have different desiderata that their regimentations should fulfill; 
how one regiments a certain notion depends on “the particular 
purposes that one has in mind”.49 One naturalist will use one set of 
pragmatic values with a particular system of weighing those values, 
whereas another naturalist can emphasize a relatively different set of 
pragmatic values and a relatively different weighing system. 
9. Pluralistic Naturalism
Quine himself is clearly guided by pragmatic principles like 
simplicity, clarity, and systematicity; hence his choice to limit his 
regimented theory to physics and the necessary mathematical 
structures that come with it. One could imagine a different naturalist, 
however, let us call him a pluralistic naturalist, who would place 
much more emphasis on pragmatic values such as 
comprehensiveness, familiarity, and maintaining the richness of 
ordinary language. Would Quine regard the choices of such a 
pluralistic naturalist as somehow inferior? Probably he would, but the 
point of the above argument is that he would not reject this alternative 
on the basis of naturalistic criteria. Rather, his dismissal would be 
guided by his “taste for desert landscapes”,50 by his pragmatic 
conviction that naturalized metaphysicians ought to construct a 
framework that connects our scientific theories as simply and clearly 
as possible. 
So, to come back to the question with which we started the 
previous section: why does Quine not draw the same conclusions as 
Putnam, given that they both reject the fact-convention dichotomy? 
That is, how can Quine impose a strict distinction between 
statements that are true, objective and factual, and statements that are 
not? In my opinion, the above discussion shows that Quine only 
draws this distinction on pragmatic grounds. Quine does not think 
that he is in the business of describing the world as it is in itself, for, 
as a naturalist, he does not think that the question as to which entities 
really exist makes sense; there is no extra-scientific notion of existence 
49Quine, “Facts of the matter,” 285. 
50Quine, “On What There Is,” 1948, reprinted in From a Logical Point of View, 4. 
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that we can discuss from “a vantage point outside our conceptual 
scheme”,51 just as Putnam claims that “the idea that there is an 
Archimedean point, or a use of ‘exist’ inherent in the world itself […] 
is an illusion”.52 Quine just chooses to adopt a physicalistic notion of 
‘existence’, ‘objectivity’, and ‘factuality’ in his regimented theory 
because this results in a simpler and more systematic theory of the 
world.  
As a result, Putnam’s reductio argument breaks down. 
Naturalism does not imply that we should distinguish between a first 
and a second-grade system of entities, nor does it imply that reference 
is indeterminate. Only, if we regiment our scientific theories in such 
a way as to obtain maximal simplicity and clarity (although Putnam 
would probably disagree that the result is really a simple and clear 
theory of the world), naturalism leads to physicalism and hence to 
Quine’s views on intentionality and ontology. Yet, simplicity, 
systematicity and clarity are not the only possible desiderata in our 
regimentation practices, nor do we have to put so much weight on 
these pragmatic virtues. This means that Putnam’s pluralistic view is 
compatible with a naturalistic approach to philosophy as well. We 
could imagine a pluralistic naturalist who places much more 
emphasis on pragmatic virtues such as comprehensiveness, 
familiarity, and maintaining the richness of ordinary language. 
Is this ‘pluralistic naturalism’ really a variant of naturalism? I 
believe it is. Putnam’s metaphysics also greatly respects scientific 
practice. Putnam only rejects the idea that we can decide “what is and 
what is not ‘science’ […] on the basis of [bankrupt] ontological 
criteria”.53 According to Putnam, there is no such thing as “Science-
with-a-capital-S”, or “The Scientific Method”. Rather, what we 
commonly call science consists of a great variety of different scientific 
practices. “Why”, Putnam asks us, should we “expect the sciences to 
have more than a family resemblance to one another? […] there is no 
set of ‘essential’ properties that all the sciences have in common”.54 
51Quine, Word and Object, 275. 
52Putnam, The Many Faces of Realism, 20. 
53Putnam, “The Idea of Science,” 1990, reprinted in Words and Life, 489. 
54Putnam, “The Diversity of the Sciences,” 1987; reprinted in Words and Life, 471-2. 
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Putnam’s pluralism, then, is perfectly compatible with a 
naturalistic approach to philosophy as long as ‘science’ is also 
interpreted pluralistically. Where Quine’s naturalism can be 
described as monistic, in that he decides to take only the language of 
physics at face value, Putnam’s position can be described as a 
pluralistic naturalism, as the view that for any word L, even if L is the 
intentional vocabulary, it holds that questions with respect to L are not 
answerable to any tribunal outside L and not in need of any 
justification beyond the methods used within L.55 
As a result, it is a mistake to believe that Putnam’s pluralism is 
based on a dismissal of naturalism. For Putnam’s position itself can 
be described as naturalistic as well. In fact, even Putnam’s objection 
to Quine can  be regarded as naturalistic in spirit. For, according to 
Putnam, anyone who denies the pluralistic character of science and 
who argues that all science should be like physics, confuses “respect 
for science with uncritical acceptance of a materialist ideology”.56 A 
worldview that is thoroughly physicalistic, i.e. a view in which 
intentionality is rejected because there is no fact of the matter to 
questions about meaning and reference by physical standards, simply 
leaves too much out of the picture. It does not do credit to the 
richness and plurality of the descriptions and explanations that 
science actually provides. Although Quine claims to have a broad 
conception of science,57 the starting point of his theory of 
intentionality is that we have to “approach semantical matters in the 
empirical spirit of natural science”.58 Why not approach questions 
about intentionality from above, i.e. “from the standpoint of [our] 
55 Intermediate positions between monism and pluralism are also possible. Penelope 
Maddy’s ‘mathematical naturalism’, for example, could be described as dualistic in that 
she only makes a strict distinction between scientific and mathematical vocabulary: 
“where Quine holds that science is ‘not answerable to any supra-scientific tribunal, and 
not in need of any justification beyond observation and the hypothetico-deductive 
method’ […] the mathematical naturalist adds that mathematics is not answerable to 
any extra-mathematical tribunal and not in need of any justification beyond proof and 
the axiomatic method”. See Maddy, Naturalism in Mathematics (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1997), 184. 
56Putnam, Preface to Word and Life, vi. 
57See Quine, From Stimulus to Science, 49. 
58Quine, “Philosophical Progress in Language and Language Theory,” 8, my italics. Cf. 
S. Haack, Evidence and Inquiry (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1993), Ch. 6. 
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intentional notions”?59 After all, interpretation is a key 
methodological tool in many of the ‘softer’ sciences, that is, sciences 
that will not improve in the future by imitating physics.60  Rather than 
claiming that Quine has shown us the limits of naturalism, just as 
Berkeley has shown us the limits of classical empiricism, Putnam 
could have claimed that Quine’s views are not naturalistic enough. 
10. Conclusion
I conclude that, in the end, the differences between Quine and 
Putnam largely depend on their different pictures of science. 
According to Quine, the different sciences should be respected, but 
physics is the ultimate arbiter of truth, factuality and existence. 
Whenever some practices cannot be reduced to physicsas is the 
case with our intentional vocabularywe have to reject them and 
treat them as second-grade. What remains are the behavioral facts. 
This ultimately leads to ontological relativity. For Putnam, such an 
account leaves too much out and does not do justice to the highly 
holistic and normative character of our interpretative practices. His 
solution to the non-reducibility of the intentional is to take our 
intentional talk at face value. Certainly there is no change without 
physical change, but this does not mean that all facts are physical 
facts. As a result, there is not one ‘Science’ that sets the standard for 
the rest. Rather, Putnam argues, science is a plurality of strongly 
interconnected, yet ultimately independent practices that all should be 
judged on the basis of criteria internal to those practices themselves.  
In this essay, I have argued that both pictures are naturalistic in 
spirit and can be defended on pragmatic grounds. An advantage of 
Putnam’s pluralism is that it does justice to the richness and diversity 
of the sciences. Quine’s variant of naturalism, on the other hand, does 
more justice to the drive for unity, precision and simplicity that is also 
characteristic of the scientific enterprise. I will leave it to the reader to 
decide which of the two pictures is more plausible or does better 
59Putnam, “Realism without Absolutes,” 1993, reprinted in Words and Life, 290. 
60Putnam, “The Idea of Science,” 490. 
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justice to our scientific practices.61 As the choice between the two 
pictures is largely pragmatic, one’s choice will probably not only 
depend on one’s view of what science actually is but also on one’s 
ideas about what science ought to be.62 
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This collection of essays originated in the Summer School 
‘Metaphysics or Modernity?’, which was held at the Uni-
versity of Bamberg in August 2012. Designed as a forum 
for graduate students in philosophy, the Summer School 
brought together a highly diverse group of young academics 
who – more often than not – came from utterly different 
schools and traditions of thought. 
This pluralism is reflected in the pages of this book. While 
the volume is roughly divided into two halves – one with a 
more historical focus, the other with a more systematic fo-
cus – the reader will find an unusually wide array of topics 
and questions treated here. Since the aforementioned plura-
lism was one of the main strengths of our Summer School, 
this is something in which we take much pride.
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